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ABSTRACT
This dissertation examines South Asian racialization in the United States after the 9/11
attacks. Using a comparative racialization framework, it proposes South Asian
racialization as entangled with neo-orientalism, anti-Blackness, and settler colonialism—
which Andrea Smith (2006, 2012) has called the three pillars of white supremacy—and
undergirded by heteropatriarchy. An examination of the Oak Creek shooting and the
discourses surrounding it demonstrated that neo-orientalism rendered Sikh Americans as
interchangeable with Muslims by constituting them as ‘Muslim- looking’ (Ahmad, 2004),
even as it coerced the former to instantiate their difference from Muslims through an
aggressive performance of heterosexual patriotism and by reducing who is a Sikh along
ethnic and gendered lines. Anti-Blackness as a central logic of policing produced
Sureshbhai Patel, an Indian immigrant visiting his son in Alabama, as a ‘skinny Black
guy,’ which exposed him to police violence. However, the response from the Indian
American community avoided situating the attack as part of a concerted pattern of
violence targeting Black people but instead sought refuge in discourses of respectability.
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Finally, the public and private personas of U.S. Congresswoman Tulsi Gabbard
illuminated how Hindu Americans were constituted as exemplary subjects as her
Hindutva-inspired Islamophobia articulated with the War on Terror to intensify the
militarization of Hawaiʻi while her “Hawai’ian style Hindu wedding” reinforced the
association of the islands with exoticism. Together, these three sites demonstrate how
South Asians become un/desirable whereby enduring forms of racism expose them to
violence even as they become ventriloquists and exemplar subjects for the normative
discourses. This project concludes by arguing for a coalition politics that reorients South
Asian Americans towards other groups of color through a candid engagement with not
only the shared history of oppression but also a grappling with how South Asians are
implicated in the racialization of these other groups.
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Chapter 1: Introduction
On December 27, 2012—over a decade after the 9/11 attacks—Sunando Sen, a
Hindu Indian American was pushed in front of an oncoming train in Queens, NY. Erika
Menendez, who was arrested for the attack, told authorities that the killing was a
retaliation for the 9/11 attack: “I pushed a Muslim off the train tracks because I hate
Hindus and Muslims ever since 2001 when they put down the twin towers I’ve been
beating them up [sic]” (Santora, 2012, para. 4). Media reports hinted that she not only
had a history of assaulting Hindus and Muslims, but that she was also homeless, mentally
disturbed, and may have been off her medication when the attack occurred (McCormack,
2015). Menendez was charged with second-degree murder as a hate crime and was
sentenced to 24 years in prison.
This incident is emblematic of some of the core issues that this project grapples
with. First, note the backlash that seems to not have diminished even after a decade after
the 9/11 attacks. Un/desirable subjects locates the 9/11 attack as a significant turning
point that intensified the racialization of South Asian communities in the United States.
Second, Menendez’s utterance alludes to the slippage between Hindus and Muslims.
Despite the association of the 9/11 attacks with radical Islam in the American
imagination, Menendez saw both Hindus and Muslims as enemies because of the
common denominator of brownness that these bodies shared. In this, her reaction had a
lot in common with the state. As Muneer Ahmad (2004) argues, vigilante violence
targeting Muslim, Arab, and South Asians after the 9/11 attacks was accompanied by a
legal and political violence from the state that re-racialized these communities as
“Muslim- looking” (p. 1262). Michael Omi also terms this phenomenon as the emergence
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of the “ArabMuslimSouthAsian” body after 9/11 (Zarrugh & Wheatley, 2013). Hence,
Menendez’s fatal attack on Sen is not an anomaly but shares much with the state.
However, despite their shared brownness, Muslim, Hindu, and Sikh South Asians did not
experience the post-9/11 violence in the same manner. This phenomenon needs to be
demystified, which this project attempts.
The figures of both Menendez and Sen demand further scrutiny in order to grasp
the full spectrum of racial violence and to understand the specific dynamics of South
Asian racialization. Menendez had endured homelessness, poverty, mental illness, and
had frequent run-ins with the mental health and law enforcement establishments in New
York City (Santora & Hartocollis, 2012). Sen, on the other hand, was pursuing a Ph.D. in
economics at New York University and had recently opened a print shop after saving up
enough money (Stepansky, Parascandola, & Tracy, 2012). His roommates described him
as soft spoken, philosophical, and gentle (Santora, 2012) while his lawyer called him an
“Indian Gregory Peck” who was helping Hindu Bangladeshis settle in the United States
(Stepansky et al., 2012). What emerges then are two contradictory profiles: one of a
(racialized) woman who became a stark example of the worst form of Islamophobia that
became pervasive and normal after the 9/11 attacks, and the other of an ideal immigrant
subject who was hardworking and entrepreneurial and whose dreams were cut short by
(misplaced) racial hatred. In other words, this incident provides us with an opportunity to
map South Asian racialization as bound up with the racial violence faced by other groups.
Un/desirable subjects explores these and other dynamics towards generating a
complex understanding of South Asian racialization in the post-9/11 United States. I
deploy racialization intersectionally as Jasbir Puar does, “as a figure for specific social
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formations and processes that are not necessarily or only tied to what has been
historically theorized as ‘race’” (Puar, 2007, p. xii). My project tries to understand how
race, ethnicity, national origins, gender, sexuality, class, and religion, among others,
intersect to script certain bodies as worthy of sympathy and state protections while
excluding others. Put differently, this project grapples with the contradictory position that
South Asians occupy in the United States: both as bodies that are exposed to racial
violence but also as ventriloquists and exemplars for normative discourses that implicate
them in the racialization of other groups.
I use South Asian as a category that captures a range of subjectivities, specifically
Sikh Americans, Indian Americans, and Hindu Americans that are the focus of this
dissertation. These subjectivities descended from South Asia are often overlapping, and
an individual or a group may be a member of more than one of them (for instance, a
Hindu American is often an Indian American). They are exposed to uneven violence in
the context of the United States based on their national origins, religion, gender, and
sexuality, among others. But, at the same time, they are also implicated in the
racialization of other groups, including Black and Native people. As such, my project
draws attention to not only how South Asian racialization is mediated by gender,
sexuality, class, and religious and national differences, among others, but also outlines
the role that the selective inclusion of South Asian bodies play in the devaluation of other
disenfranchised communities in the United States.
It is indeed a perplexing experience to be counted as South Asian in the United
States. Indian Americans, especially Hindu Americans, have become the very emblem of
the model minority myth as they have the highest median household income among all
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ethno-racial groups in the United States at $88,000 compared to $66,000 for all Asian
Americans, and $49,800 for all U.S. households (Desilver, 2014). As a result, only 9
percent of Indian Americans lived in poverty compared to 12 percent of Asian
Americans, and 13 percent of the U.S. population. If Indian American politicians such as
Bobby Jindal and Nikki Haley have ascended to prominent political positions, media
personalities such as Kal Penn, Mindy Kaling and Aziz Ansari have broken new grounds
in television. Indian Americans are also well represented in the STEM fields as 28
percent of them work in science and engineering, and two-thirds of Indian Americans 16
years or older were in management, business, or other lucrative occupations (Desilver,
2014).
Bangladeshi Americans and Pakistani Americans, on the other hand, started
arriving in the United States in the 90s through the visa lottery program (Maira, 2009).
They mostly hold blue-collar jobs. Furthermore, their religious identity as Muslims has
exposed them to intense policing and surveillance in the post 9/11 era—a vulnerability to
which Indian Americans are not completely immune due to their shared brownness, as
Sen’s example demonstrates. These dynamics need to be unpacked urgently. Although
my focus in this project will be on Sikh, Indian, and Hindu Americans, respectively—
which are neither exhaustive of South Asia nor mutually exclusive categories—I do so to
map the central role that religion and national origins play in the post-9/11 era. I am
interested in how these subjectivities, while exposed to different forms of violence, are
also constituted as exemplars for normative discourses such as liberal multiculturalism
and neoliberal productivity that intensify the devaluation of other groups. As such, my
project demonstrates the salient yet liminal positions that these South Asian subjectivities

4

occupy in the post-9/11 United States.
Theoretical Framework
This project builds upon the comparative turn within ethnic studies and other
fields. It posits South Asian racialization as entangled with, and therefore indivisible
from, the racialization of other groups of color, especially Muslim, Black, and Native
communities in the United States. It explores the particular modalities that produce Sikh,
Indian, and Hindu Americans as un/desirable subjects by mapping those discourses
hinged to sexual and gender normativities that turn these subjects into more than sites of
injuries: as coerced into reproducing normative discourses that participate in the
disenfranchisement of other groups.
In this regard, I follow Hong and Ferguson’s (2011) call for evolving comparative
models that can go beyond empirical juxtapositions and offer a comprehensive view of
racialization. As they note:
… the stakes for identifying new comparative models are immensely high, for the
changing configurations of power in the era after the decolonizing movements
and new social movements of the mid-twentieth century demand that we
understand how particular populations are rendered vulnerable to processes of
death and devaluation over and against other populations, in ways that
palimpestically register older modalities of racialized death but also exceed them.
(p. 1-2)
Hong and Ferguson (2011) critique both the hegemonic western model as well as
the minority nationalisms model. If the former sets the west as the “ideal” against which
other societies were evaluated as deviant, the minority nationalisms model emerged in the
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1950s and the 60s to draw attention to the role of racial and colonial violence in
producing non-western societies as deviant. But it replaced nation-state with races. In the
place of these two models, the authors call for a comparative model that is based in
women of color and queer of color critique that tracks the production of difference not
only between but within groups.
The comparative method of women of color feminism and queer of color critique
is heterotopic insofar as it refuses to maintain that objects of comparison are
static, unchanging, and empirically observable, and refuses to render illegible the
shifting configurations of power that define such objects in the first place. (p. 9)
I understand Hong and Ferguson as calling for an exploration of how differences
between groups always manifest as differences within groups. They suggest that gender
and sexual normativities in particular play a heightened role in and between groups as
they are mobilized to mark certain bodies as respectable and others as deviant. As such,
comparative models are rarely productive if they do not account for how gender and
sexual politics are integrally tied in with the racialization of communities.
This dissertation employs comparative racialization as its theoretical framework
to map how South Asian racialization, specifically the racialization of Sikh, Indian, and
Hindu American subjectivities, is interwoven with the devaluation of Muslim, Black, and
Native communities, respectively. Pairing of these cases is intentional as its allows me to
explore the historical forces of neo-orientalism, anti-Blackness, and settler-colonialism in
the United States—which Andrea Smith (2006, 2012) terms the three pillars of white
supremacy and which, following Audre Lorde (1984), we may call the master’s tools—as
implicated in South Asian racialization with heteropatriarchy providing the foundation
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that undergirds all of them. I contend that South Asian racialization in the post-9/11
period cannot be understood outside of how it is entangled with these three structures.
In her remarkably influential article published in 2006 and revised in 2012, Smith
contends that people of color organizing in the United States is often premised on the
idea that those victimized by white supremacy should come together based on their
shared oppression. Such a model not only flattens the different ways in which
communities are affected by white supremacy but also occludes how people of color may
be complicit in each other’s oppressions. In its place, she offers the “three pillars of white
supremacy” as a model that can help organizers grapple with how people of color can be
oppressors even as they are oppressed at the same time. As she notes:
This framework does not assume that racism and white supremacy is enacted in a
singular fashion; rather, white supremacy is constituted by separate and distinct,
but still interrelated, logics. Envision three pillars, one labeled
Slavery/Capitalism, another labeled Genocide/Capitalism, and the last one labeled
Orientalism/War, as well as arrows connecting each of the pillars together. (2006,
p. 67)
The first among them is slavery/capitalism, which I designate as anti-Blackness in
my project. I expand each of them in detail in the following chapters. But suffice it to say
here that if the logic of slavery renders Black people as slaveable—i.e., nothing more
than property (Smith, 2006)—anti-Blackness in an era of post-slavery (Sharpe, 2009)
secures the disposability of Black people by constituting Blackness as not only
undesirable but as an object of fear. It accomplishes this feat through the discourse of
criminality to produce Blackness as an aberration and mobilizes the security apparatus to
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carry out modern-day lynchings. Furthermore, anti-Blackness in my work gestures to not
only its constitution by white supremacy but also how it is practiced by other
communities of color, which Jared Sexton (2010) has called people-of-color racism.
The second pillar, genocide/capitalism, is articulated as settler colonialism within
my analysis. The logic of genocide holds that indigenous people must always be
disappearing so non-indigenous people can take their place (Smith, 2006, 2012). Their
forcible removal is both symbolic as well as material as various strategies from wars,
forced relocation, and sexual violence to biopolitical assimilation and cultural
appropriation are deployed to disappear the Indian (Wolfe, 2006). A concomitant process
is set off at the same time as settlers claim monopoly over not only Native land but also
their spirituality, cultural practices, beliefs, customs, and even costumes! I name this
pillar settler colonialism as it allows me to analyze the role of non-whites—specifically
Hindu Americans—in the dispossession of Native people. Furthermore, settler
colonialism gestures to how the mere fact of settlement by immigrants on occupied lands
can intensify the dispossession of Native people.
Orientalism/War is the third pillar of white supremacy. Orientalism, according to
Edward Said (Said, 1978), was a self-referential technique through which the west saw
itself as superior and the orient as decadent and inferior. Smith (2006, 2012) notes that
this pillar constructs certain groups, especially Arabs and others from the Middle East, as
not only inferior but as posing a constant threat to the United States that needs to be
neutralized. It provides the main reason for the constant wars launched in the name of
freedom. I rearticulate orientalism as neo-orientalism in my project to mark the
intensification and weaponization of orientalist logics in the post-9/11 United States,
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specifically the racialization of religious differences, the polarization of the world into a
us v them binary, and the reliance on gender and sexual normativities to prosecute the
War on Terror, which have had an internal impact on communities that have borne the
brunt of neo-orientalism.
All of these processes have historically shaped South Asian racialization in the
United States, but they have taken new forms and intensities after the 9/11 attacks and the
ensuing consolidation of security processes in the United States. Undergirding these
pillars is heteropatriarchy, which Smith calls the “build ing block of US empire” (2006, p.
71). Heteropatriarchy is the fundamental mode of producing ab/normalities and assigning
differential values to bodies. Furthermore, it is also the primary means through which
groups are socialized into hierarchical structures. Heteropatriarchy is an unequal model
that enforces the subservience of women to men and children to parents by rationalizing
these behaviors as part of natural law. These unequal relationships, then, become the
basis for structuring all of society and enforcing compliance: “Just as the patriarchs rule
the family, the elites of the nation-state rule their citizens” (Smith, 2006, p. 72). As such,
heteropatriarchy provides the foundation or the very ground that sustains an unequal
system. Each of my chapters is dedicated to exploring on of these pillars and how South
Asians are implicated in them.
At a very basic level, Smith’s “Heteropatriarchy and the three pillars of white
supremacy” is a comparative racialization model that allows us to see how groups of
color are complicit in each other’s oppressions. Native people, for instance, continue to
be dispossessed by settler colonialism even as they participate in orientalism as they are
enlisted in record numbers in the military (LaDuke & Cruz, 2013). Arab Americans may
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be targeted by new and deadly regimes of surveillance, but they are also beneficiaries of
settler colonialism when they profit from indigenous dispossession. This model allows a
better grasp of the position of people of color in the United States beyond the category of
the oppressed.
In sum, my project brings together the work of Hong and Ferguson (2011) and
Smith (2006, 2012) to analyze South Asian racialization in the post-9/11 United States. I
take the call for critical comparative racialization models seriously by situating South
Asian American racialization as entangled with the historical structures of neoorientalism, anti-Blackness, and settler colonialism in a manner that implicates South
Asians in the racialization of these groups. My decision to focus on South Asian
racialization in the United States is informed by what postcolonial theorist Gayatri Spivak
has termed “accident of birth” (Spivak, 2010). In other words, by focusing on South
Asian Americans, I am putting to good use my familiarity with the South Asian diaspora
in the United States. By delimiting my project this way, I am not making an identitarian
argument but drawing on my familiarity with a sociopolitical racial formation to explore
the complexity of racialization. I do so by exploring South Asian racialization as hinged
to the deployment of gender and sexual normativities to render some bodies as desirable
while, concomitantly, contributing to the scripting of Muslim, Black, and Native groups
as aberrant.
Methodology
The methodological choices for this project are informed by a women of color
feminist critique. By this, I am simultaneously invoking a reading practice (Hong, 2006)
and an oppositional politics (Sandoval, 2000) that is theoretically and politically
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committed to demystifying the processes that produce raced, gendered, and sexualized
subjectivities (among others) with unequal access to power. As such, I intentionally select
texts and excerpts that allow me to demonstrate how inequality and violence become
acceptable conditions of existence. Additionally, a women of color feminist critique
demands a rejection of liberal strategies of inclusion and assimilation in favor of a
politics of solidarity and coalition building grounded in anti-oppression and liberation,
which is a core focus of this project.
I adopt critical rhetoric, as elaborated by Raymie McKerrow (1989, 1991), and
racialized critical rhetorical theorizing as enunciated by Hasian and Delgado (1998) as
my analytical frameworks. McKerrow argues that a critical rhetorical perspective not
only allows for a “critique of domination” but also mandates a “critique of freedom,”
particularly when freedom presents itself as a desirable goal. Although I agree with Ono
and Sloop (1992) that McKerrow’s articulation of critical rhetoric can inadvertently slip
into skepticism and that domination and freedom are “two perspectives of the same
phenomenon,” I find it necessary to maintain an analytical distinction between the two.
Given the South Asian investment in procuring legal and cultural recognition by
reproducing normative discourses, I am interested in a critique of freedom (from
violence) as a particular modality of power that reinforces the state and its violent
structures. I find critical rhetoric especially helpful to analyze South Asian politics
grounded in heteronormativity and to critique the struggle for legal and other forms of
recognition that continues to organize liberal South Asian anti-racist and civil rights
activism in the United States.
Additionally, Hasian and Delgado offer racialized critical rhetorical theorizing as
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a productive framework to analyze the constitutive role of race in rhetorical cultures.
Racialized critical rhetorical theorizing, which is an amalgamation of critical race theory,
critical rhetoric, and vernacular criticism, illuminates the ways in which race is
constructed through historical, legal, political, and cultural discourses and, in turn, shapes
them. I deploy racialized critical rhetorical theorizing to understand how South Asians
are produced as un/desirable through their interpellation in neo-orientalism, antiBlackness, and settler-colonialism.
I also draw upon Foucauldian discourse analysis and Derridean deconstruction as
specific strategies for analysis. Foucauldian discourse analysis entails three processes:
historical inquiry, an analysis of the mechanisms of the power, and a description of the
process of subjectification—the signifying practices that produces subjects (ArribasAyllon & Walkerdine, 2008). Derridean deconstruction illuminates the fundamental
instability or internal contradictions (Chuh, 2003) that structure discourses by tracking
them from the most elementary form of human communication—language—to their
embeddedness in our thought processes. Deconstruction is not a method in the
conventional sense of the term but rather a strategy for analysis. As Richard Beardsworth
(1996) notes:
Derrida is careful to avoid this term [method] because it carries connotations of a
procedural form of judgment. A thinker with a method has already decided how to
proceed, is unable to give him or herself up to the matter of thought in hand, is a
functionary of the criteria which structure his or her conceptual gestures. For
Derrida … this is irresponsibility itself. (p. 4)
Both Foucauldian discourse analysis as well as deconstruction call for an anti-
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method wherein the analyst does not presume a certain way of reading a text or discourse
before encountering it. Deconstruction in particular examines what has been “set off” or
excluded to enunciate a proposition in a manner that it appears as truth. It tracks the
rhetorical maneuvers that conceal the track of the constitutive originary that has been
excluded, which Derrida termed différance, and its continuous deferment within the
enunciation called trace (Spivak, 1999). Together, these strategies help me uncover how
the discourses that South Asians articulate to produce themselves as desirable positions
them as active agents in the racialization of other groups.
If critical rhetoric and racialized critical rhetorical theorizing allow me to firmly
maintain the focus on racialization, Foucauldian discourse analysis and deconstruction
provide textual strategies to analyze a variety of primary and secondary sources in my
project. In the first chapter on Sikh racialization, I draw upon popular media
reproductions of the Oak Creek shooting to map racial violence against Sikhs as well as
analyze self-representational material produced by organizations such as the Sikh
Coalition and the Sikh American Legal Defense and Education Fund to understand how
they rendered Sikhs as desirable. My second chapter analyzes media accounts of the
police takedown of Sureshbhai Patel as well as the legal documents and court
proceedings connected with the case. The last chapter, which scrutinizes the public and
private personas of Tulsi Gabbard, draws upon a diverse archive of media reports,
congressional hearings, and self-representational material to illuminate how Hindu
Americans are entangled in the dispossession of Native Hawaiians.
Purpose of Study
My project has two purposes. My research elucidates the discursive constitution

13

of South Asians as a racialized category in the United States through their interpellation
in the racialization of other groups. I am interested in exploring South Asian racialization
as a comparative project that is influenced by historical factors that have no doubt
intensified after the 9/11 attacks. I reject the model of inter-racial prejudice in favor of
understanding how South Asian Americans are compelled into producing discourses that
make them active agents in the dispossession of other groups. I am particularly interested
in the politics of neoliberal multiculturalism and inclusion that are hinged to gender and
sexual normativities.
Second, I am interested in not only theorizing the conditions that mediate the
racialization of South Asians but also in the political implications of such conditions for
projects that seek to challenge South Asian racialization. South Asian civil rights
activism has been dominated by liberal assimilationist strategies that seek inclusion into
the U.S. cultural and political imaginary that, paradoxically, reinforce the violence facing
South Asian subjects, as I demonstrate in this project. Assimilationist strategies are
invariably tied in with the production of difference as certain groups become admissible
only at the cost of excluding others. Moreover, the U.S. nation-state is a formation of
racial power that has been historically organized around the protection of white property
rights, which implicates it directly in the exploitation and subjugation of racialized
groups. Hence, a key purpose of my project is to understand the discursive processes that
produce South Asians as un/desirable to interrupt strategies for redress that make appeals
to the U.S. nation-state. I hope that this research can offer lessons in terms of imagining
futures that reject normative demands for inclusion into a violent system in favor of a
challenge to race itself as a constitutive premise of modern state power.
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Relevance of Study
This study makes important contributions to two fields: communications studies
and South Asian American Studies. Racialization has emerged as a major area of focus
within the field of communication studies. Primarily imported through the work of Stuart
Hall (1992), cultural communication studies (Jackson, 1998) generated tremendous
interest in racialization that moved it from the margins to the center of the discipline. Of
particular interest to communication scholars is how mediatized and other forms of
discourses produce race as a normative category that erases the operation of power and
rationalizes inequalities. Critical/cultural communication studies and media studies are
not the only fields pursuing racialization, as it has emerged as a major focus of
intercultural (Roy & Shaw, 2016) and interpersonal communication studies (Soliz, 2016)
as well as other emerging fields such as environmental communication (Godfrey &
Torres, 2016). My project builds upon this interest by offering South Asian racialization
as a prime site to map the changing dynamics of racialization in the United States.
By South Asian American Studies (SAAS), I am naming a disciplinary formation
that can be seen as coalescing primarily in the U.S. academy at the intersections of Asian
American Studies and South Asian Studies. Its emergence is partly a response to the
ways in which Asian American Studies is structured by notions of Asian America as
predominantly referencing migrations from the Pacific Rim, which leaves undertheorized the emergence of “South Asian America” as a racialized category of
governance in the U.S. (for example, see Dave et al., 2001; Shankar & Srikanth, 1998).
Additionally, South Asia’s contradictory position as a vital geopolitical entity (Grewal,
2005; Radhakrishnan, 2011) even as it remains one of the two frontlines of the global
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War on Terror, continues to produce unequal effects for those racialized as South Asian
Americans. SAAS tries to account for this phenomenon through an analysis that puts into
conversation the biopolitical and geopolitical dimensions of racialization as it unfolds in
the United States. My project is directly aligned with this field as it examines South
Asian American racialization in the post-9/11 United States as a complicated
phenomenon entangled with the production of other racialized subjectivities that are
deemed disposable. My project pays attention to how such violences are normalized.
Chapter Outlines
Each of the chapters in this dissertation concentrates on a particular pillar of white
supremacy to unpack South Asian racialization as entangled with the production of
racialized others. Although these three pillars are simultaneously at work—for instance,
neo-orientalism is always already wrapped up in an assumed distinction between
brownness and Blackness—I have organized this project in a manner that each individual
chapter examines a specific pillar. While this suppresses certain analytical possibilities, it
also allows for a more in-depth examination of each of the pillars as they racialize South
Asians in specific ways.
Chapter 1, “Replaceable Subjects: Neo-orientalism, Anti-Muslim Violence and
Sikh Vulnerability,” explores the relationship between anti-Muslim racism and Sikh
racialization through neo-orientalist logics that are embedded in the discourses of
securitization. The World Trade Center collapse unleashed a wave of attacks against
especially turbaned and bearded Sikh Americans in the United States “mistaken” for
Muslims with the Oak Creek massacre reflecting a stark culmination of this violence.
However, Sikh civil rights activism following the attack has coalesced around the
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demand that attacks against Sikhs be recorded as a separate hate crime category. My
project tries to illuminate how neo-orientalist logics constitute Sikhs as enemy others
while coercing Sikhs to produce themselves as respectable subjects through embracing
American multiculturalism and inclusion.
Chapter 2, “Fungible Subjects: Anti-Black Police Violence and South Asian
Disposability,” reads the case of Sureshbhai Patel, an Indian immigrant, who was
partially paralyzed by a cop responding to a call describing a “skinny Black guy” peering
into garages. Patel had come to the United States to help his son and daughter-in- law care
for their 17-month-old baby when the incident occurred. Fungible subjects explores how
the centrality of anti-Blackness for racialized policing, especially the assemblage of
phenotype, language, and other markers, constituted South Asians as proxies for Black
people. Yet, the reaction of the Patel family and the Indian American community
demonstrated a heightened investment in normative conceptions of the immigrant family
to produce themselves as subjects worthy of rights and protections. I use this incident to
map how Indian Americans become ventriloquists for anti-Black discourses through their
embrace of sexual and gendered normativities.
Chapter 3, “Exemplary Subjects: Hindu Americans and Hawaiʻian Settler
Colonialism,” foregrounds the intersections between Hindu Americans and settler
colonialism. It tracks the public and private personas of United States Representative
Tulsi Gabbard, widely narrated as the first Hindu congresswoman, to understand how
Hindu Americans are implicated in the ongoing colonization of Hawaiʻi and the
continuing dispossession of the indigenous people of the islands. Tulsi is not a South
Asian or Indian by descent, yet she has received widespread support within the Hindu
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American community because of her religious identity. Furthermore, she is a conduit for
the Islamophobia that goes hand-in-hand with the rise of Hindu nationalism as she
articulates it into policies because of her access to institutional power. I examine how
Tulsi’s Hindu identity connects with the post-9/11 Islamophobia, liberal multiculturalism,
and military and commercial interests to further entrench settler colonialism in Hawaiʻi .
The conclusion, “Insurgent Subjects: Beyond Normative Inclusion,” recaps the
main arguments made in the earlier chapters. I outline how anti-Blackness, neoorientalism, and settler colonialism are all process in which South Asians are centrally
implicated and outside of which South Asian racialization cannot be understood. More
importantly, this chapter takes up the difficult task of coalition-building. While all the
three chapters suggest how South Asians can work towards not becoming instruments of
neo-orientalist, anti-Black, and settler colonialism, the conclusion dwells deeper into the
question of building ethical coalitions that do not trade in each other for nominal
inclusion into a violent system. I draw upon women of color theorizing to illuminate how
to approach difference without allowing it to erect walls while also not losing its ethical
purchase. My hope is that my work can contribute to a comprehensive understanding of
South Asian racialization as a relational process, which can help us build stronger
coalitions.
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Like the Sikh faith, America is very young.
– Amy Chua
Chapter 2
Mistaken Subjects: Neo-Orientalism, Anti-Muslim Violence and Sikh Vulnerability
On June 5, 2013, the Advisory Policy Board of the FBI voted to expand standard
hate crime reporting to include crimes motivated by bias against Sikhs, Hindus, and
Arabs (Kaleem, 2013). This decision came in the wake of demands by numerous Sikh
civil rights organizations that the FBI track hate crimes against Sikhs as it had done for
“Christians, Jews, Muslims, and Atheists [sic]” (“Victory!,” 2014, para. 3). The
organizations charged that under current reporting procedures, violence against Sikhs was
“often misreported as anti-Muslim” (Kaleem, 2013, para. 3), which prevented Sikh
victims from seeking legal redress. Other civil rights organizations such as the AmericanArab Anti-Discrimination Committee also supported the reporting changes on the
grounds that they would allow Arabs and Arab-Americans to report instances of violence
and crimes that were also motivated by hatred and discrimination (Mitchell, 2013).
In a notable amendment to this decision, the FBI decided to track hate crimes
against all self-identified religions as listed in the Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life
and Statistical Abstract approved by the U.S. Census Bureau. These include “Catholic,
Protestant, Mormon, Jehovah’s Witness, Orthodox, Other Christian, Jewish, Islamic
(Muslim), Buddhist, Hindu, Sikh, Other Religions, Multiple Religions-Group, and
Atheism/Agnosticism” (Kaleem, 2013, para. 13). Hastily added as an afterthought, this
amendment indexes the anxiety that has generally greeted the gains of the Civil Rights
movement, which are seen as affording special protections to disenfranchised populations
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at the expense of the majority. In this context, neutral hate crime reporting that is not
geared towards any particular religious group promise equal protection to the followers of
all religions, including majoritarian Christian denominations, thereby allaying fears of
minorities being afforded special treatment.1
But how do we make sense of the demand by Sikh civil rights organizations for a
separate reporting category that would track hate crimes against Sikh males “mistaken for
Muslims”? Such a demand rests on the premise that “Sikh” and “Muslim” exist a priori
as coherent religious categories and racial violence is seen as wrongfully targeting Sikhs
by “mistaking” them for Muslims. In other words, such an understanding presumes that
there is a coherent Sikh subject—complete with specific religious accouterments and
bodily practices— before the operation of racial violence who has become the victim of
misdirected anti-Muslim rage.
But what if these categories are made to coagulate through racial violence
(Thobani, 2012)? In asking this question, I am not suggesting that “Sikh” and “Muslim”
are entirely reducible to effects of racialization. Rather, I am drawing attention to the
ways in which anti-Muslim and anti-Arab violence articulated through neo-orientalist

1

Here, one may recall the critical race theorist Derrick Bell’s suggestion that racial

progress will not be conceded to by Whites unless it is conclusively demonstrated that it
is in their best interests to do so. Hence, Bell maintained that the law was a complicated
register in which to make a case for racial equality (2009). In this context, the decision to
track hate crimes against all self-identified religious groups allays White fears about the
state making too many concessions to the minorities.
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logics after the 9/11 attacks has played a central role in coercing Sikhs to produce
themselves in a certain image: through their distancing from Muslims and Islam (i.e.,
Sikhs are not Muslims) but also through instantiations of Sikh normativity (i.e., the Sikh
as a quintessentially turbaned [male] subject) and an aggressive performance of
heterosexual patriotism, participation in American imperialism, and a presentation of
Sikhs as a key component of the United States’ multicultural composition. Hence, the
role of racialized violence cannot be underestimated in regulating the meaning of what it
means to be “Sikh” and “Muslim,” particularly when one of them becomes intelligible by
performing its difference from the other.
This chapter maps how the intensification of anti-Muslim violence following the
9/11 attacks through neo-orientalist logics collapses Sikhs (as well as other South Asians
and Arabs) into the racial typology of “Muslim- looking people,” 2 even as it accelerates
efforts to isolate “Muslims” by coercing Sikhs to produce themselves as a distinct (i.e.,

2

I borrow “Muslim- looking peoples” from Muneer Ahmad (2004), who argues that

following the 9/11 attacks, physical violence targeted at Arabs, Muslims, and South
Asians was accompanied by institutionalized legal and political violence which reracialized these communities as “Muslim looking.” Apart from launching wars against
predominantly Muslim countries, the U.S. state apparatus reconfigured immigration laws
to keep out those it understood as “Muslim looking” while targeting such people already
present in its territory for surveillance and deportation. Immigration sweeps and
indefinite detentions complemented vigilante violence that inflicted serious bodily harm
and egregious violations against those appearing to be Muslim.
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non-Muslim) religious-cultural group. It addresses the relationship between anti-Muslim
racism and Sikh racialization in post-9/11 U.S. to explore, more specifically: What are
the ways in which fear of the Muslim (looking) produces discourses that signify the Sikh
subject as distinct from the Muslim, even as both groups continue to be collapsed into the
racialized category of “Muslim-looking” peoples? How are national origins, phenotypes,
gender, and religious identities, including religious markers, invoked in institutional
discourses? How do hate crime advocacy and self-representational practices reproduce
these distinction? What connections are foregrounded or disavowed by institutional
discourses to produce the Sikh as a distinct—i.e., non-Muslim—religious-racial subject
and what are the pitfalls in making such claims? Finally, if the fate of the racialized Sikh
subject is indelibly linked with that of the Muslim in post-9/11 U.S., then how do we
forge a response that does not secure protections to Sikhs at the cost of in/advertently
abandoning Muslims as a legitimate target of state and vigilante violence? These are the
questions I seek to explore in this chapter by drawing upon a variety of primary and
secondary sources, including media commentary, Sikh civil rights activism, FBI
reporting guidelines, Army policies, and other documents.
But why not investigate the production of the Muslim subject as a figure of terror
rather than turn to Sikh racialization to understand post-9/11 racial formations? After all,
if the goal of this chapter is to map the conditions under which racial violence renders
certain bodies as disposable, then what better way to accomplish this than examining the
production of Muslims as terrorist others? I want to clarify at the onset that I remain
acutely mindful that not all South Asians have faced post-9/11 violence in the same
manner. In positing post-9/11 Sikh racialization as intimately bound up with anti-Muslim
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violence, I do not mean to suggest that anti-Muslim racism is a diffuse mechanism that
affects non-Muslims as much as Muslims. My position is quite the contrary, as Muslims
continue to figure disproportionately as targets of the War on Terror and its egregious
manifestations internally in the U.S. and externally.3 My interest, rather, is in the ways in
which the figure of the Muslim can be mobilized as a sign of terror by state and non-state
actors to operationalize a wide range of repressive projects. In this context, I agree with

3

I return to this point in more detail later, but suffice it to say for now that the aftermath

of the 9/11 attacks was characterized by immigration sweeps targeting Muslim males
over 16 years (Bayoumi, 2006), passage of draconian laws such as the Patriot Act that
gave free rein to the security apparatus to indefinitely detain suspects (an overwhelming
number of whom were Muslim) (Sekhon, 2003), and extensive racial profiling (Chon &
Arzt, 2005). These efforts by the state bureaucracy were complimented by vicious media
campaigns that demonized Muslims, resulting in widespread vigilante violence against
those “looking Muslim” (Ahmad, 2004). Additionally, the War on Terror has
predominantly targeted Muslim- majority countries with Afghanistan and Iraq being the
most egregious examples of a phenomenon that has opened many fronts in the Islamic
world (Bacevich, 2014). A 2015 report by Physicians for Social Responsibility titled
Body Count notes that 1.3 million to 2 million people have died as a result of the U.S.
invasion of Iraq and Afghanistan and the resulting insurgency in Pakistan, all coveted
fronts in the War on Terror (Physicians, 2015), although other accounts put the total
death toll since 1990s close to 4 million people, almost all of whom are Muslims
(Ahmed, 2015).
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Junaid Rana (2011) that the figure of the “Muslim”— signified through a beard and
turban—has been invoked in such a manner that it is specific enough to target Muslims
while being flexible enough to designate a range of (non-white, non-Muslim, mostly
turbaned but also un-turbaned) bodies for containment and disciplining.
In addition, I am fascinated by the ways in which the circulation of neo-orientalist
ideology in the post-9/11 period generated attacks against turbaned Sikhs while, at the
same time, coercing them to produce themselves as a distinct—i.e. non-Muslim—
religious-cultural group. This interrupted the possibility of cross-religious alliances
among South Asians. As such, instead of presuming that a normative Muslim and Sikh
subject exists prior to racial violence, I am interested in mapping how anti-Muslim racism
following the 9/11 attacks produced Muslims and Sikhs as mutually exclusive religiousracial categories—their ethnic ties and common exposure to racial violence not
withstanding—even as it rendered them interchangeable by collapsing them into the
racial formation of Muslim- looking people.
Sikh males were overwhelmingly targeted in post-9/11 attacks as state racial
profiling practices, such as asking Sikhs to remove their turbans at airports for additional
security screening, complemented vigilante violence that targeted Sikh males for
purportedly looking “Muslim” (Sidhu, 2013; Sidhu & Gohil, 2009). Gradually, the Sikh
civil society started to respond to these attacks by claiming that Sikh males had become
victims of post-9/11 profiling as a result of their corporeal resemblance to Muslims
because of the pagh or the dastar, the turban worn by baptized Sikh men (as well as some
women—a point that is largely ignored in Sikh civil society discourses around the turban
and its role in inciting racist attacks). Most efforts from Sikh civil society were directed
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towards clarifying the religious and cultural differences between Sikhs and Muslims, in
which resignifying the pagh assumed key importance (Puar, 2007, 2008). This move was
paralleled by well-coordinated campaigns to situate Sikhs as an important element of the
United States’ multicultural composition. In sum, what emerged was an articulation of
the turbaned Sikh as a distinct, i.e. non-Muslim, religious-cultural victim-subject who, by
producing “himself” as such, came to represent an important element of the United
States’ multicultural diversity.
In emphasizing religious and cultural distinctions between Sikhs and Muslims,
such responses not only left unaddressed the role of anti-Muslim violence in intensifying
religious-racial differences but also reinforced whiteness (Koshy, 2001) and
multiculturalism (Goldberg, 1994; Melamed, 2011) as important registers that calibrate
U.S. national belonging. Additionally, Sikh civil society responses gesture to the
intensified reorganization of diasporic and migrant South Asians along religious lines
(Mishra, 2013). This not only exacerbates historical communal tensions in South Asian
communities by inflecting them with new meaning, but also severely limits the
possibility of forging a pan-ethnic, pan-religious South Asian (American) response to
post-9/11 racial profiling and attacks. If Sikhs (as well as South Asian Muslims, Hindus,
Buddhists, and Christians) are being targeted for purportedly “looking Muslim,” then
clarifying religious and cultural distinctions through recourse to multiculturalism only
aggravates the situation by in/advertently offering the Muslim as a legitimate object for
retribution.
I start this chapter by providing a historical account of Sikh racialization in the
United States. I pay special attention to the racial and religious significance of the turban
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because of its historical role in Sikh racialization. What I hope to demonstrate in this
section is how Sikh racialization in North America has often involved the collapsing of
Sikh bodies into proximal categories. Put differently, Sikhs in the United States and
Canada have been racialized precisely through their unintelligibility as Sikhs: historically
as “Hindoos” and now as Muslim (looking). I emphasize this point to mark the ways in
which racial violence tried to fix the meaning of what it means to be Sikh by collapsing
Sikhs into proximal racial-religious categories.
I then propose neo-orientalism as a theoretical and analytical framework that
allows us to map post-9/11 racialization of Sikhs outside of discourses of “mistaken
identity” that dominate accounts of anti-Sikh violence. Neo-orientalism names the
contemporary mode of racial violence against turbaned non-white bodies. It works by
reorganizing the boundaries between Sikhs and Muslims, sometimes by completely
rendering them invisible and, at other times, heightening the distinctions between them
by coercing Sikhs to produce themselves as distinct religious subjects, i.e. not Muslim.
My argument is that it is impossible to understand contemporary Sikh racialization
without accounting for how neo-orientalist logics project racial anxieties onto articles of
clothing such as the turban and the hijab by turning them into overloaded signs of oriental
Islam.
I then look at two interconnected events, both of which illuminate the ability of
neo-orientalism to render the boundaries between Sikhs and Muslims invisible and hypervisible. I first examine the Oak Creek Gurudwara shooting in which Wade Michael Page,
a self-avowed white supremacist, killed six Sikh worshippers at a Gurudwara. The
mainstream media widely represented the killings as one of mistaken rage in which the
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“wrong” community was targeted. Missing from these accounts are how militarized neoorientalist discourses that became pervasive after the 9/11 attacks rendered the
boundaries between Sikhs and Muslims porous. I then turn to how Sikh civil society selfrepresentational practices and advocacy mobilized around the hate crimes initiative soon
after the shooting worked to exaggerate the distinctions between Sikhs and Muslims. But
the “Sikh” that such re-significations offer produces its own exclusions by not only
implicitly gendering the Sikh as a turbaned male, but also flattening the racial and ethnic
diversity that constitutes the Sikh populations in North America.

4

Additionally, such

conceptions actively disavow the ethno-cultural links and common histories of racist
violence that bind non-white turbaned bodies. A major goal of this chapter is to pursue
such links so as to imagine solidarities that do not secure protections for the Sikh by
disowning the Muslim. I end the chapter by recapping my arguments and suggesting that
it is important to keep open the question of what “Sikh” means instead of calcifying the
Sikh subjectivity along certain lines to prevent its collapsing into proximal categories.

4

The 3HO community, which considers itself a Sikh sangat, largely comprises white

converts to Sikhism who follow Sikh religious tenets, including donning white paghs as
part of their attire. Literature on racial attacks and state repression facing Sikhs in the
aftermath of the 9/11 attacks has been largely silent on the experiences of the 3HO
community. While there are differences over whether 3HO community members are
Sikhs, the fact that there is little to no commentary on the experiences of the 3HO
community in relation to the racialization of the turban speaks to the absence of works
that take up the question of racial diversity in the Sikh community.
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The Tide of Turbans
On January 26, 2013, Jagjeet Singh, a turbaned Sikh who worked as a commercial
driver, was passing through Mississippi when he was pulled over for a flat tire. The
officers who detained him called him a “terrorist” and mocked him for carrying the
kirpan, a ceremonial dagger worn by baptized Sikhs (Hing, 2014). This humiliating
experience repeated again when Singh came to the Pike County Justice Court on March
26. He was promptly removed by officers from the courtroom on the orders of Judge
Aubrey Rimes for wearing the turban. When his attorney went to the judge’s chamber to
inquire about the matter, Judge Rimes confirmed that Singh would not be allowed to
enter the courtroom until he removed “the rag from his head” (Atwood, 2013). The judge
also threatened to call him last on the docket if he refused to comply with his orders.
Sadly, there is little that is surprising about this incident. As with most racialized
immigrants to North America, the story of Sikhs reveals a tumultuous history marked by
vigilante and institutionalized racism often codified in law. But violence against Sikhs is
also distinct in that it has overwhelmingly coalesced around the turban, which has
historically symbolized the racial and religious difference of Sikhs, sometimes as
members of a unique religious-cultural group but also as non-Christian, non-White
“oriental” others conflated with “Hindoos” and currently with Muslims. As a result,
accounts of the turban as an object of racial and religious difference saturate scholarly
and popular accounts of Sikh racialization in ways that have yielded critical insights but
also decentered other readings of Sikh racialization.
European imperialism, extractive colonization, and improvements in travel and
communication converged in the cusp of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries to
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unleash a grand wave of migration that saw 50 million Chinese, an equal number of
Europeans, and an estimated 30 million South Asians leave their homes for new lands
(Lake & Reynolds, 2008, p. 6). The journey of Sikhs away from the Indian subcontinent
was part of this outward migration. It was instigated by a combination of factors,
including Britain’s imperial expansion in what was then British India (Ramnath, 2011);
first-wave migration of South Asians to different parts of the empire, including North
America, which established tried routes that other migrants could follow (Shah, 2011);
the limited opportunities open to British subjects in Britain’s oversees holdings such as
Canada, which were undercut by racial citizenship requirements institutionalized in law
(Lake & Reynolds, 2008; Mawani, 2012); and the growing demand for cheap labor
unleashed by the expansion of U.S. capitalism that offered highly uneven possibilities for
Asian migrants (Hong, 2006; Luibhéid, 2002; Ngai, 2004). In their own ways, all of these
factors propelled Sikh migration to North America.
Early Sikh migrants arrived in the U.S. often through Canada and settled on the
West coast where they found employment in the railroads or on the farms worked almost
exclusively by immigrants (Takaki, 1989). Migration from what was then colonial India
to Canada and then to the U.S. remained negligible with an average of 30 migrants per
year from 1898 to 1903 and then 250 annually from 1904 to 1906 (Hess, 1969). As
Canada began to tighten its immigration policy against South Asians, mostly because of
pressure from Britain (Mawani, 2012), Sikhs and other South Asian immigrants started to
move to the U.S. and their numbers gradually increased from 1072 in 1907 to 1710 in
1908. They did so to escape the growing political repression in Canada while rallying
other diasporic South Asians to support the anticolonial struggles in South Asia.
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Diasporic Sikhs had established the Ghadar Party to work for independence in the Indian
subcontinent while organizing South Asians in the U.S. and Canada against racial
oppression (Gill, 2014; Sohi, 2014). It became a leading voice of dissent against the
colonial violence inflicted on South Asians, which it saw as integrally tied to the racial
violence faced by diasporic Sikhs and other South Asians.
Nevertheless—and despite the turban—Sikhs do not appear as a distinct category
in the United States’ historical or legal archive. Rather, a recurring feature of their
racialization is precisely their unintelligibility as Sikhs. In the 1900s, Sikhs were
enumerated as “Hindoos”—a generic racial designation that did not refer to the followers
of Hinduism but to those from what was then known as “Hindustan,” including Hindus,
Muslims, Buddhists, Christians, and Sikhs, among others (Hess, 1969; Takaki, 1989).
Sikhs were seen as part of the “Asiatic hordes” trying to emigrate to the U.S. This marked
them for “anti-oriental” violence by organizations such as the Asiatic Exclusion League,
whose members not only attacked Asian migrants5 but also worked closely with the
political establishment to pass anti-Asian immigration laws that denied legal and
economic rights to those already present in the U.S. Although citizenship was limited to

5

Shah (2011) argues that violence against “Asiatics” was often indispensable to the

practice of white male privilege and homosociality: “White male homosocial solidarity
consolidated around the ridicule of the turbaned South Asian man. This racial
subordination through ridicule and humiliation confined South Asian men to a tightly
circumscribed world and heightened their wariness of interactions with the white public”
(p. 39). Also, see Ngai (2004) and Lake and Reynolds (2008).
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“free white persons” under the Naturalization Act of 1790, 6 South Asians, including
Sikhs, found some respite in courts that were prone to grant them citizenship on the
grounds that they had descended from Caucasians. Such cases often relied upon the
Aryan invasion theory, which was widely accepted at that time (Hess, 1969; Joshi, 2006).
To borrow the title of Ian Haney Lopez’s (1996) famous book, they became “White by
law,” if not in practice.
The 1923 Bhagat Singh Thind case was to change this phenomenon. To rehearse
an oft-told story in South Asian and Asian American Studies, Thind, a turbaned Sikh,
applied for citizenship after his discharge from the U.S. army after World War I. He was
offered citizenship twice—first by the state of Washington and then Oregon—to be
revoked both times on the grounds that he was not a “free white person” (Snow, 2004).
His case went to the U.S. Supreme Court, which adjudicated that Thind was ineligible for
naturalization. In writing the majority decision, Judge George Sutherland (himself a
naturalized citizen of British extraction) noted that while Thind’s genealogical claim that
he was a high-caste Hindu who had descended from a Caucasian ancestor was consonant
with anthropological and scientific definitions of the term “Caucasian,” it was contrary to
commonsensical understanding of “free white persons.” Sutherland reasoned that Thind’s
dark skin made him ineligible for citizenship (“United States v. Bhagat Singh Thind,”
1923). He argued that Section 2169 of the Naturalization Act of 1790, which limited

6

An amendment to this Act in 1870 opened citizenship to “aliens of African nativity and

to persons of African descent” while the 1940 Nationality Act added language to include
indigenous people. See Ngai (2004, p. 38).
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citizenship to “free white persons,” was enacted to bar “Asiatics” from naturalization. As
such, Thind could not be considered eligible for citizenship.
Thind’s quest for citizenship through the claim of white racial ancestry can be
understood as an effect of how whiteness was indispensable for naturalization (Koshy,
2001). In this context, his legal representation as a high-caste “Hindoo” (rather than as a
Sikh) was an attempt to work with already intelligible academic and legal categories to
gain entry into whiteness and thereby citizenship. One could then argue that Sikh
racialization has depended on the prevailing configurations of biopolitics and geopolitics
structured by whiteness as the constitutive category of national belonging (Koshy, 2001).
But what about Thind’s racial-sartorial difference emblematized by his turban? If the
turban emblematizes the Sikh subject’s racial/religious difference from other groups, as
argued by Sikh rights activists, what role did it play in the court’s decision that Thind was
not a “free white person”?
Despite its widespread citational history, this aspect of the Thind case has not
received adequate attention, as Puar (2007, 2008) points out. The court and most of the
ensuing commentary refuse to remark on Thind’s turban as a mark of his racial/religious
difference, resting instead on his presumed phenotypical difference from the white man—
a phenotypical difference vividly marked by Thind’s brown skin and perhaps heightened
by the visual appendage of the turban. As such, I believe there is truth to Puar’s argument
that racialization worked as an interaction between the organic and the inorganic as
bodies were sorted into different visual, tactile, sensorial, and racial economies based on
their appearance—with “appearance” not just limited to epidermal or phenotype
differences but to its signification through accouterments and bodily difference such as
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unshorn hair, turbans, clothing, beards, etc.
While it is undeniable that the turban stands as an important sign of the Sikh’s
racial/religious difference, it takes on different meanings depending upon the prevailing
racial configurations of the time and the issues at stake in each instance when the turban
is invoked to mark racial/religious difference. I underscore this point to suggest a slightly
different role for the turban in the post-9/11 period. My argument is that if the pagh that
sat on Bhagat Singh Thind primarily marked his non-white status in law, it plays an
additional role today. As a sign overloaded with racial meanings—thanks in no small
measure to the ubiquitous representation of Osama bin Laden in a turban (Griffin, 2004;
Poynting, 2002)—it collapses the Sikh into the figure of the oriental Muslim. Hence, it
becomes imperative to track this signification of the turban, whose importance is
paramount for the contemporary racial formation of “Muslim looking peoples” premised
on anti-Muslim racism articulated through neo-orientalist logics.
Few other theorists have engaged the role of the turban in contemporary
racialization as much as Jasbir Puar. I turn to her work to sketch the contemporary role of
the turban while addressing what I see as a critical limitation in her otherwise brilliant
theorization. Puar’s research has pursued the intersections between South Asian queer
diasporic and Sikh American organizing in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks. She argues
that the turban became a key object around which state and vigilante violence coalesced
as it imbued the body on which it sat with patriarchal and racial meanings. As such, the
turbaned body became evocative of a patriarchal-terrorist masculinity.
Its (the turban’s) historical attachments to hypermasculinity, perverse
heterosexuality (and at times pedophilia and homosexuality), and warrior
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militancy rendered these turbaned bodies neither within the bounds of respectable
queer subjecthood, nor worthy of a queer intervention that would stage a
reclamation of sexual-racial perversity, suggesting that it is a body almost too
perverse to be read as queer. (original emphasis, 2008, p. 50)
Central to Puar’s argument is the idea that a perverse, pathological sexuality is
invented and imputed to the turbaned body—a sexuality that is to be disowned by both
normative South Asian queerness and Sikh heteronormativity. Here, Puar maintains that
renderings of non-normative sexuality are central to contemporary instantiations of
racialization, as also argued by several other scholars.7 South Asian diasporic queer
communities were forced to disown turbaned bodies as vestiges of traditional patriarchy,
longing instead for a liberated, secular queerness to be actualized through investments in
American nationalism or what Puar terms “homonationalism.”8 She notes that reading
certain bodies this way depended on visual representations of corporeal difference in
which the turban played a key role and appeared as a sign of patriarchal and racial
difference. Instead:
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For example, see Ferguson (2004).
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According to Puar (2007), homonationalism names the contemporary arrangement

whereby certain queer subjects are afforded the privileges of citizenship primarily based
on their allegiance to the U.S. nation-state and its empire but also premised on other
markers such as their participation in racial capitalism as productive economic subjects
and their willingness to practice monogamy and embrace the nuclear family structure.
Also see (Duggan, 2003).
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As a figure that deeply troubles the nation’s security, the turbaned body can be
most fruitfully rearticulated, not solely as a body encased in tradition and
backwardness, attempting to endow itself with modernity, nor as a dissident queer
body, but rather as an assemblage… My interest here is to rethink turbaned
terrorist bodies and terrorist populations in relation to and beyond the ocular: that
is, as an affective and affected entity that creates fear but also feels the fear it
creates, an assemblage of contagions (again, this is distinct from the perverse
body as contagious), cohered not through identity or identification, but the
concatenation of disloyal and irreverent lines of flight – partial, transient,
momentary, and magical. (Puar, 2008, p. 53)
But what about the turban’s religious significations, which seem to have gained
renewed valence after the 9/11 attacks? While I agree with Puar’s argument that the
turban became coded as a sign of repressive patriarchy and racial difference, I wonder
about the extent to which her reading disregards the turban’s contemporary religious
significations as representing oriental Islam, which has been widely depicted in popular
discourse as being in fundamental opposition to Western civilization (Smith, 2012). As
Mandair (2009) points out, the turbaned man is not just a patriarchal figure who
embodies a perverse sexuality:
While Puar rightly brings attention to the heteronormative frame of white middleclass America, which endowed the turban-wearing man with a terrorist
masculinity, what seems to be underplayed in her analysis is the religious
grounding of this frame, a grounding that equally motivates liberal and
conservative sentiments. Within this religio-heteronormativity, the turbaned man
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is not just a patriarchal figure who presents “a resistant anti-assimilationalist
stance” but a deviant figure of monstrosity, a barbaric evil that refuses to become
civilized. (p. 306)
If the turbaned Sikh becomes an object of violence because of his reception as
“Muslim” (looking), it becomes important to account for the contemporary significations
of the turban—significations that emerge in a social habitus structured by Protestant
secularism as the norm and oriental Islam as its nemesis. In other words, neo-orientalism.
My argument is that instead of understanding the Sikh as a distinct religious-racial
subject who has been “wrongly” victimized as Muslim, we need to turn our attention to
how anti-Muslim violence articulated through neo-orientalist logics and its attendant
discourse of the “Clash of Civilizations” (Huntington, 1996) places the figure of the
Muslim at the very epicenter of racial violence into which the Sikh slides. To reiterate,
instead of presuming that a coherent Sikh subject already exists, we need to turn our
attention to how neo-orientalist logics produce Sikhs as proximal, even proxy, Muslim
(looking) subjects while, at the same time, coercing them to perform their difference from
Muslims.
From Orientalism to Neo-Orientalism
Historically, the occident discursively produced the orient as a mysterious and
promiscuous site inhabited by primitive people and, by contrast, understood itself as
rational, sexually disciplined, and civilized. Edward Said (1978) names this selfreferential process orientalism: “a distribution of geopolitical awareness into aesthetic,
scholarly, economic, sociological, historical, and philological texts” (p. 12). Orientalism
posited an ontological distinction between the east and the west by producing the former
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as inferior and the latter as superior. Such depictions heavily relied upon the racialization
of religious distinctions, specifically the purported antagonism between Old World
Christianity and Islam, which were rearticulated as civilizational differences. In Said’s
oeuvre, orientalism represents the Middle East, particularly the Holy Land and its
adjoining regions, as the oriental site par excellence and Muslim-Arabs as embodying the
starkest racial, religious, and civilizational differences from the European self (also see
Edward W. Said, 1997). The racialization of religious differences was central to this
process as it imbued phenotype and other differences with new meanings that were
eventually deployed to posit an unbridgeable civilizational split between the occident and
the orient.
Melanie McAlister (2001), however, has argued that while orientalism provided a
fruitful grid to understand the operations of European colonial and postcolonial power, it
cannot be easily transposed in the context of the U.S.’s engagement with the Middle-East.
If European orientalism depended on the presumption of a homogenous us of the west
differentiated against them, the people of the east, the United States has imagined itself as
a multicultural nation that remains obsessed with domestic and international diversity.
This challenges the “unified us v indistinguishable them” dichotomy. A second problem
is posed by orientalism’s neat mapping of the orient as feminine and the west as
masculine. McAlister contends that while there is some truth to Said’s reading of how
orientalism gendered the world, it ignores how the feminine articulated through the logics
of heteronormativity is increasingly becoming central to (re)producing the United States
through representations of nationality, sentimentalism, and citizenship (as also argued by
Berlant, 1997). Summarizing that the binaristic and gendering premise of orientalism are
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ill suited in the context of the United States, McAlister posits “post-orientalism” instead
as an apt model to theorize how the United States has dealt with questions of racial and
religious differences both internally and in the Middle East.9
While I concur with McAlister’s assessment that the United States remains
obsessed with (racial) diversity and relies heavily on the “feminine” to articulate national
identity, I remain unconvinced that this limits the formulation of a normative identity—
the us—against which the them can be elucidated. On the contrary, I posit neoorientalism as a framework that allows us to map the contemporary production of the
us/them binary through the racialization of religious differences. To clarify, I am not
suggesting that this mode of racial difference has displaced other historically salient
modes of racialization (for example, the production of Blackness as abjection, which
continues to calibrate racial belonging for all groups in the U.S.). Rather, my argument is
that neo-orientalism has become a salient racial technology whose importance cannot be
underestimated in understanding South Asian, specifically Sikh and Muslim, racialization
after the 9/11 attacks.
By neo-orientalism, I am marking the ways in which three salient features of
orientalism—the racialization of religious differences, particularly the production of
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It is important to note here that McAlister’s path-breaking work was released a few

months before the 9/11 attacks. One can only wonder how her interpretation of
orientalism would have changed if she were to account for the impact of the 9/11 attacks
on questions of racial difference in the U.S., which were reorganized around religious
identities, specifically Islam and Muslims.
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oriental Islam as the Other; the positing of a us v. them binary; and the centrality of
gendering and sexualization practices to the racialization of religious differences—have
come to be intensified after the 9/11 attacks in a manner that produce Sikhs and Muslims
as sympatric, even synonymous, categories in particular instances while rendering them
mutually exclusive at other times. Let me elaborate.
First, neo-orientalism refers to the historical anxieties around religious
differences, specifically oriental Islam, that became exacerbated in the post-9/11 U.S. By
this, I am marking how the racialization of religious differences and national origins
following the 9/11 attacks generated the turbaned Muslim as a figure of terror through
tropes of religious fundamentalism, oppressive patriarchy, and ontological civilizational
differences. All of these were posited as inalienable traits of Islam. The emergence of
“Muslim looking” as a post-9/11 racial typology—into which the Sikh slowly slides—is a
direct outcome of this ideological production of Islam.
The racialization of religious differences has a long-standing history in the U.S.,
as several scholars of American puritanism and orientalism have elaborated. Elver (2012)
and Bayoumi (2006) argue that immigration and naturalization is the best register to
understand how Muslims are rendered disposable in the United States. One of the earliest
cases that illustrate this phenomenon is that of Ahmed Hassan, a Yemeni immigrant, who
applied for naturalization in 1942. Just like Bhagat Singh Thind, Ahmed relied on the
argument that Arabs were descendants of Caucasians and shared a common Semitic
heritage with them, which made him eligible for citizenship. However, just as in the
Thind case, the court thought otherwise and ruled that Arabs were not white persons
within the meaning of the Nationality Act. As Judge Arthur J. Tuttle noted:
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Apart from the dark skin of the Arabs, it is well known that they are a part of the
Mohammedan world and that a wide gulf separates their culture from that of the
predominately Christian peoples of Europe. It cannot be expected that as a class
they would readily intermarry with our population and be assimilated into our
civilization. (quoted in Bayoumi, 2006, p. 269)
A key difference here is that unlike in the Thind case where religious differences
does not warrant commentary from the court, Hassan’s racial difference is specifically
marked by drawing attention to his religious identity. While nothing in the archive
suggests that Hassan wore a turban or any article of clothing that marked him as a
Muslim, his name’s religious significations seemed to have played a major role in the
court’s decision.10 In highlighting this point, I am not arguing that religion was one of the
primary axes of differentiation that assigned differential value to groups, “just like race.”
Rather, racialization as a technology of producing otherness relied on religious
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A similar phenomenon is at work with regard to the president, Barack ‘Hussein’

Obama. A major allegation that Obama has had to contend with is that he is a Muslim.
His detractors invoke his middle name as proof of his religious affiliation. Despite
providing several public rejoinders that he is a practicing Christian, Obama has never
been able to dispel this charge completely. In fact, the president had to cancel his visit to
the Golden Temple—the holiest shrine of Sikhism—during his 2010 visit to India as he
would have had to cover his head to visit the shrine. This decision was made after his
team expressed apprehensions over how his photographs with a head cover could be used
to fan rumors about his religious beliefs. See Little (2004).
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differences to police access to citizenship and belonging.
Even a cursory survey of literature demonstrates a similar but intensified
phenomenon at work in the post-9/11 U.S. I again draw upon immigration as a register
through which to map these logics. Soon after the 9/11 attacks, the Bush administration
instituted the National Security Entry Exit Registration System (NSEERS), which
mandated that all non-citizen males over the age of 16 who were citizens or nationals
from 25 countries be interviewed, fingerprinted, and photographed by a Department of
Justice official (Love, 2009; Tehranian, 2007). It also applied to all nonimmigrant visitors
already present in the United States. All of the 25 countries were Muslim- majority with
the exception of North Korea. Although NSEERS was superseded by US-VISIT which,
in turn, morphed into the Office of Biometric Identity Management, the program
accomplished several goals, including the calcification of Muslims as a distinct racial
typology through the bureaucratic collectivization of all followers of Islam, their ethnocultural and racial differences not withstanding (Bayoumi, 2006). Needless to say, such
logics inversely helped define “us,” the “universal” subject understood as white, straight,
Protestant-Christian (and secular), and property-owning (Razack, 2008).
However, just as in most instances of racialization that rely on racial optics to
render bodies transparent, the creation of “Muslim looking” peoples as a racial typology
heavily drew upon the turban and the hijab as well as physiological markers such as
beards to identify the Muslim body. In particular, and mostly because of its ubiquity in
media and other popular cultural representations of Osama Bin Laden, the turban gained
a supericonic status (Berlant, 1997) as it came to signify the Muslim’s fundamental
difference from Western modernity: a form of alienation that was inalienable. As such,

41

the turban (its different permutations notwithstanding) and the hijab11 became the starkest
sign of this racial difference, endowing the bodies donning them with a stubborn
resistance to western modernity. Hence, turbaned bodies—both Muslim and Sikh—
became proxies for Laden: Not him, but just like him. This genealogy is important to
understand how Sikh racialization has unfolded after the 9/11 attacks.
Second, neo-orientalism functions very much in a binaristic manner by polarizing
the United States into us v them, albeit with some nuances. If the (malleable) figure of the
turbaned Muslim fundamentalist still inherits the “them” of this binaristic formulation,
the us does not refer solely to practicing (white) protestants but to all un-turbaned and
some turbaned bodies aligned with (Protestant) secularism and its attendant values of
“freedom,” “responsibility,” and “democracy” that undergird free market racial
capitalism.12 Here, I am drawing upon Saba Mahmood’s (2013) definition of secularism
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The hijab plays a different role in contemporary racialization because of its heightened

gendered inflections. Coded in equal parts as a threat (the hijab conceals the bomb) and
the starkest sign of repression of women under Islamic patriarchy, it calls forth both the
security and rescue instincts that are constitutive traits of Euro-American imperialism.
Thus, while the turban is seen as a sign of a subject’s voluntary fealty to fundamentalist
Islam, which sanctions the use of preemptive force against the subject, the hijab invokes
complicated feelings of both rescue and neutralization. See Bouchard (2012).
12

Unfortunately, but not surprisingly, the us includes India, largely seen as a Hindu-

majority nation-state and a coveted partner in the fight against Islamic terrorism. This has
been achieved in no small measure due to lobbying by Hindu-Americans, who have
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“not simply as the doctrinal separation of church from state but also as the rearticulation
of religion in a manner that is commensurate with modern sensibilities and modes of
governance” (p. 65). Broadly understood, secularism is indispensable for liberal
democracies to achieve two goals that are integral to the practice of modern statecraft.
First, secularism becomes an implied political consensus that can transcend “particular
and differentiating practices of the self that are articulated through class, gender, and
religion” (Asad, 2003). This renders it into an important register that signifies a point of
unity around which the nation-state can coalesce, despite bodily and other differences
embodied by its subjects. Second, and closely tied to the first goal, secularism becomes a
mode of diffusing the “protestant ethnic” (i.e., the mastery of economic productivity as
the key drive organizing public life; Weber, 1976) into the public sphere as it pushes back
the practice of ritualized religion into the private sphere.
In this context, the figure of the turbaned Muslim (and its proximate cousins, the
turbaned Sikh and the hijabi Muslim woman) can be seen as posing a challenge in that it
brings back religion into the public sphere, thereby unsettling the supposed secular
consensus of western modernity. As such, neo-orientalism associates un-turbaned and
turbaned bodies with freedom and repression, respectively. Additionally, this boundary
also manifest among turbaned bodies as it coerces some to produce themselves as

sought to distance themselves from Muslims through public disavowals and aligning
themselves with the West in the global War on Terror (See Mathew & Prashad, 2000;
Prashad, 2009).
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affiliated with “us” by voluntarily separating themselves from “them,”13 a position that
Sikhs civil rights activism has aspired for. This, in my view, explains the power of neoorientalism in exacerbating the divisions between Sikhs and Muslims even as both are
forced to inhabit the them category.
I am emphasizing this point because while scholarship acknowledges that
turbaned subjects trouble the Christonormativity (Ferber, 2012) of western civilization,
rarely is their impact explored in relation to the purported secular moorings of western
modernity. Hence, I believe that Mandair (2009) is right in pointing out that the turban
provokes hostility from both liberals and conservatives, who see it as a threat to western
civilization. In sum, the turban (and the hijab) sometimes becomes a sign of nonChristianity and sometimes a challenge to secularism, but always a threat to western
modernity. One can therefore argue that it has worked as a glaring sign of oriental Islam,
marking the subjects who don it for retribution.
Lastly, neo-orientalism relies on an intensification of gendering and sexualization
practices to produce turbaned bodies as perverse and degenerate (Puar & Rai, 2002). In
this, it heavily draws upon orientalist tropes that produced the orient as sexually
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One can see this manifested internally in such formulations as “Good Muslims, Bad

Muslims.” If “good Muslims” are those who have become partners in the U.S.’s globegirdling War on Terror, bad Muslims simply stand in the way of “freedom” and
“democracy” through their resistance to the West’s imperial interventions. See Mohamed
Mamdani (2004). However, the primary fault line continues to be between us (broadly
understood as non-Muslims organized around whiteness) and them (oriental Muslim).
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degenerate. However, unlike orientalism, which produced the West as heteronormative
and the orient as exotic and decadent, neo-orientalism articulates sexual freedom and
gender equality as foundational to western modernity. In other words, Euro-America
(and, through pinkwashing, Israel) is produced as not only heteronormative but also
homonormative (the internal repression of homosexuality not withstanding) against
which turbaned masculinities are coded as patriarchal, pathological, and sexually
repressed and repressive.
Neo-orientalism relies on the deployment of sexual tropes to pathologize racial
and religious others even as normative queerness and liberal feminisms are rewarded with
the privileges of citizenship and belonging. Puar and Rai (2002) are perhaps most useful
here. As they note, the construction of the (turbaned Islamic) “terrorist” in the post-9/11
period relied heavily on orientalist knowledge of sexual perversity (failed
heterosexuality, notions of the psyche, and monstrosity), which in turn evoked an
aggressive heterosexual patriotism in Sikh and South Asian organizing. They argue that
Western norms of the subject and its abnormal others, which were worked out in the
eighteenth and nineteenth century (the highpoint of European colonial contact) are central
to the contemporary production of the “terrorist”:
The monsters that haunt the prose of contemporary counterterrorism emerge out
of figures in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries that have always been
racialized, classed, and sexualized. The undesirable, the vagrant, the Gypsy, the
savage, the Hottentot Venus, or the sexual depravity of the Oriental torrid zone
shares a basic kinship with the terrorist-monster. (p. 124)
However, this sexual perversity attributed to the terrorist is no simple misnaming
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of homosexuality. Rather, inclusion of normative forms of queerness under western
modernity is central to neo-orientalism, which produces Islam as degenerate by coding it
as being inherently destructive of queerness. To be clear, western modernity is inclusive
of normative forms of queerness only in so far as they do not pose any challenges to the
centrality of reproductive heteronormativity and in so far as non-heterosexual forms of
desire and gender non-conformity can be contained into a secondary position legally and
socially. Nevertheless, and despite these important qualifications, queerness and gender
equality have become key sites of contestation under neo-orientalism as Euro-America
appropriates them to enunciate itself as superior and renders Islam as degenerate.
Together, these three dimensions of neo-orientalism are heavily implicated in
Sikh racialization in that they produce Sikhs as proximal, even proxy, Muslim (looking)
subjects while concomitantly coercing Sikhs to produce themselves as distinct from
Muslims. My point is that instead of understanding Sikhs as a group “mistaken” for
Muslims, as if the two existed as discrete categories before the operation of violence, we
need to account for how neo-orientalism actively produces Sikhs as proxies for Muslims
even as Sikhs are coaxed into producing themselves as distinct religio us-racial subjects in
accordance with conceptions of diversity as articulated under U.S. multiculturalism.
The implications of such a shift cannot be overstated. It strikes at the very roots of
the “mistaken identity paradigm,” which has become the regnant explanation in both
popular and scholarly inquiries of anti-Sikh racial profiling after the 9/11 attacks. Neoorientalism as a theoretical framework helps explain how Sikhs are not “mistaken” for
Muslims. In post-9/11, racism is articulated through neo-orientalist logics and
rearticulates the boundaries between different religio-racial categories, specifically
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Sikhism and Islam, in such a manner that the distinctions between them are exaggerated,
even as Sikhs and Muslims are collapsed into the racial typology of “Muslim looking.”
Inversely, such a framework explains how the meaning of what it means to be a Sikh has
come to be constrained into a narrow religious-racial category, which not only
invisiblizes un-turbaned and non-cismale Sikh bodies but also interrupts inter-religious,
pan-ethnic alliances among South Asians. I now turn to the coverage of the Oak Creek
shootings and the subsequent efforts of the Sikh civil society around the hate crimes
initiative to demonstrate how neo-orientalism produces Sikhs as proxies for Muslims
while coercing Sikhs to perform their differences from Muslims at the same time.
Oak Creek Massacre: Mistaken Identity or Cultivated Terror?
On August 5, 2012, white supremacist Wade Michael Page shot dead six Sikh
worshippers—Paramjit Kaur, Suveg Singh, Satwant Singh, Ranjit Singh, Sita Singh, and
Prakash Singh—at a Gurudwara in Oak Creek, WI. Page also injured a police officer
before killing himself after a responding team grievously wounded him. Although the
reasons for his fatal rampage are unclear, media reports indicated that he harbored a deep
hatred for non-whites, whom he referred to as “dirt people” (Leitsinger, 2012; Romell,
2015). The shooting left the American Sikh community in general and the Oak Creek
Sikh community in particular shaken as it had all the telltale signs of an incident that was
in the making for some time.
The Oak Creek massacre had all the markers of mass shootings that have become
the staple of American national life: a disgruntled white male with easy access to firearms
who focused his rage on racially marked subjects with whom he had no personal ties.
Page’s history of involvement with the organized white supremacist movement had been
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well documented (Goodwin, 2015; Heim, 2012; McGreal, 2015). The Southern Poverty
Law Center had tracked Page’s activities for over a decade (Beirich & Potok, 2015). As a
result, and contrary to most mass shootings where the racial dimensions are deliberately
underplayed (for example, see Brandzel & Desai, 2008; Kimmel & Mahler, 2003), the
Oak Creek massacre starkly highlighted the primary role played by Page’s white
supremacist leanings in the shooting spree. Yet, while most media reports recognized this
dimension, including Page’s membership in hate groups such as the Hammerskin Nation
(a white supremacist group), the framing of the shooting worked in two ways to
underemphasize the post-9/11 climate of racial-religious acrimony that intensified Page’s
hatred for non-whites.
First, the media coverage rendered Page as largely an isolated extremist who had
gotten radicalized through his association with the white supremacist movement in his
role as the leader of a white-power band, “End Apathy,” and another band called
“Definite Hate” (Beirich & Potok, 2015). In their detailed profile of Page in The New
York Times tellingly titled “Wisconsin Killer Fed and was Fueled by Hate-Driven
Music,” Goode and Kovaleski (2012) focus on the role that white-power music or “hate
rock” played in radicalizing Page. The article quotes SPLC fellow Mark Potok to
emphasize that white power bands were key in radicalizing Page: “The music that comes
from these bands is incredibly violent, and it talks about murdering Jews, black people,
gay people and a whole host of other enemies. ” Another story in the Washington Post
titled “Wade Michael Page was Steeped in neo-Nazi ‘Hate Music’ Movement” similarly
emphasizes the role of music in extenuating racial hatred.
Whatever caused Wade Michael Page to massacre worshipers at a Wisconsin Sikh
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temple on Sunday may never be known. But this much is clear: For at least a
decade, he had been steeped in a neo-Nazi “hate music” scene that espouses white
power and racial superiority and occasionally promotes violent acts against people
of other races and religions. (Heim, 2012)
Just as in other cases of media coverage of school shootings that link gun violence
to the perpetrators’ tendency to play violent video games and/or exposure to other forms
of mediatized violence (for example, see Anderson, 2004), the framing of the Oak Creek
shooting overemphasized Page’s role in the white music scene in inciting racial animosity
while eliding the structural conditions behind the eruption of violence, particularly the
pervasiveness of neo-orientalist discourse in the post-9/11 period that marked turbaned
bodied as “enemies.” Hate music worked remarkably similarly to anxieties around
different forms of mediatized violence in that it was seen as the primary reason that
incited the fatal attack rather than the post-9/11 climate that normalized violence against
those perceived as Muslims.
But the links between the white power music scene and the capacity to indulge in
racial violence is arguably more complex. As Futrell, Simi, and Gottschalk (2006), who
studied the white power music scene in Southern California of which Page was a part,
pointed out, “White power music culture matters to activists, but it is not clear precisely
how it matters” (p. 282). They argue that music is an important component of the white
power movement in that it allows for intergenerational contact, which creates a cohesive
community of shared interests. But there is no reason to believe, according to the authors,
that music is what brings white activists together or that it incites violence on its own.
Nevertheless, this purported link between music and violence was so strong in the
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mainstream media’s framing of the Oak Creek shooting that soon after Page was
identified as the killer, the FBI was looking into what music he was listening to in the
hours before the killing to understand “whether it shaped his state of mind…” (McGreal,
2015).
Second, and as is the case with most mass shootings, the media rendered what is
essentially a case of nationally-condoned racial rage into an effect of Page’s troubled
upbringing. Almost all of the media profiles framed Page as having had a difficult
childhood that manifest in a severe drinking problem and the inability to hold a job. The
New York Times quotes his stepmother, Laura Page, humanizing Page as “a precious little
boy” who would go camping and fishing with his father and her in Colorado.
For most of his childhood, Ms. Page said, Mr. Page lived in the Denver area with
his mother, a dog groomer, but she died when he was 13 or 14, and “he took it
very hard.” He was not close to his father, she said, and moved in with a
grandmother and an aunt who were also in Colorado. (Goode & Kovaleski, 2012)
In sum, what slowly emerged was the profile of a “lunatic” with a troubled past,
as The New York Post report summed it up (Fenton, 2012). “Lunatic” as a framing device
not only signifies individual pathology rooted but also renders racial violence as an
exceptional act, thereby misrepresenting the pervasiveness and frequency of what has
been a recurring feature of Sikh life. In sum, by attributing racial violence to “hate
music” and a “troubled past,” mediatized discourses invisiblized the neo-orientalist racial
climate that condoned violence against turbaned bodies. While I am not denying that
several factors could have contributed to Page’s eventual outburst, I am perturbed by the
ways in which the media astutely avoided broaching the post-9/11 climate in which anti-
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Muslim racism not only became normalized but reached endemic proportions. Moreover,
if Page’s troubled upbringing and hate music were indeed the central factors behind the
shooting, why were his targets members of a group whom he understood as racially
different at best or as Muslims/Arabs/Middle-Easterners at worst? And is it a coincidence
that Page’s victims are also the ones that have experienced the brunt of post-9/11 racial
violence in the form of vigilante attacks and state-sanctioned racism?
Something else was also at work that the media was reluctant to explore as a
causative factor: Page’s radicalization in the U.S. military. Page served six years in the
U.S. military, first in the psychological operations unit at Fort Bliss, Texas, and then as a
E4 psychological operations specialist at Fort Bragg, N.C., before receiving a general
discharge for being AWOL and for being drunk on duty (Shane III & McCloskey, 2015).
Although he was never deployed, Page was awarded the Army Commendation Medal,
Army Achievement Medal, Army Good Conduct award, the National Defense Service
Medal, Humanitarian Service Medal and Parachutist Badge (Foxnews, 2012). Page’s ties
with organized white supremacist groups started during his time with the military, which
not only initiated him into a “thriving neo-Nazi underworld” (Elias, 2012) but might have
also introduced him to neo-orientalist discourses that situated Muslims and Arabs as the
primary threat facing the United States. This might have played a role in his eventual
retaliation.
The U.S. military has served as key recruiting grounds for white supremacist
movements such as the National Alliance and National Socialist Movement, which often
look for soldiers with tactical training to join their ranks (Hudson, 1999; Kennard, 2015).
In fact, a disproportionate number of those convicted on domestic terrorism charges in
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the United States have had documented military experience (Simi, Bubolz, & Hardman,
2013). However, I am interested here not only in the tactical and weapons training that
the military offers to recruits but also in how it is integrally tied to the production of
knowledges such as neo-orientalist counterinsurgency discourses that normalize the
alterity of those racialized as Muslims. Put differently, the military not only offers tactical
skills that are highly sought after within white supremacist organizations but also
produces knowledges and experiences that deeply draw upon and reinforce neoorientalist racialized logics, thereby reinforcing the fear of those coded as Muslim.
My argument is that Page’s radicalization is integrally tied to the role of the
military both as a state apparatus that trains individuals in technologies of violence and as
an entity that is centrally complicit with the production of neo-orientalist knowledges that
reinforce the alterity of racial-religious groups. While the former role—the military as a
producer of tactical knowledges—has been relatively well documented in various
congressional hearings, independent studies, and academic scholarship, not much has
been said about how the defense establishment relies on neo-orientalist logics to
prosecute its War on Terror. I posit that Page’s radicalization should be located at the
intersection of these two roles of the U.S. military.
Officially, the U.S. Army maintains a zero-tolerance policy with regard to
discrimination based on racial and religious differences. It also proscribes extremist
activities within the military on the basis of race, color, gender, or national origin. The
latest Army Command Policy issued in 2014 notes:
Participation in extremist organizations and activities by Army personnel is
inconsistent with the responsibilities of military Service. It is the policy of the
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United States Army to provide EO [equal opportunity] and treatment for all
Soldiers [sic] without regard to race, color, religion, gender, or national origin.
Enforcement of this policy is a responsibility of command, is vitally important to
unit cohesion and morale, and is essential to the Army’s ability to accomplish its
mission. It is the commander’s responsibility to maintain good order and
discipline in the unit. Every commander has the inherent authority to take
appropriate actions to accomplish this goal. (Department of the Army, 2015)
However, it is important to note that the military uses “extremism” as a catchall
phrase, which occludes the specificity of racial violence targeted at non-white groups. In
addition, its response to extremism was developed to primarily clamp down on left-wing
activities (Hudson, 1999). As a result, white supremacist networks on bases have rarely
attracted serious disciplinary action, making the military home to a thriving white
supremacist movement. An investigation by the Federal Bureau of Investigations
spanning Oct. 2001 to May 2008 reported 203 individuals with ties to white extremist
organizations who had confirmed or claimed military service (FBI Counterterrorism
Division, 2008). Of these, 19 veterans had verified or unverified service in the ongoing
wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. In addition, another report on gang members and gangrelated activities in the U.S. military notes that white supremacist groups along with other
ethnically-organized gangs are active in U.S. military installations both internationally
and domestically and often recruit children from military families into a range of
activities, including drug peddling (National Gang Intelligence Center, 2007).
Fort Bragg, where Page was stationed for some time, was a hotbed of white
supremacist activity. A billboard in the mid-1990s near the military base, the time when
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Page was serving there, read “Enough! Lets start taking back America.” It was paid for
by an active-duty soldier on the base who was also a recruiter for the National Alliance
(Barton, 2012). Page transferred to Fort Bragg in 1995, the same year that three
paratroopers—James N. Burmeister 2nd, Malcolm Wright Jr., and Randy Lee Meadows
Jr.— attached to the 82nd Airborne Division were involved in the killing of a Black
woman and a man in Fayetteville to earn spider web tattoos, which signify that the bearer
had killed non-whites (Elias, 2012). Burmeister’s documented history of white
supremacist activity was ignored by the authorities (Hudson, 1999). The three soldiers
received prison sentences for life and 19 soldiers from the base were discharged for
participating in neo-Nazi activities (Elias, 2012). The shootings also prompted an internal
investigation by the Army into white supremacist activity in its ranks. It revealed that
only 100 of the 7,600 soldiers interviewed belonged to known white supremacist groups
but that 3.5 percent of the interviewees had been contacted to join an extremist group
since joining the military (“Ex-G.I. at Fort Bragg,” 1997).
Page recognized Burmeister from his days at Fort Bragg, although it seems they
knew each other only in passing (Goodman, 2012). Nevertheless, he confessed to Pete
Simi, a sociologist who met Page as part of his fieldwork on the organized white
supremacist movement, that he had become radicalized in the Army: “If you don’t go
into the military as a racist, you definitely leave as one” (Goodman, 2012). Page
maintained that it was not the military’s indifference or even tacit support that
encouraged white supremacist activities but the feeling that white recruits were treated
badly compared to recruits of color, which turned the former towards rightwing extremist
groups.
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Here, a central trait of the injured white male subjectivity presents itself: the
feeling of being a victim of political correctness when denied the privilege that one feels
historically entitled to. As Lauren Berlant (1997) noted, the cultural wars of the ReaganThatcher era were a direct result of the growing acrimony among whites who felt that the
Civil Rights era had short-shrifted them while helping accrue undue benefits for people
of color. As a result, the period after 1980s marked the emergence of the wounded white
male subjectivity which was forced to speak its own name and make claims on behalf of
what was widely perceived as a racial slight against the white male subject (Robinson,
2000).
While Page’s radicalization can be seen as part of this broader response to the loss
of white male privilege, the military weaponized it with knowledges and training and
redirected it towards turbaned bodies. Page worked as an E4 psychological operations
(PSYOPS) specialist at Fort Bragg and before that in Fort Bliss. PSYOPS is defined as
“the planned use of communications to influence human attitudes and behavior. It
consists of political, military, and ideological actions conducted to induce in target groups
behavior, emotions, and attitudes that support the attainment of national objectives”
(Paddock 1989; quoted in Post, 2005). The army’s description of the job duties on its
webpage includes “Research and analyze methods of influencing foreign population from
a variety of information sources” (U.S. Army, 2015). Furthermore, it adds “Interest in
foreign countries, cultures and languages” and “Skilled at building rapport in unfamiliar
surroundings” as helpful skills for applicants to possess.
The defeat of the United States in the Vietnam War and the conclusion of the
Cold War spawned two developments that made PSYOPS a critical unit in the U.S.

55

military. First, Islamic fundamentalism replaced the U.S.S.R. as the primary threat to the
United States (Collier, 1994). This intensified an already existing interest in Islam,
Muslims, Arabs, and the Middle-East, all of which were often used interchangeably.
Second, it catalyzed efforts to reinvent the U.S. military in a new mold. Beginning in the
1980s, military strategists started calling for a change in the “mindset” of the defense
establishment that would allow for the harnessing of information technology and other
technological advances to create a leaner, effective war machine unencumbered by its
own weight (Boot, 2003; Kennard, 2012). This new military was to be highly effective,
mobile, decentralized but well-coordinated, and would be able to inflict crushing defeat
on its enemies. The renewed interest in PSYOPS, particularly after the first Gulf War,
should be placed at the intersection of these two broad developments.
Page began working as a PSYOPS specialist at a time when the military had just
concluded the First Gulf War. Hutchinson (2006) notes that “information warfare,” which
had only existed as a concept since the 1980s, came to life in the Gulf War of 1990-91
when the production and circulation of selective information became a critical component
of battlefield operations. The military controlled not only what information would be
conveyed and by whom but also took an active role in crafting and disseminating
messages aimed at the Iraqi people. In addition, there was a growing understanding that
the enemy facing the United States was an irregular one, which made the role of
information and its use in subverting the enemy highly salient in contemporary military
operations (Department of Denfense, 2007). Information became a mainstay of military
operations to such an extent that “information operations” replaced “information warfare”
with the latter referring to that subset of operations that were to be resorted to during war
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(Hutchinson, 2006). Around the same time, social psychology theory was integrated with
psychological warfare as a key tool of war, particularly to study those populations seen as
posing a threat to the United States.
William C. Bradford, a controversial professor at the U.S. Military Academy at
West Point, posits the War on Terror as unfolding between two factions: the West and
Islamists (Bradford, 2015). The latter, according to Bradford, is a loosely defined
formation encompassing everyone from Al-Qaida to secular Muslims opposing
dictatorial regimes supported by the United States and European powers and they do not
shy away from using anything and every means at their disposal. Terming the current
modality of this conflict as 4GW (Fourth Generation War; the first three being premised
on manpower, firepower, and maneuvers, respectively), Bradford (see also Lind, 2004)
chalks out a heightened role for the PYSOPS, so much so that “Military operations are
combat support efforts that frame, magnify, and potentiate the effects of PSYOPs on
adversarial political will” (p. 4)
One can imagine the formative role that obsession with Arab Muslim societies
and the fundamentalist Muslim subjectivity played in organizing PSYOPS work. Porter
(2009) notes that war became the primary site through which to apprehend the oriental
enemy. And key to waging a war is the Chinese war strategist Sun Tzu’s instruction,
“Know your enemy, know yourself,” which is perhaps overemphasized within the U.S.
military and made evident through the numerous area studies programs funded by the
defense establishment. This marked the cultural turn within contemporary
anthropological approaches to war that, according to Porter, resurrected metacultural
forms that suggested an undifferentiated “orient” stretching from Japan to Turkey against
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which the West had to be vigilant.
A key text that encapsulates this phenomenon and became popular following the
First Gulf War was written by the cultural anthropologist-cum-orientalist Raphael Patai
and is telling titled The Arab Mind (1973). The popularity of the book in military
academics is perhaps best captured in the foreword to the 2007 reprint of the book by
Col. Norvell B. De Atkine, who taught at the John F. Kennedy Special Warfare School at
Fort Bragg. De Atkine noted that The Arab Mind formed the basis of his instruction at the
military school where he taught. He adds:
Over the past twelve years, I have also briefed hundreds of military teams being
deployed to the Middle East. When returning from the Middle East, my students,
as well as the members of these teams, invariably comment on the paramount
usefulness of the cultural instruction in their assignments. In doing so they
validate the analysis and descriptions offered by Raphael Patai. (p. XV)
Rather adventurous in its ambition to offer a preview into the “Arab mind,”
Patai’s work traffics in the most egregious orientalist stereotypes by reducing sociopolitical complexities and colonial histories of the Middle East to psycho-cultural
peculiarities of the “Arab mind” (also see Hersh, 2004). Patai argues that Arabs are ruled
by primal instincts and, as such, it is only through the use of force that they can be
reigned in and made to fall in line with Western interests. Patai renders “Arabs” and
“Muslims” as synonymous categories by collapsing racial and religious distinctions. I am
highlighting this point because the collapsing of Sikhs into the racial formation of
“Muslim- looking” peoples can be traced back to this phenomenon.
The Arab Mind is a (neo)orientalist text that is emblematic of the cultural
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instructions that the military relied on to prosecute it wars in the Middle East. While it is
unclear if Page ever read the book, it sketches a general psychobiography of the “Arab”
that was trafficked heavily in military academies. As such, it is emblematic of the training
material that Page might have been exposed to in his work as a PSYOPS specialist. Patai
argues that while “Arabs” and “Muslims” can be apprehended as analytical different, the
crossover between them in the real world is so immense that any effort to distinguish
them is unrealistic. As he notes in his characteristic hyperbolic delivery, “Middle East is
as Muslim as Europe and America are Christian” (p. 12). The Arab Mind implicitly
compares the Arab society to the West and, in the process, posits one as Islamic while the
other—the “us,” the location where this scholarship is produced and intended to be
read—is rendered Christian (and secular). Patai adds, “Arabs identify Arabism with Islam
and vice-versa” (p. 14). This collapses Arabs with Muslims, rendering both these
categories interchangeable.14
It is in this context that Page’s training as a PSYOPS operative is key to
comprehend the Oak Creek massacre. There is no reason to believe that Page held
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The extent to which neo-orientalist logics held sway on the military’s imagination is

also made apparent from the fact that the leading video games in the genre of the military
shooter, Kumu/War, Close Combat, America’s Army, and Full Spectrum Warrior, were
developed in close coordination with the military with the latter two wholly or partly
funded by the military. All of these games depict the Middle East as the quintessential
battleground with “Arabs” in turbans representing the terrorist-enemy. See Höglund
(2008).
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animosity against Sikhs. In fact, he never seemed to have mentioned Sikhs as his primary
targets seem to have been Blacks and Jews (Goodman, 2012). His last girlfriend, Misty
Cook, worked as a cook at a restaurant near the Oak Creek Gurudwara (Elias, 2012), and
Page might have frequently seen turbaned Sikhs pass by the restaurant, the only time he
came into contact with Sikhs. Nevertheless, he was enraged after the 9/11 attacks,
remarking that “America should just plaster all of the Middle East” (Walker, 2012). His
military training may have intersected with the 9/11 attacks to add “Arabs” and
“Muslims” to his list of racial enemies and perhaps may have even moved them to the top
of the list (Elias, 2012).
But why attack Sikhs? Neo-orientalism as an explanatory mechanism can throw
some light on how Page’s rage was redirected against a population he saw as “Arab and
Muslim.” After the Gulf War, “Arab/Muslims” emerged as the central objects of the U.S.
military’s attention. This was nowhere more true than in the world of PSYOPS, which
was tasked with “understanding” the enemy. “Arab/Muslim” was a racial formation that
was primary defined as an index of otherness. Its primary coordinates were knowledge of
Arabic (or any language not recognizably European15 ), fealty to Islam, and was best
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While Arabic continues to be one of the primary “signs,” it works with a constellation

of other signs that are understood to make the enemy apparent. A case in point is that of a
Northwest Airlines flight bound to India that was escorted by two Dutch fighter jets to
Amsterdam airport after the captain radioed in asking for help. The aircrew said their
suspicion was aroused when they saw 12 men with “a large number of cell phones, lap
tops and hard drives, and (they) refused to follow the crew's instructions” (Sterling,
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emblematized by the turbaned Muslim who refused to assimilate into Western ways.
When seen through this racialized optics, Sikhs fit the profile.
Page declared that “America should just plaster all of the Middle East.” I argue
that “all of” in this iteration stands for a key characteristic of the contemporary War on
Terror: it encapsulates not only the entirety of the Middle East, including all Arabs
(coded as Muslims), but also captures the inherent interchangeability of non-white, nonChristian, turbaned bodies that lose their specificity when whiteness perceives a threat.
Recall that neo-orientalism is not only premised on the racialization of religious
differences but also on the production of the us/them binary that reduces socio-cultural
and other differences into binaristic metacultural categories that are mapped onto bodies
to render the other/enemy apparent. In the post-9/11 period, visual and other sensory cues
became key signs of reading racial-religious difference. The turban (and the hijab), which
was rendered as a supericonic sign of oriental Islam, also sat on Sikh heads, making them
equally expugnable. The vulnerability of Sikhs then is not an accident but is directly
related to the ways in which neo-orientalism imputes disposability onto non-white, nonChristian bodies by rendering them interchangeable.
John Liebert, a psychiatrist who conducted fitness exams for the military, noted
soon after the shooting that Page should not have been recruited as a PSYOPS specialist

2006). U.S. air marshals on the flight were also suspicious of them. The men spoke Urdu,
“the language commonly spoken in Pakistan and by many of India's Muslims.” All the
men were later released as there was no reason to believe they were planning to commit
an act of violence.
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as he had a history of mental illness (Kissinger, 2012). However, locating individual
pathology as the main reason for racial violence does little to address the ways in which
neo-orientalism and the broad categorizations that it spawned formed the basis of much
of the military’s operations and continues to guide state apparatuses whose function is to
be prepared against terrorism. To give but one example, the slide below is part of the
FBI’s instructional material titled “Militancy Considerations” used in counterinsurgency
trainings (Ackerman, 2011).
Figure 1

It compares the influence of the Torah, the Bible, and the Koran (sic) over Jews,
Christians, and Muslims. While those who adhere to the teachings of the Torah and the
Bible are depicted as generally moving from violence to non-violence by embracing
liberal hermeneutical practices, the reception of the Koran is depicted as being immune to
this process. The implication here is that any reading other than strict doctrinal
interpretations are frowned upon in Islam. This is signaled as the basis for militancy.
While the FBI has arguably different responsibilities than PSYOPS, the training
material nevertheless gesture towards how neo-orientalist logics suffuse state security
apparatuses whose task it is to neutralize internal and external threats to the United
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States. Needless to say, not all PSYOPS personnel have turned to violence and neither do
all shooters who go on a rampage have PSYOPS experience. And not all victims of
shooting sprees are Sikhs. Rather, my point is that Page’s exposure to neo-orientalist
logics in the military weaponized his racial rage and redirected it onto turbaned bodies
that were coded as a threat to the U.S. In other words, neo-orientalism and its attendant
ideas of racial threat that coalesced around discreet objects such as turbans and the hijab
rendered Sikhs as proxies for Muslims, making them disposable.
“The Dignity of Being a Statistic”
On Sept. 19, 2012, Harpreet Singh Saini appeared before the U.S. Senate
Subcommittee on the Constitution, Civil Rights and Human Rights Committee on the
Judiciary convened by Sen. Dick Durbin to offer testimony on the need to include attacks
against Sikhs as a separate hate crime category. His mother, Paramjit Kaur, was one of
the Sikh worshippers shot dead by Page. Saini’s testimony starts with a description of the
shooting that claimed his mother and five other Sikhs’ lives. All of the victims are
presented as devout familial subjects who came to the U.S. looking for better
opportunities: “He (Page) killed my mother, Paramjit Kaur, while she was sitting for
morning prayers. He shot and killed five more men – all of them were fathers, all had
turbans like me” (United States Senate, 2015). The shooting is presented as an
interruption of the American dream, which is a key trope that organizes Saini’s
testimony. As he rehearses the names of those killed, Saini prefaces it with “This was not
the American dream of …” to humanize the victims who lost their life that day. Then,
Saini puts forth his main demand to the committee: to give his mother “the dignity of
being a statistic” by recognizing the attacks against Sikhs as a separate hate crime
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category.
Senators, I came here today to ask the government to give my mother the dignity
of being a statistic. The FBI does not track hate crimes against Sikhs. My mother
and those shot that day will not even count on a federal form. We cannot solve a
problem we refuse to recognize. (United States Senate, 2015, emphasis mine)
I situate Saini’s testimony as a text that represents Sikh pain, fears, and
aspirations in the post-9/11 period. In addition, it forcefully articulates the central demand
of post-9/11 Sikh civil rights activism: to recognize the specificity of anti-Sikh attacks by
enumerating them as a separate hate crime category. Saini humanizes this demand by
calling the federal government to give his mother “the dignity of being a statistic” so that
violence against Sikhs can be prosecuted effectively. Given the general apathy of the
state towards the plight of Sikhs and Sikh Americans despite a decade of attacks against
turbaned bodies, Saini’s plea evinces a desire to make Paramjit’s death count by gaining
her recognition as a prelude to state acknowledgement of attacks against Sikhs as hate
crimes.
But one cannot help but ask: what other options are foreclosed when the demand
to be recognized as victims of hate crimes becomes the central focus of Sikh civil rights
activism? In posing this question, I want to clarify that I do not mean to underestimate
Saini’s demand. Quite the contrary, as I remain aware that one of the important ways in
which marginalized populations facing racial violence have historically dealt with it is by
calling for such attacks to be recognized as hate crimes in the hope that it would have a
deterring effect on the perpetrators. Additionally, the post-9/11 period has been marked
by an intensification of the security state, particularly its legal and police apparatuses
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(Khalili, 2013).16 Hence, grievances coded as legal demands become easily intelligible to
the state and, consequently, elicit liberal promises of protection. For these reasons, hate
crimes have become one of the few avenues through which marginalized populations can
demand an end to racial violence perpetrated by vigilantes.
However, two concerns inform my question. First, the state draws upon the same
logics of racial profiling such as singling out turbaned bodies at airports for additional
security checks that drive vigilante attacks. In this light, Saini’s demand raises important
questions about the effectiveness of depending on the state to prevent attacks against
Sikhs. Second, if we are to set aside skepticism momentarily and accept hate-crime
recognition as an important way to address anti-Sikh violence, what are the terms on
which this recognition is sought and what are its implications?
Sikh efforts to force the federal government to recognize attacks against Sikhs as
hate crimes began soon after vigilantes started targeting turbaned Sikhs after the 9/11
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Khalili argues that “lawfare” or the deliberate use of law as a weapon of war has been a

key feature of the contemporary War on Terror, which lead to a proliferation of the legal
apparatus. The use of law in the War on Terror has taken several forms from the passage
of such draconian legislation as the Patriot Act, which severely limited civil liberties, to a
suspension of law through legal procedures in places such as the Guantánamo Bay
detention center, where the rule of law was substituted by administrative measures. As
such, legal demands have better traction with the state, although one is never sure if the
state shares the same intentions as marginalized groups in recognizing legal demands.
See Khalili (2013).
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attacks. 17 However, as Navdeep Singh, policy director of the Sikh American Legal
Defense and Education Fund (SALDEF) noted, the Oak Creek attack became the turning
point in galvanizing public and governmental attention to this issue as it forced the state
to expedite efforts to at least collect data on attacks against Sikhs (Navdeep Singh,
personal communication, April 2, 2015). As such, I examine the activism around hate
crimes to understand how the effects of neo-orientalism coerced Sikhs to instantiate their
distinction from Muslims.
Neo-orientalism not only rendered Sikhs as proxies to Muslims; it also instigated
efforts from Sikh organizations to (re)present Sikhs as a distinct religious-cultural group
by emphasizing their difference from Muslims. Resounding through media as well as
academic discourses, neo-orientalism forced a closer collaboration between Sikhs and the
state by channeling Sikh rage against post-9/11 violence into seeking recognition for such
attacks as Anti-Sikh hate crimes. In these efforts, resignifying the pagh assumed
significance followed by well-coordinated attempts to place Sikhs within a multicultural
national imaginary that would secure them their rights and protections as “Americans.”
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The earliest document I could access in this regard is a 2003 communiqué from Sikh

Mediawatch and Resource Task Force (SMART) encouraging Gurudwaras in the U.S. to
write letters endorsing an initiative led by inter-faith religious leaders in support of S.966,
the Local Law Enforcement Enhancement Act (LLEEA), and its House companion bill,
the Hate Crimes Prevention Act, which would expand the federal hate crimes legislation
to include a broad set of categories. The communiqué also includes a sample letter that
the Gurudwaras are instructed to use ("SMART," 2015).
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Despite being conscientious not to mark Muslims as the “real targets,” such
representations not only betray a deep investment in multiculturalism but also a belief in
the supposed insularity of religious-cultural categories. As such, the implications of these
moves are not solely limited to Sikhs.
Figure 2

Two days after the Oak Creek massacre, the Chicago-based Red Eye, a daily
publication aimed at young readers, published a “Turban Primer” that narrated to its
readers the difference between different turbans and their wearers (“Turban primer,”
2012). The primer features “Sikh men,” “Iranian leaders,” “Taliban members,” “Indian
men,” and “Muslim religious elders”—all coded as men—horizontally arranged from left
to right and wearing different turbans. The text accompanying the illustration explains
that although they are common in many societies, including Muslim ones, “turbans are
not required by Islamic faith” (“Turban primer,” 2012). The following text appears under
the figure titled “Sikh men”:
(Sikh men) commonly wear a peaked turban that serves partly to cover their long
hair, which is never cut out of respect for God’s creation. Devout Sikhs also tuck
their uncut beards up into their turbans. Sikhism originated in northern India and
Pakistan in the 15th century and is one of the youngest of the world’s
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monotheistic religions. (“Turban primer,” 2012)
The illustration gives special attention to the nuances of the turbans as they are
depicted in different colors and variations. In the process, the primer renders the turban
into the central sign that can help distinguish the different ethno-cultural-religious
subjects on which the different turbans sit—particularly Sikhs from others. Eerily
reminiscent of an illustrated story that appeared in a 1941 issue of the Life magazine
titled “How To Tell Japs (sic) From The Chinese” to help Americans distinguish
Japanese from Chinese immigrants in the U.S. (“WTF: ‘Turban Primer,’” 2012), the onus
of the primer is on capturing the different variations of turbans with as much detail as
possible, as if to provide a visual guide to the uneducated American eye to tell Sikhs
apart from members of other groups who also wear headgears.
In the textual commentary, only “Sikh men” and “Indian men” (a highly
amorphous category) appear with no qualifications other than their religious and national
identities. Iranians and Muslim elders are represented as “leaders” and “religious elders,”
respectively, with an illustration of Ayatollah Ali Khamenei standing in for the
archetypal Iranian. At the center of the infographic is a “Taliban member” who along
with the preceding two subjects emblematizes the ethno-national diversity of the
“Muslim world.” The turban again is the key sign of difference that helps the readerviewer tell them apart. Despite the effort to depict the variety of turbans, including the
differences in turbans worn by Muslims, the primer not only sets up the primary contrast
as being between the turbaned Sikh and Muslim subjects—thereby reinforcing the idea
that Sikhs have been “mistaken” for Muslims—but also renders political positions as
incumbent on religious authority in Muslim societies. This move buttresses the dominant
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view of a lack of separation between religious and secular authority seen as a scourge in
Islam (Asad, 2003). As such, I believe that while Hatty Lee’s (2012) argument that the
primer serves no purpose other than helping to “distinguish your friends from potential
shooters” is only partially true as a closer reading also suggests the continued
politicization of Islam. The primer is an example of how neo-orientalist racial meanings
are coded into texts through a combination of visual illustration and text. It also offers a
glimpse into how elaborations of Sikh distinctiveness invariably situate Islam as an object
of contrast.
The primer was not alone in catering to the sudden need to tell Sikhs apart from
Muslims. Rather, it was part of a voluminous media production that sought to teach
American audiences unschooled in the nuances of orientalist multiculturalism, how to
match turbans with bodies. A story that appeared on the CNN website two days after the
attack and titled “The Sikh turban: at once personal and extremely public” situates the
turban as the central object that has heightened Sikh vulnerability (Basu, 2012). It
profiles two brothers—one who decided to retain the turban and another who decided to
shed “the most visible sign of his faith” after the 9/11 attacks—to map the general crisis
faced by Sikhs. While the author does not dwell into the nuances of the Sikh turban in as
much detail as the primer, the message of the story is nevertheless that the central
dilemma of Sikh life after the 9/11 attacks has been about how to retain one’s religious
identity as Sikh—rendered synonymous here with the ability to keep the pagh—while
presenting oneself as “American” at the same time. The answer, according to the author,
is in the re-presentation of Sikhs as “not Muslim.”
In the years following [the 9/11 attacks], the Sikh Coalition, a New York-
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based advocacy group, reported more than 700 attacks or bias-related incidents
against Sikhs.
That was certainly cause for concern in the Soin family.
They displayed an American flag and bumper stickers on the family car
that said: “Proud to be American” and “Sikh American.”
“It was to show people that we are with you,” Harkirat Soin says. “We are
not who you think we are.”
“We are not radical Muslims.” (Basu, 2012).
This was a recurring theme in media discourses, as if the inability to distinguish
between Sikhs and Muslims was the primary reason driving the attacks against Sikhs.
Another story also starts with a similar suggestion: “Ten years ago, Balbir Singh Sodhi
was gunned down, apparently because he looked Muslim or Arab. He was neither. Sodhi
was a Sikh (Santos, 2012). The message repeated by such stories is that Sikhs are not
“Muslim or Arab” but that they have been mistaken for Muslims. This is presented as the
main reason behind the attacks against Sikhs. Additionally, such stories situate men as
the primary victims: “Sikh women are less identifiable than men, [who are] identifiable
by their beards and turbans. Many American Sikh women dress like other Westerners or
wear the salwar kameez, a traditional north Indian garment of a long shirt and loosefitting pants” (Santos, 2012). While it may be true that those coded as men figure
primarily among the victims, such coverage takes attention away from the fact that
vigilante attacks are often the most visible of a variety of repressive projects that target
communities, including women and children, who are often the most vulnerable.
Even voices that tried to chart a different course could not help but reinforce the
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primary contrast as being between Sikhs and Muslims. Raushenbush (2012) noted a day
after the Oak Creek shooting that the media’s need to clarify the differences between
Sikhs and Muslims, however thoughtfully done, left the impression that there was
something wrong with Muslims with whom Sikhs did not want to be identified. “Sikhs
are not interested in being identified as ‘not Muslim.’ American Sikhs would rather their
tradition be understood for what it is, rather than what it is not” (Raushenbush, 2012).
Despite their intention to challenge the stigmatization of Muslims by carving an
autonomous representational space for Sikhs, such utterances left unaddressed the racial
grammar of neo-orientalism that produced the turbaned body as a threat, irrespective of
the religious identity of that body. While I am aware that the association between Sikhs
and Muslims—or Sikhs as Muslims—was difficult to escape as the semantic field was
overwhelmingly forged by this binary, I am perturbed by the media’s evasion of how
securitization discourses produced turbaned bodies as a threat.
This heightened attention to the vulnerability faced by Sikhs spawned two broad
but intertwined responses. First, it pushed Sikhs into an intensified embrace with the state
apparatus. At the heart of this emerging alliance was the demand that the federal
government recognize attacks against Sikhs as Anti-Sikh hate crimes. Second, it spawned
a parallel drive to create awareness among the “American public,” especially white
Americans, about Sikhs through campaigns that would resituate them as distinct
religious-cultural ethnic subjects who complemented the United States’ multicultural
diversity. Cumulatively, both efforts set out to produce Sikhs as distinct ethnic subjects
by calling attention to their difference from Muslims.
Paradigmatic of the effort to seek a collaborative relationship with the state
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apparatus is UNM law professor Dawinder S. Sidhu (2013), who not only argued against
retiring the mistaken identity paradigm, but insisted that the Oak Creek massacre be
treated as an act of domestic terrorism. Sidhu observed that federal statutes as they
existed did not allow for dealing with violent reprisal against racial others as terrorist
attacks as current definitions of terrorism rested on objective criteria such as whether a
shooting was premeditated and politically or ideologically motivated. This was arguably
difficult to prove in the Oak Creek massacre:
Uncertainty hinders, if not precludes, that final determination from being made.
There are many possible reasons why Page did what he did. For instance, Page
may have sought to kill people whom he thought were Muslims; shot the Sikhs
because they were a non-white “other” or because they were Sikhs; or sought
simply to kill someone—anyone—regardless of their background or
characteristics. (p. 79)
Sidhu argues that not only objective criteria but also subjective ideology and
motivation should also be considered when determining whether an incident qualified as
a terrorist act. Such an approach would produce a reevaluation of the definition of
terrorism as “the premeditated, random murder of innocent people that causes physical
and psychological harm on a community, without regard to whether the perpetrator
attempted to further a possible message” (Sidhu, 2013, p. 82). Prosecuting the Oak Creek
incident as an act of terrorism would provoke strong social disapproval and might act as a
deterrent against future attacks targeting Sikhs.
This call to treat the shooting as an act of domestic terrorism is very much aligned
with the demand that the federal government recognize attacks against Sikhs as a separate
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hate crimes category. As Attorney General Eric Holder noted soon after the attack, the
Oak Creek massacre constituted both a hate crime and a terrorist act: “Now, the victims
of Oak Creek must never be reduced to mere crime statistics. But, in order to honor their
untimely losses by ensuring that justice can be done – they do need to be counted”
(Holder, 2013). The call to prosecute the Oak Creek attack as an act of domestic
terrorism was part of the growing demand for hate crime recognition for attacks against
Sikhs.
The Matthew Shepard and James Byrd, Jr., Hate Crimes Prevention Act was
passed in 2009. It is the most comprehensive piece of hate crimes legislation that allows
for the prosecution of attacks motivated by prejudice. Before its passage, the federal
government could bring charges in bias-related crimes only if the victim had been
attacked because they had engaged in a federally-protected activity such as serving on a
jury (“Matthew Shepard and James Byrd, Jr.,” 2015). The passage of the act expanded
federal jurisdiction significantly by not only allowing for the prosecution of hate crimes
but also added more categories to the existing list of race, color, religion, and national
origin.
The law makes it unlawful to willfully cause bodily injury—or attempting to do
so with fire, firearm, or other dangerous weapon—when 1) the crime was
committed because of the actual or perceived race, color, religion, national origin
of any person, or 2) the crime was committed because of the actual or perceived
religion, national origin, gender, sexual orientation, gender identity, or disability
of any person and the crime affected interstate or foreign commerce or occurred
within federal special maritime and territorial jurisdiction. (Federal Bureau of
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Investigation, 2015b)
However, note here that the victim should have faced serious bodily harm on the
basis of “race, color, religion, (or) national origin” for hate crime charges to be invoked.
But discrimination based on “gender, sexual orientation, gender identity, or disability”
can be prosecuted only when the crime committed on their basis intervenes with
interstate or foreign commerce within federal maritime and territorial jurisdiction.
For Sikhs, the legislation did little as it did not revise the reporting categories
under anti-religious attacks. The bipartisan Hate Crimes Statistics Act 1990 only allowed
for hate crimes motivated by religious attacks against “Jews, Catholics, Protestants,
Muslims and atheists/agnostics” to be tracked as specific categories (Kaleem, 2013). All
other anti-religious attacks were treated as crimes against “other religions.” In 2013, for
instance, the FBI data indicated that 60.3 percent of the “anti-religious crimes” were
committed against Jews while 13.7 percent targeted Muslims. Anti-Catholic, antiProtestant, anti-atheist, and anti-agnostic attacks and those against multiple religious
groups accounted for 14.8 percent of the attacks while 11.2 percent were characterized as
crimes against “other religions” or “anti-other religions” (Federal Bureau of
Investigation, 2015a). Sikhs belonged to this latter category.
The advocacy for identifying attacks against Sikhs as a distinct hate crime
category rests on the premise that state recognition is often the first step in evolving a
more comprehensive and just response to the violence facing Sikhs. However, three
problems are immediately evident in this approach. As I have been arguing throughout
this chapter, such a demand obscures the role of the state in normalizing neo-orientalist
racial logics that render Sikh lives fungible. Put slightly differently, Sikh investment in
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procuring hate-crime recognition (re)situates the state as the arbitrator of racial justice by
ignoring how state-sponsored securitization and counter-insurgency discourses reinforce
the alterity of turbaned bodies. Second, it helps the state to consolidate its monopoly over
violence through a re-intensification of its security-making apparatus, which has emerged
as the primary arena to elaborate racial distinctions (Kundnani & Kumar, 2015; RichterMontpetit, 2014). Lastly, hate-crime recognition relies on the ability of Sikhs to resituate
themselves as distinct religious-cultural ethnic subjects through their disavowal of the
threat faced by all turbaned non-white bodies and by instead underscoring their
difference—implicitly from whiteness and explicitly from other ethnic(ized) subjects,
particularly Muslims. This is arguably a high-risk approach. While it offers the best
chance of procuring immediate redress for turbaned Sikhs, it can do so only by reducing
Sikh essence to orientalist conceptions of religious differences by heightening the role of
visible ethnic and religious markers. In the process, the ethical oppositional core of
Sikhism that poses a challenge to the secular-religious consensus of modernity is
overpowered (Grewal, 2012). In addition, Sikh vulnerability is depoliticized and made to
seem as a result of “bad” reading practices from “misguided” individuals rather than as a
cumulative effect of state-condoned neo-orientalist racial logics.
All of these dimensions converged in the demand for recognizing attacks against
Sikhs as Anti-Sikh hate crimes. In June 2013, almost a year after the Oak Creek shooting,
the Advisory Policy Board to the FBI recommended adding two new categories—AntiSikh and Anti-Hindu—under anti-religious attacks, which was quickly revised to include
all religious categories. This became possible in no small measure because of lobbying by
Sikh civil rights organizations. Needless to say, this new-found recognition became
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possible at a cost, albeit one that may not be readily evident.
In conveying his strong support along with over 100 other members of Congress
to add an Anti-Sikh category to the Hate Crime Statistics Act, U.S. Rep. John Garamendi
situates the United States not as the source of the threat facing turbaned bodies but one
where they may find resolution:
We Americans will never forget the 2,977 victims of the September 11th terrorist
attacks. If I have any say in the matter, we also won’t forget the 2,978th victim,
Balbir Singh Sodhi, a loving Sikh father shot and killed in Mesa, Arizona on
September 15th because his hateful ignorant killer was out for revenge and
thought he was a Muslim (Garamendi, 2013).
By integrating Sodhi as a casualty of the 9/11 attacks rather than as a victim of stateendorsed racialized prejudices, Garamendi obscures the role of neo-orientalist logics in
generating attacks against Sikhs. Furthermore, he notes that excluding Sikhs from datacollection efforts not only diminishes their safety but also weakens the quality of hate
crime data overall. Herein surfaces an important reason behind asking for a separate hate
crime category for Sikhs: to enable the security apparatus to collate better data so as to
ensure better law enforcement. Recall here that for Foucault, what separates the modern
biopolitical state from its predecessors is its reliance on statistics and other modern
techniques to “make live and let die”: a process that helps identify populations that need
to be protected from those that are coded as a threat (Foucault, 1978). It is not a stretch to
argue that access to better data on hate crimes—while beneficial to turbaned Sikhs in the
short-term—enables the state to perform better threat assessments to neutralize any
perceived threats that are associated racial others.
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Yet, along with these problematics that explicitly shore up state power, hate
crimes recognition is fundamentally incumbent on situating Sikhs as distinct religiouscultural ethnic subjects by essentializing Sikhi into the visible religious dimensions of
Sikh life. Put differently, it is not enough to mark Sikh difference in abstract and
philosophical or even ideological and political terms. Rather, Sikhs have to constantly
perform their difference in visible/racialized terms at two levels: from whiteness, on the
one hand, and from other South Asian and non-white un/turbaned subjects, on the other.
And with regard to the former, they have to do so in ways that do not elaborate a
fundamental difference with whiteness but rather instantiates a degree of separation that
can be made to work harmoniously with depoliticized multiculturalism.
Furthermore, the Sikh demand for hate-crime recognition was honored in a
manner that acknowledges the request in letter but not its intention. The annual 2015
Hate Crime Data Collection Guidelines and Training Manual of the FBI, which is issued
to all local and federal law enforcement authorities to collect and report hate crimes data
to the FBI’s Uniform Crime Reporting (UCR) program, instructs law enforcement
agencies to collect data against all self-identified religious categories as listed by the Pew
Forum on Religion and Public Life and Statistical Abstract approved by the U.S. Census
Bureau. In this manual, Sikhs finally emerged as a distinct category, but did so in a
manner that recognized their distinctiveness while reducing them to one of the many
religious groups in the United States, which are catalogued in alphabetical order. For
instance, the following definition of “Protestant” and “Sikh” appear one after another:
Protestant–A person who follows the monotheistic religion of Christianity that is
not part of Catholic or Eastern Orthodox faith. Members of this faith affirm the
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Reformation principles of justification by faith alone, the priesthood of all
believers, and the primacy of the Bible as the only source of revealed truth.
Moreover, believers deny the universal authority of the Pope and some churches
are governed by federated councils on the local, national, and international levels.
(Merriam-Webster Collegiate Dictionary [Eleventh Edition, 2003]; the
Encyclopedia Britannica Micropedia Ready Reference [15th Edition, 2010]).
Sikh–A person who follows the monotheistic religion founded by Guru Nanak in
the Punjab region of South Asia. Sikhs follow the teachings of 10 gurus; study
from the religion’s primary sacred text (i.e., the Guru Granth Sahib), and worship
in Gurdwaras. Some members of the Sikh faith may be distinguished by the
dastarr (Sikh turban) and five religious articles: kesh (unshorn hair, including a
beard), kanga (wooden comb), kara (steel bracelet), kachera (short trousers), and
kirpan (religious sword). (Criminal Justic Information Services, 2015)
Note here how “Protestant” and “Sikh” emerge as separate but somewhat
equivalent categories because of the decontextualized nature in which they are presented.
More importantly, Sikh suffering and the endangered position that they occupied in
America’s post-9/11 racialized neo-orientalist landscape is obfuscated as they are reduced
to another religious category whose heightened vulnerability does not warrant any
mention, in the same way that the historical privileges that attach to identifying as a
protestant in the United States is made invisible by reducing Protestantism to just another
religious category. This way, Sikh precarious position is denied, even as Sikhs emerge as
a distinct category. Additionally, by embodying these racial-religious characteristics, the
Sikh emerges as a subject distinct from whiteness—particularly as that against which
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white normativity can distinguish itself.
Apart from pushing Sikhs back into the orientalist trappings that they were trying
to dislodge, this definition of “Sikh” denies the Sikh subject’s ties to other South Asian
and non-white subjects emerging in common histories of racial violence. In doing so, the
document delimits the “Sikh”—a complex formation whose signification is in equal parts
social and religious and includes immense variations in theological as well as embodied
terms—into a practicing baptized Sikh who is male-bodied and displays the five articles
of Sikh faith. This, constitutes the basic profile of the religious-ethnic Sikh subject,
according to the document, and any departure from thusly scripted ethnicity renders one’s
claims to Sikhism spurious at best and untenable at worst.
Yet, such arbitrary delimiting of complex identities comes undone in more than
one way. First, the resignification of the pagh, which has emerged as a vital component of
Sikh activism, cannot proceed without drawing attention to the place of the turban in
other religions before rendering it an essential part of the Sikh religious identity. To give
an example, in outlining the significance of the pagh in Sikhism, the Sikh Coalition relies
on the importance of the turban in both Islam and Christianity. It uses excerpts from the
Old Testament to render turbans as embodying cross-religious significance that
represents faith and devotion to god. Then, it goes on to outline the role of the turban in
Islam:
Prophet Mohammed in one of his hadiths states that the turban is a frontier
between faith and unbelief. This aptly describes the significance of the turban for
a Sikh as well. It is a
true mark of sovereignty and a crown. (“Sikh Theology,” 2012)
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In Freud and the Non-European (2003), Said turns to Freud’s work, Moses and
Monotheism (1939) to argue against the mutual constitution of identities. Freud argued in
his book that Moses, the patriarchy of Judaism, was an Egyptian who was only belatedly
assimilated as a European. Said reads this work as brushing against the historical
constrains of its time as it recognizes the most important figure in Judaism as a nonEuropean Egyptian, thereby opening the possibility to examine the inherent limitations of
identity, which cannot work outside of the originary break which constitutes it. I suspect
that something similar is happening in the Sikh Coalition’s presentation of the turban as it
demonstrates how religions cannot exist as isolated entities that are hermeneutically
sealed from each other. In calling attention to the status of turbans in Christianity and
especially in Islam, the Sikh Coalition invariably renders Sikhism as something that
cannot be made sense of on its own.
This is not the only place where the effort to render Sikhism as distinct and
isolated from other religious formations comes apart. The FBI training manual also
repeatedly fails in sustaining this distinction on its own terms:
Classifying a hate crime can be confusing when a perpetrator commits a biasmotivated act based upon a victim’s religious clothing, object, or identity marker,
but uses epithets commonly directed at members of the Arab, Muslim, Hindu,
Sikh, and South Asian communities, such as “raghead,” “towelhead,” and
“terrorist.” In such cases, officers should classify the crime based on the religion
that investigation determines was the targeted group. If the investigation
determines an attack was motivated by and directed at a victim’s article of faith
such as a Dastaar (Sikh turban) or the kesh (unshorn hair, including a beard), and
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the offender knew the victim was a Sikh, the incident should be classified as AntiSikh. If the investigation shows the victim’s turban was targeted because the
offender believed the victim to be a Muslim, the crime should be classified as
Anti-Islamic (Muslim). (Criminal Justice Information Services, 2015)
If one were to follow this set of instructions, it is not entirely clear that our hypothetical
assailant attacked the Sikh pedestrian because he was aware of the former’s religious
identity. In fact, the last sentence above states that if a person is attacked because the
attacker believed the victim to be Muslim, the crime is to be classified as Anti-Islamic,
irrespective of the religious self-identification of the victim. As such, if a Sikh is
victimized using an anti-Muslim epithet, then the incident can only be recorded as an
Anti-Muslim and not as an Anti-Sikh hate crime. In effect, then, an Anti-Sikh hate crime
can be added only if the assailant made an explicit anti-Sikh reference or had a
documented history of dealings with the Sikh community. But the instructions allow for
an attack to be categorized as Anti-Sikh if a person was attacked because of their turban.
In doing so, the hate crimes manual ends up firmly coding the turban as “Sikh,” missing
any other references.
What I am marking here is how the essence of Sikhism is made to conform to
orientalist conceptualizations of religious identities that are paradoxically also used to
mark the religious-ethnic difference of certain subjects. In other words, the recognition
sought by Sikhs is conceded, but only after further entrenching them into religious-ethnic
difference. At the same time, it is important to note that despite these contradictions, the
recognition of attacks against Sikhs as Anti-Sikh hate crimes worked to cleave Sikhism
not only from other religious and spiritual formations but also from intimacies that bind
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the Sikh to the non-Sikh (non-white) other. As a result, the Sikh emerges as a distinct
category, but with a heavy price.
Along with the hate crime initiative emerged concomitant efforts to educate
Americans (i.e., non-Sikh whites) about Sikhs through campaigns that would “rebrand”
the turban as well as resituate Sikhs as (ethnic) American citizens. In summer 2013,
almost a year after the Oak Creek massacre, the Sikh American Legal Defense and
Education Fund (SALDEF) commissioned the Stanford Peace Innovation Lab to conduct
a study on American perceptions of Sikhs and to offer recommendations for an advocacy
and engagement program. The multimodal study integrated two consumer surveys; an
overview of social sciences literature on stereotypes, bias, shooter bias, and hate crimes,
among others; interviews with Sikh leaders; a review of media coverage of hate crimes
against Sikhs; and a study of internet conversation regarding Sikh Americans.
The study noted that Americans overwhelmingly associated the turban with Osama
Bin Laden than any named Sikh or Muslim alternative (Stanford University Peace
Innovation Lab, 2013). In addition, almost half of the respondents thought that Sikhism
was a sect of Islam and 70 percent could not identify a (turbaned) Sikh man in a picture.
Lastly, the study noted that anti-turban bias was common even among those with a
greater knowledge of Sikhs, including populations considered “sophisticated.” One in
five respondents said they would be angry or apprehensive if they came face-to-face with
someone wearing a turban. As a result, the study proposes the turban as a prime candidate
for a campaign:
Because of its strong visual identity, and because of the strong emotion it invokes
among so many Americans, the turban can be analyzed in the context of a
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behavioral loop. Thus the turban can be seen as a viable candidate for a campaign
that is as much about behavioral change as it is about advocacy. In fact, the [sic]
change the dynamics between Sikhs and non-Sikhs in America, a campaign that
does not incorporate behavior design might be insufficient. (Stanford University
Peace Innovation Lab, 2013, p. 18)
While many of the findings of this study, particularly the conflation of the turban
with Islam, confirm what I have been arguing throughout this chapter, my interest here is
in the recommendations that are offered to redress Sikh precarity. The study postulates
that Sikhs should first “engage and align themselves internally” before they can engage
the larger public. It argues that “the Sikh community’s relative lack of engagement with
general influencers on hate crime, human rights, peacebuilding, etc.” needs to change,
and it calls for better integration (with the American public), influence (within and
outside the Sikh community), and institutional capacity (building) (p. 25). Specifically,
with regard to the turban, the report asks the Sikh community to leverage the power that
the turban has acquired so as to alter its signification “from negative to positive” (p. 26).
By doing so, the study—perhaps more explicitly than the hate crimes initiative—
enunciates a neoliberal model of personal responsibility whereby the burden of racial
rapprochement is transferred onto Sikhs. Note how Sikhs are held responsible—if not
outright blamed—for not engaging the larger American public to dispel negative
perceptions of the turban. By suggesting that such negative perceptions arise from a lack
of Sikh outreach to the U.S. American public, the study comes close to “victim blaming”
as Sikhs are held liable for what has happened to them. Inversely, by doing so, the
structural conditions that produce such “negative perceptions” are given a pass even as it
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becomes the responsibility of Sikhs to remedy their conditions.
Furthermore, culture has become the lynchpin of racial relations under neoliberal
multiculturalism as it comes to be coded as both a counterweight and metonym for race
(Balibar & Wallerstein, 1991). One can see this in the ways in which the title of the study
represents the turban as a “cultural symbol of post-9/11 America.” Additionally, through
recourse to social sciences such as psychology and criminology, the study translates what
is essentially a case of nationally-condoned racial animosity and violence into
individually inhabited psychological traits. The language of “bias” and “stereotype”
overemphasizes the emotional dimensions of racial violence while decontextualizing the
political and social milieu that produces and sustains them.
Another report commissioned by the National Sikh Campaign and titled Sikhism
in the United States: What Americans Know and Need to Know (2015) reports similar
findings as the earlier study. What is quite revealing about this project is that it started
“with three focus group among white Americans with mixed levels of education (one
group in Iselin, NJ, and two in Chicago, IL) to allow Americans to describe in their own
words their knowledge, perceptions, and reactions to Sikh Americans” (p. 4). Although it
slowly expanded to reach out to non-Asian Americans, we are still forced to ask: Why
does “white America” become the starting point for such a study? Is the public that is to
be reached and whose approval is sought solely imagined as white?
What is evident here is how “white America” comes to stand in for the
“mainstream” to which Sikhs should endear themselves. Notice how Sikhs are called
upon to tailor their presentation to this mainstream so as to write themselves as
“Americans” worthy of protection. In doing so, they are forced into a metonymic
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identification with whiteness. In other words, one can argue that to be American is to
disappear into whiteness. What the report perhaps inadvertently captures is not just the
place of whiteness as occupying the farthest distance from the Sikh subjectivity but also
its power in determining the protections that Sikhs are to receive. In other words,
whiteness emerges as an alibi for America to whom Sikhs have to endear themselves. As
such, the report encourages Sikhs to reach out to (white) “Americans” but in an idiom
that they understand: “In particular, messages and information that emphasize the
commonalities Sikhs share with other Americans and Sikhism’s strong focus on equality
are effective in communicating the Sikh American story to the broader American public”
(p. 3). The study notes that (white) Americans are more likely to be receptive to Sikh
outreach campaigns if they incorporate elements of the “American story” and
“Patriotism” in narrating the Sikh experience in the United States. While patriotism
emphasizes Sikh participation in U.S. armed forces, including in World War I and II, and
active servicemen in Iraq and Afghanistan, the American story, which elicited the most
positive reaction, is defined as:
Sikhs embody the quintessential American story. Like the Irish, Italians, and
Chinese before them, Sikhs immigrated to this country seeking a chance to build a
better life for their families through hard work. Today, Sikhs serve on their local
PTAs and in Boy Scout troops, run small businesses and local charities, and sing
our national anthem with pride. They are part of the fabric of their communities in
every corner of this nation. They know that the United States is the greatest
country on earth, and they are proud to call themselves Americans (p. 14).
In summary, what the two studies try to accomplish is a de-historicization of Sikh
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suffering and its routing into modalities that shore up state power by denying the
structural nature of anti-Sikh racial violence. In doing so, both studies not only reiterate
the need to distinguish Sikhs from other ethnic subjects, particularly Muslims, as the
solution of the post-9/11 backlash but also map the responsibility of racial violence onto
Sikhs by blaming them for not integrating completely into the “American mainstream.”
As a result, structural neo-orientalism is made invisible, the centrality of (unmarked)
white norms is reiterated, and Sikh suffering is attributed to Sikh reluctance not to lose
their ethical distinctiveness by merging into the American mainstream.
The Turban as an Opportunity
Both popular and academic discourses have relied on the idea that the attacks
against Sikhs are a result of bad reading practices. Yet, I have attempted to show here that
it is not mistaken identity but the intensification of neo-orientalist racial logics after the
9/11 attacks—including the racialization of religious differences, especially around
Islam; the positing of a us v. them binary; and the centrality of gendering and
sexualization practices to the racialization of religious differences—that produced Sikhs
as proxies for Muslims, i.e., Muslim looking, even as Sikhs were coerced into
instantiating their difference from Muslims at the same time by rearticulating themselves
as distinct religious-cultural subjects who were an indispensable part of the United States’
multicultural diversity. Neo-orientalism works by rearranging the distinctions between
Sikhs and Muslims, sometimes by rendering them non-existent and, at other times, by
heightening them.
I situated the Oak Creek shooting, in which a white supremacist gunned down six
Sikh worshippers, and the subsequent organizing that emerged around the hate crimes
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initiative as dense sites that demonstrate these paradoxical tendencies of neo-orientalism.
If Page targeted Sikhs believing they were Muslims because of how religious markers
such as turbans and beards and non-whiteness became firmly linked with radical Islam,
such an association is rooted in an orientalist history in which phenotype, national
origins, gender, and religious differences were marshalled to produce otherness and one
which the military has weaponized to prosecute the War on Terror. The Oak Creek
massacre, then, should be seen at the intersection of these developments.
In sum, my argument throughout has been that Sikh vulnerability in the post-9/11
United States is not a result of “mistaken identity,” as has been generally projected in
popular discourse, but that it is structurally produced because of how neo-orientalism has
become indispensable for the maintenance of the U.S. empire. If this is indeed the case, it
stands to reason that Sikh vulnerability cannot be redressed through a recognition of the
attacks against Sikhs as a separate hate crimes category or by producing Sikhs as distinct
religious-cultural subjects in the American imagination. Such maneuvers depend upon
calcifying the Sikh as an exclusive religious-cultural subject, which not only denies the
historical ties that bind the Sikh body to other non-white bodies, but also reinforces the
reliance on religious markers to produce the normative Sikh subject.
What then needs to be done to address Sikh precarity? If law can only offer shortterm relief (Volpp, 2002) and that, too, only by circumscribing the meaning of what it
means to be Sikh, then what other options are available to secure Sikh life against state
and vigilante violence? Here, I want to suggest that Sikh wellbeing is, first and foremost,
incumbent upon a grappling with the condition of fungibility that plague all non-white,
non-Christian bodies in the United States. This is a historical crisis that has arguably
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intensified after the 9/11 attacks. The violence facing Sikhs can then be read not as
exceptional but as resulting from this condition of disposability. This would reorient Sikh
aspirations away from the state and modalities of liberal redress towards a reckoning of
the role of racialization in rendering non-white bodies fungible.
Often, groups facing egregious violence have little in the way of choices, so working in
partnership with the state is unavoidable. Yet, as David Goldberg reminds us in his book
aptly titled The Racial State (2002), the state (apparatus) should be understood not as
neutral with regard to the question of race but rather as an instantiation of racial power.
As such, it works in the final instance to protect the interests of whiteness even as it
dabbles with liberal modalities, particularly in the legal avenue, to arbitrate on racial
grievances while making least amendments to the status quo.
Yet, there is an ontological problem that emerges in relying on the state for
recognition. As I have been arguing throughout this chapter, such a move mandates a
reification of “Sikh” through a delimitation of that category onto overt religious markers
which, in turn, reduces the variety of subjectivities hailed by the term, “Sikh.” Put
differently, there is the danger that “Sikh” will become reified along racial-religious lines
that will work to increasingly exclude those who do not display the overt markers of
Sikhism, particularly the five articles of faith as mandated by orthodox Sikhism.
In The Subject of Sikh Studies (2005), Alhuwalia and Mandair note that despite
the shifts within the field—from the traditional domination of the theological approach
making way to an anthropological methodology grounded in a secular approach to the
current emphasis on how race and gender intersect with Sikhism—the ontological
grounds of what it means to be Sikh continues to be foreclosed. In other words, 1960s
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Sikh Studies presumed a coherent Sikh subject “by simply accepting the native
informant’s self-representation as a legitimate enunciation” (p. 5) of what it means to be
Sikh. This led to the calcification of what it means to be Sikh through a re-turn to
normative Sikh theology.
A way out of this impasse, it will be suggested, is to retrieve the question
concerning the ontological status of “Sikh” in Sikh Studies. It would mean to shift
from the sole preoccupation with epistemological… towards the more uncertain
ontological terrain of the question “what is Sikh Studies?” which, in turn, depends
on the existential question “what does it mean to be a Sikh?” If the temporal
element in the latter question is always kept open, attested to by the temporal
etymology of the words Sikh (“learner” or “student”) or Sikhi (“the constant
process of learning and becoming”), it can become a very different starting point
for Sikh Studies because what can never be definitively installed with a once-andfor-all meaning… is the category “Sikh.” (p. 9)
The authors argue that such an undertaking is essential if the Sikh subject is not to
be trapped eternally in a museum culture. In its place, they call for a rigorous analysis
that illuminates the processes that produce the Sikh as a religious-cultural-ethnic-racial
subject, which this project has tried to pursue. Foregoing ontological certainty mandates
that we keep the question of what constitutes a “Sikh” eternally open. Specifically, in the
context of this project, it would mean that we shift the focus from who a Sikh is to how
Sikhs are produced as distinct religious-cultural ethnic subjects through their
disarticulation from Muslims. It would also mean that alternative solidarities be forged
that does not allow for any easy differentiation between the Sikh and the Muslim but
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rather grapple with the centrality of whiteness to the United States’ self-imagination that
produces the Sikh as a proxy for the Muslim.
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Whoever, under color of any law, . . . willfully subjects any person in any State,
Territory, Commonwealth, Possession, or District to the deprivation of any rights,
privileges, or immunities secured or protected by the Constitution or laws of the
United States, or to different punishments, pains, or penalties, on account of such
person being an alien, or by reason of his color, or race, than are prescribed for
the punishment of citizens, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more
than one year, or both; and if bodily injury results from the acts committed in
violation of this section or if such acts include the use, attempted use, or
threatened use of a dangerous weapon, explosives, or fire, shall be fined under
this title or imprisoned not more than ten years, or both, or may be sentenced to
death.
--United States Code, Section 242 of Title 18.
Chapter 3
“Skinny Black guy”: Anti-Black Police Violence and South Asian Fungibility
In January 2015, Sureshbhai Patel left India for Madison, Alabama, to help his
son Chirag Patel and his daughter-in- law care for their 17-month-old baby (Sheets, 2015).
On February 6, 2015, about a week into his visit, the 57-year-old was taking a stroll in the
neighborhood when the police received a call from a neighbor about a “skinny Black
guy” peering into garages. The caller said that he had lived in the same neighborhood for
four years and had never seen Patel before. He also expressed concerns about leaving his
wife alone at home with a stranger in the vicinity. Apart from sketching Patel in racial
terms—skinny Black guy—the caller gave extensive details about the clothes Patel was
wearing and the direction in which he was headed (Challen, 2016).
Two officers showed up soon after and intercepted Patel on the sidewalk. They
asked him for some identification. Patel, who only speaks Gujarati and a little Hindi, told
the responding officers “no English” and repeated the number of his son’s house. The
officers ignored his plea and attempted to frisk him. At this point, Patel may not have
fully cooperated with the officers because of communication barriers (Challen, 2015b).
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Later, he told the court through translators that he was attempting to walk the officers
towards his son’s home. Eric Parker, one of the responding officers, who tried to restrain
Patel and had asked him not to “jerk away” (Challen, 2015a), used a controversial leg
sweep and slammed him to the ground. Patel was hospitalized for spinal swelling and
was declared paralyzed. He underwent surgery for cervical fusion. As of writing this
chapter, he has not fully recovered the ability to use all of his limbs.
The case did not initially attract much attention but following growing public
outrage over the incident after the video of the takedown was widely circulated on social
media, Parker was charged with third-degree assault, a misdemeanor that carries a fine
and a maximum sentence of one year. The incident was widely discussed in mainstream
media outlets, on social media, and within the South Asian diaspora, and eventually
escalated into a diplomatic row between India and the United States (Holpuch, 2015).
The Federal Bureau of Investigation charged Parker with civil rights violation for
“deprivation of rights under color of law” after the video of the takedown was shared
widely on the social media (Challen, 2015a). The Governor of Alabama, Robert Bentley,
had to tender an apology to the Indian Consul General over the incident (Elliott, 2015),
and Madison police chief Larry Muncey recommended that Parker be fired. In a letter
dated Feb. 17, 2015, Bentley called for a parallel investigation by the Alabama Law
Enforcement Agency to examine the charge of excessive use of force. 18 However, two
juries failed to indict Parker on the federal civil rights violation charges and the court
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finally acquitted him. The state also dropped the misdemeanor charge (Stephens, 2016b).
The Patel family filed a civil lawsuit against Parker and the city of Madison (Bonvillian,
2015). Meanwhile, Officer Parker vowed to fight to get his job back (Stephens, 2016b).
This chapter explores how racialized policing implicates South Asians in antiBlack discourses. Policing has emerged as a primary institution in the regulation of
populations that are deemed “social surpluses.”19 Although it plays a vital role in the
racialization of all groups, its impact is acute on non-white bodies in general and Native
and Black bodies in particular. Furthermore, the burgeoning state security apparatus 20 not

19

While Karl Marx (1934) and those in the Marxist tradition (for example, see Li, 2010)

are widely credited with developing the concept of surplus populations, my use of this
category is in line with scholars in the Black oppositional and critical race theory
traditions (for example, see Gilmore, 1999; Gilmore, 2007), who argued that the impact
of capitalist accumulation of surpluses is particularly acute on bodies of color, which are
produced as disposable through the prison industrial complex and other technologies of
racialized violence. I see policing as a primary technology of racial violence that works in
concert with systems such as the prison industrial complex to manage surplus
populations.
20

I borrow this terminology from Louis Althusser (1972) who argues that states deploy a

wide array of ideological and repressive apparatuses to enforce compliance with
authority. While the repressive apparatuses comprise primarily the police and the
military, the ideological apparatuses include schools, churches, etc. that work at the
superstructural level or at the level of ideology to normalize repressive ideologies. While
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only plays an important role in drawing the line between “make live” and “let die”
(Foucault, 2003) but also determines the extent to which populations racialized as nonwhite are exposed to various levels of rightlessness. As such, it is very important to map
the role of racialized policing in rendering racialized populations as disposable.
Specifically, this chapter explores the relationship between anti-Black policing
and South Asian racialization. How does the constitutive role of race in policing
implicate South Asians in anti-Black discourses? How do racial logics combine
phenotype, language, and other markers to produce South Asians as proxies for Black
people? Consequently, what rhetorical maneuvers are resorted to by South Asians to
produce themselves as distinct, i.e., respectable subjects worthy of state protections? How
do such attempts reinforce the devaluation of Black people? Finally, if South Asians
become disposable through their collapsing into Blackness, then how may we address the
problem of police violence without embracing sexual and gender normativities? These
are the main questions I explore in this chapter. A combination of primary and secondary
sources, including media reports, court proceedings, and witness testimonies, comprise
the archives that I draw upon to answer these questions.
I propose that the impunity with which policing operates against Black (looking)
bodies—in other words, as a race-making technology—constitutes some South Asians—
in this case, an Indian immigrant—as proxies for Blacks, which coerces the latter to

this distinction has produced several critiques, I find repressive state apparatus useful to
mark those apparatuses such as the police who rely on the use of deadly force to regulate
populations marked as non-white.
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perform their difference from Blackness. Put differently, the racialized logics of
contemporary policing create slippages at particular moments when some South Asians
become proxies for Black bodies, which then intensifies efforts among them to perform
their difference from the Black community by distinguishing themselves as a distinct
ethnic and racial community. Representations of the heteronormative, cohesive,
economically committed family play a central role in representing South Asians ideal
immigrant or citizen subjects who, despite their racial difference, are in compliance with
“American” ideals. What remains unsaid but forceful in such articulations is the
continued scripting of Black bodies and communities as economically unproductive,
sexually unrestrained, un-normed by nuclear family ideals, and therefore unworthy of
legal protections and recognition that accrue to familial American subjects, both white
and non-white (C. P. Cohen, 1997). In summary, I argue that it is the need to organize
populations into hierarchical relationships that produces South Asians and Blacks as
discrete, ahistorical categories at certain times while rendering them interchangeable at
others.
I would like to clarify, nonetheless, that in suggesting that contemporary policing
produces some South Asians as proxies for Black people, I do not mean to imply that
South Asians are exposed to the same intensity of genocidal violence facing Black bodies
and communities. Here, I take my cue from Lisa Maria Cacho (2012), who aptly notes
that while criminalization has generally been used to signify both being stereotyped as a
criminal as well as being criminalized, it is important to differentiate between the two. As
she argues:
Unlike stereotyping (as a criminal), which refers to the multiple ways (in which)
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law-abiding people of color are misrecognized as criminal and treated by others as
such, criminalization refers to the various ideological and material processes that
turn some people into criminals by making it all but impossible for them to be
law-abiding. (Cacho, 2012, p. 29; paranthesis mine)
In other words, to be branded as a felon, a gang-banger, an “illegal” immigrant, or
a terrorist is to be prevented from being law-abiding through the full force of the
repressive state apparatuses. Hence I remain aware that being misrecognized as Black is
not the same as living in a Black body (Coates, 2015), which is to be made unlivable
except as the object of law. This paper is not an effort to draw false equivalences between
the Black and South Asian communities by collapsing historical differences and the
dissimilar effects of structural racisms on these groups.
I hope to accomplish three tasks by exploring how anti-Black policing constitutes
some South Asians as proxies for Black bodies. First, my project demonstrates the
socially constructed nature of race, particularly the role played by policing and security
discourses, in elaborating Blackness and, by extension, South Asians, as discrete
racialized categories that become interchangeable at times. Here, I am following the
argument made by Kundnani and Kumar (2015) that race, specifically Blackness
(Browne, 2015), has been historically produced and reproduced in the United States
through systems of surveillance—a phenomenon which I argue has intensified after the
9/11 attacks. Second, this chapter draws attention to how the regulation of Blackness
continues to be at the center of law enforcement work. In other words, anti-Black
policing continues to centrally organize domestic security processes in the United States.
This phenomenon should be unpacked if South Asian interpellation into Blackness is to
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be understood, which this chapter attempts. Third, my project examines how anti-Black
policing coerces South Asians to participate in anti-Blackness through a reinvestment in
gender and sexual normativities. My hope in doing so is to interrupt efforts among South
Asians to signify themselves as respectable subjects through a recourse to the trope of the
South Asian heterosexual family, but instead build strong coalitions with Black and
Native communities around the issue of police violence.
The next section reviews theories of policing in an attempt to outline the racial
implications of the security apparatuses. A recent spurt of scholarship in this area,
influenced by Foucault’s work on policing and prisons, situates the institution of police as
the strong arm of the state whose target is the management of poverty and the
disciplining of stubborn bodies into economically productive subjects. In this scholarship,
the emergence of policing in medieval Europe continues to provide the dominant model,
and the question of race or specifically anti-Blackness is a glaring blind spot. In its place,
I build on the work of Black theorists to situate policing as the central instrument of racial
terror in the United States. It then naturally follows that policing is constitutively antiBlack and cannot be apprehended through a strictly poverty-based lens.
I then turn to the case of Sureshbhai Patel to demonstrate how policing implicates
South Asians in anti-Black discourses. I develop the concept of the phobic stranger by
combining the work of Frantz Fanon and Sarah Ahmed to illuminate the anti-Black logics
that constituted Patel as an object of fear. Then, I look at how the Patel family
represented themselves as respectable familial subjects, which contrast against the history
of representing Black communities as sexually promiscuous. A core goal of this project is
to interrupt such logics and to imagine solidarities grounded in an anti-violence approach.
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Guarding Racial Boundaries
Policing in the United States has received some critical attention with the
widespread circulation of videos in the social media of egregious violence against Black
bodies. The murders of Sandra Bland, Ersula Ore, Eric Garner, Michael Brown, Tamir
Rice, and others have opened up a conversation about the normalized nature of police
terror against Black and Native bodies and not too infrequently against other bodies of
color. In the first half of 2016 alone, police had killed over 500 people (“The Counted,”
2015). As if this were not enough, officers involved in fatal shootings have been
overwhelmingly acquitted by courts, as juries tend to be deadlocked over cases involving
officers.21
Thanks to regular police executions, Albuquerque, the city where I lived during
the completion of this dissertation, also made it to national news. According to The
Guardian’s “The Counted” (2015), a database tracking people killed state-wise by the
police in the United States, New Mexico topped the country per-capita with 21 people
killed in police encounters in 2015. Albuquerque Police Department’s extrajudic ial
policing methods prompted a U.S. Department of Justice investigation, which
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To address the problem of juries acquitting cops, California governor Jerry Brown

signed SB 227 in August 2015 that banned the use of grand juries in deciding whether
police officers charged with excessive use of force would face criminal charges
(Gutierrez, 2015). The bill was authored by Sen. Holly Mitchell following widespread
distrust in juries for failing to indict police officers charged with excessive and fatal use
of force.
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documented several instances of unconstitutional lethal and non-lethal policing and lack
of accountability, such as repeated use of “electronic control weapons” (Tasers) on
incapacitated victims, using “excessive force” against those with mental illnesses, and
supervisors endorsing officers’ version of events uncritically (U.S. Department of Justice,
2014).
Yet, we live in a confounding moment. Despite the irrefutable nature of racialized
police violence, critiques of law enforcement in the United States, including those from
scholars in the critical Left tradition, continue to turn to Foucault to theorize police
violence.22 While Foucault’s work has revealed important ways in which police function
in modern society, its Euro-centric nature as emblematized in the woeful lack of attention
to racialized policing, calls for alternative theories. I turn to scholars in the critical race
theory tradition and Black feminists as they can provide an important corrective that can
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Scholars in what I term the liberal tradition continue to resort to police reforms as a

way to regulate police violence. Emblematic of such work is Radley Balko’s Rise of the
warrior cop: The militarization of America’s police forces (2013), in which he argues
that the militarization of the police forces is a recent phenomenon directly emerging from
the ill-advised policies of politicians. In doing so, Balko not only ignores the racial
histories of policing but also posits that the problem is not policing per se but the
unconstitutional abuse of power by law enforcement. My chapter bypasses ahistorical
work such as these as they do nothing more than reinforce the normalcy of policing.
Rather, I center my critique around such works that call into question the role of policing
itself and supplement a class-based analysis with a race-based one.
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capture the structural nature of racialized policing in the United States.
For Foucault, policing emblematizes an intensified form of state disciplinary
power deployed towards managing poverty (1977). His work situates the institution of
policing as emerging with the rise of the bourgeois society and the collapse of the old
order, which released poor surplus populations onto cities. Historically, it was not the
prevention of crime but the maintenance of communal order that was the core function of
the police (Neocleous, 2000). As a result, certain populations—the vagabonds, the infirm,
prostitutes, and the homeless, among others—were seen as needing surveillance to
unmoor them from their habitual ways and socialize them into the wage economy so they
could be turned into economically productive subjects. Although fears of moral
corruption, particularly around sexuality, and the spread of diseases organized police
work, it was the management of poverty that provided the raison d’être for intensified
policing. As Foucault notes:
Police is the totality of measures which make work possible and necessary for all
those who could not live without it; the question Voltaire would soon formulate,
Colbert’s contemporaries had already asked: “Since you have established
yourselves as a people, have you not yet discovered the secret of forcing all the
rich to make all the poor work? Are you still ignorant of the first principles of the
police?” (Foucault, 1965, p. 43)
Foucault’s work is interested in policing as a core logic of state governmentality
itself rather than the police as a distinct, repressive institution. Perhaps owing to this
reason, he does not specify the differences between the police and the prison system. But
despite race entering the priorities of European state management through colonization
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and through the presence of bodies of color who arrived on the shores of Europe as
slaves, traders, soldiers, etc., Foucault does not account for it (Weheliye, 2014).
According to him, the police were called upon to perform a variety of functions such as
monitoring intellectuals, registration and classification, book-keeping, monitoring foodgrain production, and the like. At the same time, policing as a primary state function is
diffused through different apparatuses such as schools and clinics. As he noted in an oftcited quote: “Is it surprising that prisons resemble factories, schools, barracks, hospitals,
which all resemble prisons?” (Foucault, 1977).
In his assessment of the work of Foucault, Andrew Johnson (2014) argues that
there is a core contradiction while using Foucault’s work to theorize policing. He notes
that while the functions of the other apparatuses of the state have arguably expanded
following the neoliberalization of the state, the role of the police has narrowed down
along repressive lines. In other words, if other state institutions have progressively
subsumed disciplinary powers under biopower, the police seem to have migrated in the
other direction by embracing their role as the iron-fist of the state. According to Johnson,
this misunderstanding persists because the police use different strategies, only some of
which are visible. These include everything “from biopower, to disciplinary techniques,
to security and insurance analysis, and even the instantiation of an ideological thoughtpolice” (p. 22). Johnson argues for a nominalist reading of Foucault that will help account
for the supposed inconsistencies in his theorizing. He notes that sovereign power,
disciplinary power and biopower are not so much historical epochs but rather different
technologies of power. Finally, he adds: “The best path forward for critical theories of
modern police power is a ruthless criticism of neoliberalism, its functional mechanics and
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its organising principle” (p. 24).
I argue that Foucault’s lack of attention to how race have historically shaped
police work both in Europe and elsewhere limits the applicability of his work to explain
the role of law enforcement in the United States. Foucualt’s ethnocentricity has been
well-documented.23 This is a limitation that carries into his theorizing of policing. While I
agree with Johnson’s reading of Foucault to a certain degree, my main contention is that
it is not because the police use a variety of techniques that their role in modern society
remains invisible. Rather, we should understand these techniques as specific strategies
that are reserved for particular populations. Therefore, it is important to pay attention to
policing as fundamentally racialized in the United States where it can function as highly
repressive but also as invisible at the same time, particularly to those who are not the
direct objects of law. Second, my project hopes to demonstrate how anti-Black logics
suffuse the security apparatus, including the police and the judiciary. My intention in
doing so is not only to demonstrate that policing is anti-Black but also that anti-Blackness
circulates at the highest levels of the judiciary and other parts of the security apparatus.
Owing to these reasons, I would proffer that “The best path forward for critical theories
of modern police power” is not “a ruthless criticism of neoliberalism,” as Johnson argues,
but rather a critique of the anti-Black and other racial logics that suffuses policing.
I have presented Johnson’s work as symptomatic of the mainstream Left’s
colorblind approach to the problem of police violence. Against it, I want to chalk a
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on the Eurocentric nature of Foucault’s work.
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different position from which to apprehend the role of law enforcement as an institution
of racial terror in the United States that is organized around the regulation of Blackness
and other bodies of color. There now exists an extensive body of literature that maps the
anti-Black roots of modern policing. Rodriguez (2011) argues that slave patrols formed to
apprehend escaped slaves were the forebears of modern-day police (Rodriguez, 2011,
2012). Often, free white men were deputized by the town sheriff into such patrols. They
freely used their power to hunt down Black bodies. This legacy has carried into modern
policing.
Simone Browne (2015) notes that modern policing techniques, including
surveillance practices such as the use of biometric data and the common procedure of
asking people to produce IDs to prove their identity, have their roots in slavery as Black
bodies were branded with hot iron to mark their status as the property of specific white
masters, and Black people were forced to carry manumission papers to prove their
identity as freed slaves. She terms such practices racialized surveillance: “Racializing
surveillance is a technology of social control where surveillance practices, policies, and
performances concern the production of norms pertaining to race and exercise a ‘power
to define what is in or out of place’” (p. 16). In other words, racialized surveillance are
those practices that reify the “boundaries, borders, and bodies along racial lines” in a
manner that race starts to emerge as a natural, ahistorical, and essentialist category (p.
16).
My theorizing of policing is also informed by the path-breaking work, Policing
the Crisis: Mugging, the State, and Law and Order (Hall, Critcher, Jefferson, Clarke, &
Roberts, 1978), which tracks the ways in which notions of crime are themselves
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racialized. Policing the crisis maps how the rise of policing mediated the United
Kingdom’s racial crisis by morphing it into a social crisis. Situated at the intersection of
cultural studies and legal theory, this work demonstrates the ways in which racial
anxieties around crime invented “mugging” as a new form of street crime in Britain that
became a handy tool to criminalize predominantly youth of color. The fiction of mugging
helped the British society forge new links between “race,” “youth,” and “crime” to
normalize the discourse that the British society was in the midst of a collapse, which
revived calls for intensified policing.
In summary, Hall et al.’s work is organized around crime as a racialized
phenomenon that brings social contradictions to the fore. More importantly, it
demonstrates how social forces re-narrate an illegal act as an “exemplary crime” (also see
Cacho, 2012) that becomes the raison d’être for intensified policing. Hall et al. accurately
point out that, in the end, mugging alibies society’s need to “police the (social) crisis” by
determining who needs to be rendered as the object of law’s disciplinary regime for
society to function smoothly. In doing so, their work opens up ways to not only map the
important role played by ideas of crime in racializing populations of color but also allows
one to see how social contradictions are woven into the logics of crime itself. It sets the
precedent for my work to investigate how racialized logics that are endemic to policing
produce South Asians as “Black looking,” which intensifies South Asian efforts to
distance themselves from Blackness through strategies that are hinged to the reproduction
of sexual and gender normativities. Hall et al.’s work, along with the upending of the
causality between race and racism by Karen Field and Barbara Field (2012) and the
centrality of anti-Black logics to racialized surveillance as outlined by Simone Browne
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(2015), provides the theoretical and methodological foundations for this chapter.
Anti-Blackness as a constitutive pillar of white supremacy (Smith, 2012) and a
historical force in the United States deeply structures policing. For Browne, racialized
surveillance is derived from the larger ontological phenomenon of Blackness historically
constituted through the white gaze, specifically through surveillance. While Blackness is
not reducible to its constitution through the white gaze, this historical phenomenon
cannot be ignored, either. W.E.B. Du Bois (1913) also captures the work of the white
gaze in constructing Blackness through the idea of double consciousness: “It is a peculiar
sensation, this double-consciousness, this sense of always looking at one’s self through
the eyes of others, of measuring one’s soul by the tape of a world that looks on in amused
contempt and pity” (p. 2-3). Note here that the particular modalities of this gaze are
contempt and pity, the former of which, I argue, organizes the relationship of policing to
Blackness. I borrow Browne’s excellent outlining of racialized surveillance as a model to
develop the concept of anti-Black policing.
Anti-Black policing names the operation of anti-Black racial logics in the domain
of policing, which associates Blackness (and everything that resembles it) with
criminality that is in need of negative management through disciplinary tactics ranging
from hyper surveillance to bodily neutralization. It also marks the weaponization of the
anti-Black propensities of policing with different technologies and knowledges that are
marshalled with the specific aim of regulating and neutralizing Blackness. Another key
component of anti-Black policing is what Mimi Thi Nguyen (2015) calls the “liberal
disavowal of racism” (p. 793) whereby the anti-Black mooring of policing is consistently
denied through the colorblind language of crime and punishment, even when there exists
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overwhelming evidence to the contrary. 24 This chapter illuminates how these logics are
operationalized.
In identifying anti-Black policing this way, I deliberately avoid the theory of
racially biased policing, which maintains that policing as an institution suffers because of
the racial prejudices of its officers (Weitzer & Tuch, 2005). Rather, my argument is that
policing in the United States is constitutively anti-Black as it is designed to regulate
Blackness. This is not only borne out by the disproportionate number of Black people
killed by police officers but also by how anti-Blackness structures ideas of crime and
punishment. In 2015, over 100 unarmed Black individuals were shot and killed by the
police and only in nine cases were officers charged with a crime (“Police killed more
than 100 unarmed Black men,” 2016). Additionally, one in three Black people killed by
the police was identified as unarmed, although the number is likely to be higher. Another
example that demonstrates how anti-Blackness structures ideas of crime is the vast
dissimilarity in crack cocaine and powder cocaine sentencing. As David Sklansky (1995)
argues, mandatory federal sentences for traffickers in crack cocaine are demonstrably
harsher than penalties for powder cocaine, partly because the former is imposed almost
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Here, one only has to consider the work of prison abolitionists such as Joy James

(James, 2000), who argues that Black men are much more prone to be in the prison
system than white men, a point also made by Michelle Alexander (2010). Additionally,
despite the availability of bystander and police bodycam recordings of police shooting
unarmed Black people (for example, the beating of Rodney King), officers have been
overwhelmingly acquitted by courts, as I mentioned earlier.
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exclusively on Black defendants. Despite federal reforms to crack cocaine sentencing,
this is a phenomenon that has continued, which gestures to how laws constitute Blackness
as a devalued category. In citing this example, I am not trying to collapse judiciary into
the institution of policing but rather suggesting that these institutions work in tandem to
reify anti-Blackness.
I now turn to the case of Sureshbhai Patel to illuminate how anti-Blackness
constitutes a foundational pillar of policing. I first elucidate how contemporary policing
constitutes Black bodies at objects of fear. I then turn to the anti-Black strategies that are
mobilized in South Asian representations that depend on the production of sexual and
gender normativities to distance South Asians from Blackness. Lastly, I look at how
migrant imaginaries also contain the seeds of resistance to American assimilation. My
archive here comprises of court proceedings as well as media representations of South
Asians that produce them as respectable subjects.
The Phobic Stranger
How may we understand the violent treatment meted out to Sureshbhai Patel at
the hands of Officer Parker,25 which opened this chapter? In posing this question, I evade
the more-common framing of this issue as one of police brutality, which abhors excessive
violence against peaceful protestors but turns away when the same violence is directed at
racialized bodies (Rodriguez, 2012),. In its place, I turn to the racial dimensions of
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him as an agent of the state to draw attention to the structural nature of anti-Black
policing.
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policing, especially anti-Blackness, as a foundation for modern policing. I do so to mark
the irrefutable importance of race for contemporary policing even as it continues to be
denied at the highest levels. If violence against Patel was the direct result of racialized
policing, then it is important to highlight how the right to live is unevenly distributed and
enforced through contemporary policing and how this process is rationalized through the
judiciary.
Most attempts to make sense of the violence against Patel drew attention to
Officer Parker’s violent streak that manifested frequently in his interactions with
civilians. A year before his run-in with Patel, Parker was off duty with some friends when
an armed man tried to rob him. He fired two shots at him but missed (Grass, 2014).
Eventually, Officer Parker was declared the victim and cleared of all charges. Soon after
Patel’s take-down, several members of the Madison Gujarati community told a local
news outlet about Officer Parker’s repeated aggressive behavior with them. There seem
to be a consensus that he was far from cordial with Madison’s minority populations
(Grass, 2015). These accounts demonstrate that his excessive methods were not an
anomaly but racially-specific strategies to discipline non-white populations. Andrew
Slaughter, the other trainee officer who accompanied Officer Parker to the scene, told
investigators that he did not sense that Patel was a threat to them. Some media reports
even suggested that Officer Parker might have been trying to demonstrate the leg sweep
to Slaughter when things quickly went out of hand. 26
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But courts are generally reluctant to consider such behaviors as part of an
established pattern. In her analysis of the case of Vincent Chin whose murder in 1982 by
Ronald Ebens and Michael Nitz in Detroit was a major factor in the emergence of the
Asian American civil rights movement in the United States, Sheila Bedi (2003) notes that
Ebens had a confirmed history of racist behavior. In 1974, he had screamed racial slurs at
Willie Davis, an African American, in a bar and the latter was asked to leave to diffuse
the situation. When the defense introduced this as evidence of Ebens’ racially biased
mindset and proof of intent to violate Chin’s civil rights, the court not only held that the
prior incident was too remote to have any bearing on the current case but also maintained
that proof of racial hatred against an African American was not an indication that Ebens
was biased against Chinese Americans. Hence, it is highly unlikely that Officer Parker’s
racially prejudiced policing practices would be registered by the courts because of the
colorblindness that pervades the security apparatus.
The treatment meted out to Patel lays bare not only the importance of race for
policing but also how judiciary acts as a cover for this process. Law enforcement
authorities in the United States have been deeply implicated in anti-Black racism, as I
have been arguing throughout. For example, investigative journalists have documented
the widespread use of racial slurs by police officers to refer to people of color,
particularly Black people, in email communications and in everyday conversations
(Williams, 2016; Yimam, 2015). However, I am interested here not only in the casual
racism of police departments but also in how racial categories and racialized knowledges
are woven into the very texture of policing.
I contend that the descriptor “skinny Black guy” was not an innocent profile but a
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racialized portrait of Patel that was elicited by the law enforcement’s dependency on
racial taxonomies. Here, I use Frantz Fanon’s enunciation of a phobogenic object (1967)
in combination with Sara Ahmed’s theorization of the “stranger” as a racialized figure of
danger (2000), to argue that the profiling of Patel as a “skinny Black guy” constructed
him as a phobic stranger who had to be contained. Any other descriptors such as “old
person in the neighborhood” or “unfamiliar person walking in the street” would have
sufficed. But the caller racially profiled Patel as a “skinny Black guy,” which testifies to
the integral nature of racial categories—particularly Blackness—for policing.
According to Fanon, the phobogenic or the phobic object produces the twin
feelings of fear and revulsion in the seeing self. The phobic object’s constitutive trait is
that it is racially coded in a manner that the perceiving self apprehends its absolute
difference from the phobic object immediately. This evokes a powerful irrational reaction
aimed at neutralizing the phobic object (Hook, 2004). As Fanon (1967) puts it, “In the
phobic, affect has a priority that defies all rational thinking” (p. 155). Moreover, it is not
the phobic object’s actions but the phobic object itself which evokes such an affect. Its
mere sighting can induce a deep sense of abhorrence and insecurity in the seeing self.
Additionally, it is attributed with superhuman powers, which necessitates its immediate
containment. As Fanon further notes (1967), the phobic object is endowed with “the
attributes of a malefic power” (p.155). It turns into something monstrous: an entity that
should be preempted because of the enormous powers it possesses and is likely to unleash
upon the seeing subject. Under such circumstances, any act is permissible in the interest
of self-preservation.
While a range of subjectivities such as queer and disabled bodies often appear as
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phobic objects, the over-determining nature of the colonial-racial relationship—imported
into our times primarily through security discourses—makes racial difference and
particularly Blackness a constitutive mode of producing the other (Wynter, 2004). And
given racism’s fundamental reliance on skin color, or what Spivak (1990) terms
chromatism, to reify racial difference, Blackness has been interpellated as the other of
whiteness. So fundamental is racial difference to the European self that Fanon argues that
the European collective unconscious itself becomes coalesced through an intense
revulsion towards Blackness. As he asks (1967), “Why is it the case that, concretely or
symbolically, the black man stands for the bad side character?” (p. 198). For Fanon, this
(white) unconsciousness is sustained through the symbolic and material reproduction of
what he calls the “Negro myth,” a collection of popular and scientific knowledges,
stereotypes, discourses, and practices that produced Blackness as the abject(ed) other of
whiteness.
However, Patel’s status as a phobic object is not only derivative of his dark skin
tone but also his cultural otherness marked through his inability to speak English, to
comply with officer instructions, etc. Here, I use Ahmed’s (2000) definition of a stranger
to capture the fears that Patel evoked. Let us revisit the anonymous caller’s description of
Patel as not only a “skinny Black guy” but also as someone he had not seen in the
neighborhood before. In describing the stranger as a figure who evokes racial anxieties,
Sara Ahmed (2000) forcefully argues that the stranger is not someone “whom we do not
know” but whom we have already recognized as a stranger (p. 19). Hence, to identify
someone as a stranger is to racialize her or him as not-belonging. She further adds that
identification of “some body” as a stranger—as a body that does not belong in a
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particular place—is critical to how a locality becomes transformed into a living
community where the stranger appears as an unwanted presence. Terming this
phenomenon “stranger danger” (p. 20), Ahmed notes that racial knowledges are liberally
deployed to mark certain bodies as “strangers” against whom [racially homogenous]
neighborhoods should unite. As she notes, “I am suggesting that it is the recognition of
others that is central to the constitution of the (self) subject” (p. 22).
Ahmed’s work also draws attention to how neighborhood watch schemes—a
growing collaboration between neighborhood associations and police departments
beginning in the United States in the 1970s and in the United Kingdom in the 1980s—led
to the normalization of such logics. Ahmed argues that police departments recruited
neighborhood watch associations as “eyes and ears of the police” (p. 25) to report
“strangers” or “suspicious activities” so police could preempt crime. The emphasis was
not only on creating safe neighborhoods as the opportunity to conduct surveillance on
bodies that did not belong was presented as a way to bring communities together. As she
explains, “There is a constant shift between an emphasis on a caring community and a
safe one: a safe community moreover is one in which you feel safe as your property is
being ‘watched’ by your neighbours” (p. 25). Moreover, members of neighborhood watch
associations were instructed not to hesitate to call the police if they saw “something out
of the ordinary,” even if their “suspicions” turned out to be false. Ahmed notes that the
term “suspicious” functions as an empty signifier; the very fact that it is not defined
stands as a technique of knowledge as it allows one to mark all bodies that are perceived
as not racially belonging as strangers and thereby a threat.
Over the past three decades, policing in the United States has turned towards what
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is termed as “broken windows” or “order maintenance” policing, which
disproportionately affects poor people of color. This trend was inaugurated by a
remarkably influential article titled “Broken Windows” appearing in The Atlantic in
which social scientists James Wilson and George Kelling (1982) suggested that police
work had to be reoriented away from preventing crime towards maintaining order as
disorder was what gave the impression that “no one cared” and invited further
lawlessness. In what would popularly come to be known as the “broken window thesis,”
they argued that the primary function of the police should be to reverse the urban decay
that vandals—itself a racialized term—had caused. The authors argued that “one broken
window becomes many” unless the police sent out a strong message to those aspiring to
move up the criminal ladder that their transgressions would not be tolerated. Coinciding
with the rise of the Reaganite era, the broken window theory reinforced the idea of
tougher policing by marshalling racialized fears of inner-city decay, which spawned the
white-flight of the 70s (also see Lauren Berlant, 1997). By seeking to refocus policing
towards property crime or “vandalism,” the broken window theory reinforced the antiBlack foundations of policing. As Hartcourt (2009) argues, this newly emerging
insistence on order maintenance only served to criminalize poor people of color as
mundane activities such as strolling or cruising through neighborhoods came to be
heavily monitored by the police.
This context should help us in grasping the motivation of the anonymous caller in
reporting Patel. Policing both draws upon as well as reproduces the devaluation of
Blackness by situating it as the phobic object against which whiteness has to be on guard.
It also provides the background to understand why the caller read Patel as both “Black”
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and as a stranger. Even though Patel did not pose any immediate threat to the caller or to
his family, the latter thought it his civic duty to report him because of how fears of the
figure of the Black criminal/stranger produced Patel as a threat. Put differently,
Sureshbhai Patel’s dark phenotype, which signaled his proximity to Blackness, combined
with his status as a stranger or someone unrecognizable (except as not-belonging here), to
constitute him as the phobic stranger: the object of white fears. Excerpts from Officer
Parker’s testimony at his trial, as outlined in journalistic recapitulation of the hearing as
well as the judgment delivered by United States District Judge Madeline Hughes Haikala
throwing out the case, illuminate the ways in which Patel became the phobic stranger
against whom Officer Parker was forced to act.
A constant theme in Officer Parker’s testimony is the exaggeration of Patel’s
physical traits, which made the latter appear as a threat. Officer Parker argued that Patel
gave several indications from his behavior that he posed a threat to him and fellow officer
Slaughter. As Gattis (2015), who was covering the trial for a local news outlet, reported:
“That included Patel repeatedly walking away from the officers when they approached to
investigate possible trespassing as well as putting his hands in his pocket. Other signs
were a distant stare by Patel and a tensing of his body.” Throughout the trial, Parker
stressed that all actions he took were for officer safety. “I have no idea he lived (in the
area)… Or he was a grandfather or he was 57 years old. I was called to investigate”
(Gattis, 2015).
In this excerpt, note how Patel loses his personhood in Officer Parker’s eyes and
becomes rendered into an object or a threat that needs to be neutralized. The police
officer’s statement that he did not know that Patel “was a grandfather or he was 57 years
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old” captures the erasure of personhood that can be the basis for empathy. As Saidiya
Hartman argues, Western modernity cannot see the other’s personhood unless it has been
rendered in the image of the self: “Only if I can see myself in that position can I
understand the crisis of that position” (quoted in Wang, 2015). Officer Parker maintained
in his testimony that factors such as older age that would have normally evoked a
sympathetic response (one can only hope), did not register in his interaction with Patel. I
argue that the profiling of Patel as a “skinny Black guy” abbreviated him in a manner that
chromatic Blackness overwhelmed all other details that could have led to a different
outcome.
Put differently, Patel became a threat even before Officer Parker arrived on the
scene, and all subsequent interactions should be seen as “colored” by this profile. What
Patel did or did not do would have no impact on the outcome of that day. This is further
borne out by how routine actions such as the twitching of an eye or the pulling away of
hands are narrated as threats of danger by Officer Parker. He told the court that Patel
pulled his left hand away four times when he was attempting to restrain him, which
forced him to escalate his actions to restrain Patel. Note here how a reflex action, one that
the body unwittingly performs, is presented as a definitive sign of danger. Recall Fanon’s
argument that the phobic object is invested with a monstrosity that endows it with almost
superhuman powers. Patel stands in as that phobic object, which had to be neutralized
through an extreme response.
Furthermore, despite Patel’s limited fluency in English, his noncompliance is
narrated as a justification for the body slam that Officer Parker used to subdue him.
Officer Parker initially denied that he had used a leg sweep while confessing that he had

115

resorted to a “similar maneuver” on other suspects without injuring them (“Madison
officer denies,” 2015). The hearing then slowly turned to discussing the “reasonableness”
of his technique with some police officers calling it a leg sweep while others refraining
from using the term. Ten officers called in by the defense to testify on behalf of Officer
Parker termed it an “adapt and overcome” approach that helped him deal with the
situation (Challen, 2015c), while three other police officers testifying on behalf of the
prosecution disagreed with Officer Parker’s tactics because it was not a technique taught
in police academies.
John Lee Smith, a karate expert who created the martial art program used by
police academies in Alabama and was called in to testify by the defense, maintained that
Officer Parker’s maneuver should be seen in the context of his interception of Patel, as it
was impossible to say in hindsight whether it was not reasonable to use this technique or
not. When prosecutor Saaed Mody argued that Officer Parker was aware of four things:
that Patel was an older-looking man, on a sidewalk, did not speak English, and had no
weapons, Smith interrupted him to suggest that it was not obvious from the video if Patel
had been completely patted down. He noted that Patel moved his left foot forward and
dipped his head. “I think it’s plausible he was trying to pull his left hand away,” Smith
said. He maintained that this suggested “passive borderline defense” to add a moment
later that Patel was, in fact, actively pulling away (Challen, 2015c).
It is important to note here that barring a karate expert (someone with deep ties to
the police and who testified for the defense), both the prosecution and the defense
depended on police officer testimonials to decide whether Officer Parker’s actions were
reasonable. In his reading of the grand jury transcripts in the Michael Brown case,
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Nicholas Mirzoeff (2016) argues that the testimony of Officer Darren Wilson, the police
officer who killed Brown, became the standard against which physical evidence was
judged. Mirzoeff added that the prosecutor framed the case in such a manner that an
indictment was unlikely and a conviction would have been impossible in that case.
Similarly, in this case, it is police officers who were called upon to decide whether
Officer Parker had used reasonable force. The gold standard here is whether another
reasonable police officer in a similar situation would have resorted to the same response.
By effectively removing this matter from the public domain and making it the exclusive
preserve of expert police knowledge, law works to render this as an internal and
specialized matter that only other police officers can arbitrate on. Give the fraternal order
of police, this is clearly a tall order.
The phobic object is not just any generic threat but a danger to whiteness. It
becomes a threat to the (white) officer because he stands in as an agent of whiteness.
More specifically, he protects the borders of white propertied interests, looks for its
opponents, and is tasked with neutralizing them. Although he speaks the language of law
and uses the preemption of crime as his main excuses, his chief enemies are those of
whiteness. This is made evident by the numerous ways in which security discourses
render non-whiteness, particularly Blackness, into a threat that needs constant
surveillance, monitoring, and, increasingly, elimination through execution. It is because
of this reason that racialized logics render even routine actions such as the twitching of an
eye or the resting of hands by Black (looking) people as provocations that the officers are
“forced” to respond to.
Furthermore, when the prosecution questioned him about whether it was clear that
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Patel understood English and could comply with his orders, Officer Parker responded:
“People constantly try to deceive us. Officers get assaulted and killed taking that for
granted” (Gattis, 2015). Here again, Patel’s ability to speak English becomes irrelevant.
This chilling statement gives the lie to the claim that one is presumed innocent until
guilty. Rather, racialized policing constitutes the phobic stranger as guilty, and selfpreservation licenses the use of maximum violence. Parker is not a “lone bad apple” here,
as some would be inclined to think; during the trial, the defense attorney Robert Tuten
noted that “When you come to the US we expect you to follow our laws and speak our
language. Mr. Patel bears as much responsibility for this as anyone” (Sureshbhai Patel
speaks out, 2015). Such an argument maintains that it is not Officer Parker who is at fault
but Patel for not being able to speak the assumed language of the land. At one point, the
trial broached the possibility of charging Patel with a misdemeanor for not carrying his
identification papers while he went out on a stroll (Challen, 2016).
If Parker’s testimony gestures to anti-Blackness masquerading as colorblindness
as it operates through policing (Mirzoeff, 2016), the judgment acquitting Parker penned
by Haikala allows us to see how this same ideology permeate the highest levels of the
judiciary, if only more insidiously. A close reading of the judgment acquitting Parker
makes it abundantly clear that despite being a body formally distinct from policing, the
judiciary is suffused with the same colorblindness that refuse to see the vulnerability
facing Black bodies. Thus, my argument is that the judiciary is not so much a mechanism
that can act as a check on policing but is strung together with it. Particularly, I am
interested in how the juridical embrace of colorblindness enables anti-Blackness to
operate even as it continues to be denied.
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Here, it is important to point out that right from the commencement of the first
trial, Haikala was hostile towards even weak attempts by the prosecution to highlight the
racial dimensions of this case. The first jury had deadlocked after the 10 white men on it
declared Parker innocent while two African-American women voted guilty. Following
subsequent media coverage of the racial composition of the jury, Haikala had instructed
the prosecution to desist from bringing up the racial dimensions of the case (Stephens,
2016a). In a meeting that occurred in the judge’s chamber when the second jury was
deliberating, Haikala noted that the Assistant U.S. Attorney Robert Posey had used the
phrase “all lives matter” in his closing arguments even though she had asked him not to
bring up race. Despite Posey’s clarification that he had mentioned “all lives matter” to
indicate that it is not the lives of cops but all lives that mattered, Haikala noted that the
phrase still had racial overtones. Reproaching Posey for going too far, the judge
observed: “I said to you at the first trial, and I don’t think I said it explicitly at this one,
but I did say that I did not want there to be racial issues in this trial” (Stephens, 2016a).
I want to draw attention to two issues here. First is the judge’s strong reluctance to
consider race as an important factor in this case. Lest we read this as her personal choice,
I want to suggest that the widespread embrace of postracism after the election of Barack
Obama as the first Black president of the United States may have been a factor forcing
the rejection of race as a crucial factor that could determine the outcome of this case.
Postracism, defined by Cho (2009) as a revamping of the colorblind ideology for the new
millennium, maintains that Obama’s presidency is proof that racism is now passé (Ono,
2010). As such, postracism call for a material retreat from the category of race. In
particular, the state is forced to abandon the use of race both as a basis for its policies and
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as a consideration when arbitrating matters such as police violence that have historically
allowed for the perpetuation of racial injustice. In its place, postracial ideology calls for a
race-neutral or colorblind approach that deliberately ignores the relevance of race. Judge
Haikala’s firm stipulation that the racial dimension of this case not be mentioned is then
as much a result of structural postracism than her own decision to ignore it.
But even though Haikala may appear to disavow race, what she is, in fact,
attempting is a racial project that benefits the status quo. Omi and Winant (Omi &
Winant, 1994) define a racial project as:
… simultaneously an interpretation, representation, or explanation of racial
dynamics, and an effort to reorganize and redistribute resources along particular
racial lines. Racial projects connect what race means in a particular discursive
practice and the ways in which both social structures and everyday experiences
are racially organized, based upon that meaning (p. 56; emphasis in original).
Following this theorization, it can be argued that by censoring race, Haikala gives
it new meaning: one where race cannot count as being of import to the legal process. Her
stipulation not only draws upon colorblindness but also normalizes it through a strict
embargo on any mention of race. This specification went a long way in strengthening
Parker’s case.
Second is the decontextualized use of “All Lives Matter” by the prosecution. “All
Lives Matter” appropriates the rallying cry of #BlackLivesMatter to deny the racial
vulnerability facing Black bodies. In doing so, it masks the significance of anti-Black
logics to policing practices. In her exhaustive account of Black Lives Matter, KeeangaYamahtta Taylor (2016) argues that the movement emerged as a response to egregious
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cases of systematic police violence against Black people. It was triggered by the murder
of Michael Brown by Darren Wilson and his subsequent acquittal, which sparked off an
uprising in Ferguson. She notes that Black Lives Matter brought to national attention with
tremendous urgency the continued hemorrhaging of Black lives in the hands of the
police, thereby exposing the lie that the presidency of Obama had resolved the question
of race.
Black Lives Matter spawned two rhetorical responses. First was the racist “White
Lives Matter” (WLM) used by white supremacist groups such as the Aryan Renaissance
Society (Viets, 2016) “to promote the white race” and to amplify the false message of
Black-on-white crime as a grave threat to white people. But far more sinister is “All
Lives Matter,” a rhetorical strategy devised by liberals to deny the anti-Black nature of
police violence. This call subverts “Black Lives Matter” to implicitly claim that no life
should be privileged over another, which reinforces colorblindness and obfuscates the
fact that all lives are not exposed to the same intensity or frequency of state violence as
Black bodies are. As Judith Butler argues
It is true that all lives matter, but it is equally true that not all lives are understood
to matter which is precisely why it is most important to name the lives that have
not mattered, and are struggling to matter in the way they deserve. (Yancy &
Butler, 2015)
Although Posey might appear to use “All Lives Matter” to uphold the sanctity of
non-white life and not just the lives of cops, it cannot be stressed enough that this strategy
ultimately works to shore up a colorblind approach through law by denying the
vulnerability facing Black lives. Yet, even this weak reference—which, as I have
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demonstrated, is an articulation of colorblindness—was disallowed by the judge because
of its implicit association with the “Black Lives Matter” movement. I have highlighted
this fact to show how the judicial system remains inimical to addressing race, despite the
fact that it provides the basic grid of intelligibility for police work. This is a racial project
with far reaching consequences beyond the purview of this case. Although there is no
evidence that the judge explicitly favored Officer Parker, I contend that the censoring of
the racial dimensions in the hearings created the optimal conditions that would enable the
disgraced cop to walk free.
Haikala’s judgment opens by stipulating that a jury may find Officer Parker guilty
of a violation of § 242 if the government can prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Parker
acted under the color of law; that he deprived Patel of the right to be free from the
unreasonable use of physical force by law enforcement officers; that Officer Parker acted
willfully; and that his actions resulted in grave bodily injury to Patel. Since Officer
Parker was indeed acting under the color of law and since his actions did result in Patel
suffering a spinal injury, the only two issues left for the jury to resolve were whether his
use of force was unreasonable and whether he acted willfully. The judge notes: “The
first—reasonable use of force—is measured by an objective standard while the second—
willfulness—involves a subjective test” (p. 5). “Willfully” here gestures to the racial bias
that may have prompted the officer to detain Patel, but refuses to name it as such. The
first is presented as an objective matter to be resolved using legal standards and the
second as a subjective matter where Parker’s “intent” is of primary importance.
Nonetheless, the outcome with regard to the first issue—of whether Parker used
excessive force under the color of law and violated Patel’s Fourth Amendment right—
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necessarily influences the decision with regard to intention.
Here, I want to briefly focus on the judicial cleaving of the first issue from the
second one (intent). Note here that the objective issue is ranked as “first” while intent
occupies the “second” position. I contend that this is a strategy that works to exclude
charges of racial bias from receiving any consideration in the hearing process. Leipold
(1997) suggests that the move to “objectify” certain claims and defenses during the
pretrial hearing is guided by the need to streamline the judicial process and to limit the
number of issues that courts can arbitrate. Nevertheless, such efforts invariably close off
attempts to draw attention to the “mindset” or racial biases of state officials, thereby
affecting the chances of those who might have a legitimate claim of racial prejudice:
“Simply put, by moving the inquiry of certain issues away from the actor’s mindset
(towards objective issues), courts have undermined the ability to root out vestiges of racebased behavior” (Leipold, 1997, p. 560). He further argues that the judicial process is
largely based on discretion, which privileges state actors who often make judgments
based on race while not admitting to it. Consequently, defendants can rarely prove that a
state actor’s actions were motivated by race. Hence, the cleaving of the current case into
objective and subjective issues and the privileging of one over the other suppresses the
claims of racial bias made by Patel while limiting the scope of the hearing to primarily
resolving whether Parker’s use of force was unreasonable.
Haikala states that to resolve the first issue (use of force), the jury would have to
consider two issues: whether Officer Parker used a leg sweep, widely seen as an
undesirable technique and against Madison Police Department (MPD) policy, and
whether Patel understood English so as to determine if he was intentionally not
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complying with officer instructions. Yet, even this limited opportunity around deciding
whether the use of force was unreasonable is seriously compromised as the judge
maintains that the only criterion that can be applied to determine the use of force is
whether another officer in a similar position would have used a similar response: “The
‘reasonableness’ of a particular use of force must be judged from the perspective of a
reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight” (United
States District Court, 2016). In limning the issue this way, the court interprets the
un/reasonable use of force as an issue that only police officers can determine, and
something that is effectively outside of the domain of public opinion. The judgment
further notes that police are often called to make split-second decisions in circumstances
that are tense; therefore, it is only other police officers who can decide whether the use of
force was reasonable or not. Furthermore, cops who use force must “be able to articulate
that their decisions and actions were reasonable at the time of a response to resistance
incident based on the totality of the circumstances and information available to them at
the time” (p. 8).
In effect, the judgment firmly articulates that the un/reasonable use of force as
something that only fellow officers can determine. This might also explain why a
majority of the witnesses lined up by both the prosecution as well as the defense in this
case were police officers. Given the strong homo-social bonds among police personnel
and the strict codes of secrecy that bind officers (Westley, 1955)—what Nolan (2009)
terms the “blue wall of silence” (Nolan, 2009)—it is difficult to imagine that cops would
implicate their own. One study, for instance, found that police officers committed perjury
20 percent to 50 percent of the times they were called to testify on Fourth Amendment
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issues (Orfield Jr, 1992). Furthermore, many police departments have unspoken
conventions prohibiting officers from testifying against each other (Westley, 1970).
Given such strong structural conditions that discourage cops from testifying against other
officers, it is not a surprise that not many of Officer Parker’s colleagues would come
forward against him. Hence, it is hard to deny that he had an advantage from the start.
Even those police witnesses who testified that there may be a case against
unreasonable use of force remain tellingly ambivalent about Officer Parker’s actions. As
the judgment records, while Lieutenant Harrell attested that Officer Parker had admitted
to him about using a leg sweep when they reviewed the video together, he also allegedly
told Officer Parker that “everything was okay” (p. 80). Furthermore, Lieutenant Harrell
instructed the officer to pad up his report with information about other burglaries in the
area so he could claim probable cause. Note here how Lieutenant Harrell’s contradictory
responses where he both claimed to have witnessed Officer Parker admit that he had used
a leg sweep and yet went on to give him advice on how to cover up his tracks, created an
opening for the defense to exploit. Although other officers, Capt. Stringer and Capt.
Sanders, testifying for the government submitted that the use of force was inconsistent
with MPD policy and that Officer Parker appears to have used a leg sweep, Lieutenant
Harrell’s position created chinks in the prosecution’s arguments. Hence, the court was
inclined to believe Sergeant Marc Bray when he testified for the defense that Officer
Parker’s use of force was consistent with the MPD policy because he had used
“objectively reasonable force” (p. 35) and that he had lost balance while trying to restrain
Patel. The judgment does not dismiss the fact that Officer Parker may have used
disproportionate force; in fact, it admits that Officer Parker’s technique is not something
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that is taught at the police academy. But it maintains that given the inconsistencies in
prosecution testimonies, there is incomplete evidence to suggest that he used the leg
sweep.
Second is the question of Patel’s fluency in English. Specifically, I am interested
in how the judgment interprets Patel’s lack of proficiency in English as both a mark of his
foreignness while also refusing to see it as an alleviating factor. Lisa Lowe (1996) argues
that Asians in the United States have been integrated into its markets as workers and
managers, yet rendered foreign through exclusionary laws and restrictions on citizenship.
She calls the Asian subject in the United States the “perpetual immigrant” or the
“foreigner-within” who is figured as being at odds with the cultural, racial, and linguistic
forms of the nation-state, irrespective of legal citizenship status. The uneven distribution
of English proficiency among Asian subjects has undoubtedly played a role in reinforcing
the stereotyping of Asians as culturally unintelligible. Such fears also suffuse the court’s
attempt to understand and interpret Patel’s lack of proficiency in English.
Even before broaching this issue, Haikala notes that “an officer is not excused
from the obligation to investigate, and a subject is not excused from complying with a
preliminary investigation, simply because the subject reports to an officer that he does not
speak English” (p. 43). Furthermore, she adds that the issue for jurors is not so much
whether Patel understood English or not but “whether a reasonable officer evaluating the
totality of the circumstances concerning use of force would question whether Mr. Patel
legitimately could not understand English or whether Mr. Patel made an excuse in an
attempt to avoid an investigation” (p. 45). Note here how the judiciary again interpellates
itself into the shoes of the police and refuses to allow alternative readings of the
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interaction between Officer Parker and Patel. By framing the issue this way, the judgment
renders Patel’s knowledge of English as both insignificant but highly salient to the case.
Haikala reads Patel’s ability to follow simple commands in English as, in fact,
undercutting his claims that he did not understand English, which is presented as grounds
that would reasonably rouse the suspicions of a police officer. As this excerpt from the
judgement reveals, Patel’s limited ability to follow commands becomes the very grounds
through which his claims are dismissed:
The enhanced dashcam video demonstrates that when Officer Slaughter called to
the unidentified subject to “come here,” the subject turned, waved, and walked a
few steps toward Officer Slaughter… Mr. Patel testified that he did not
understand what Officer Slaughter said when he called out, but he stopped and
stated in English, “I am walking, walking.” Mr. Patel added that Officer Slaughter
“asked me about my house and I said, 148, 148.” Neither the phrase “I am
walking, walking,” nor the statement “148, 148” can be heard on the audio track
of the dashcam video recording, but some of Mr. Patel’s statements are
unintelligible or inaudible on the recording. (United States District Court, 2016)
The judge notes that a police officer is not at liberty to walk away from a suspect
because of communication barriers. She even adds that “an officer cannot walk away
from the subject to go to his patrol car to call an interpreter if the officer is concerned that
the subject may flee” (p. 20), overlooking the fact that there were two police officers on
the scene that day and that Officer Parker could have easily called for an interpreter while
Officer Slaughter stayed with Patel. Although Haikala admits that Officer Parker’s
statements are inconsistent about whether he thought Patel knew English or not, she
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relegates this observation to a footnote. Rather, the entire incident is seen as exacerbating
the situation as it heightened the suspicions of Parker and led to what the court admits
was an unfortunate incident.
The judge’s inclination to see Patel’s limited knowledge of English not as an
alleviating but an aggravating factor repeats the defense’s strategy to mark Patel as
undeserving of legal protections. For instance, during the trial the defense attorney Robert
Tuten said, “When you come to the U.S. we expect you to follow our laws and speak our
language… Mr. Patel bears as much responsibility for this as anyone” (Stephens, 2015,
para. 5). English continues to be a prime vector of cultural and national belonging, and a
lack of fluency in the language marks the cultural alien. Conservative political scientist
and commentator Samuel Huntington says as much when he noted: “There is only the
American dream created by an Anglo-Protestant society. Mexican-Americans (and other
non-whites) will share in that dream and in that society only if they dream in English”
(Huntington, 2004, p. 256). The judge here ventriloquilizes this argument to give a clean
chit to Parker.
The court reduces willfulness to a subjective issue that is difficult to arbitrate by
tying the outcome to the objective issue of the unreasonable use of force. Haikala refuses
to consider if Parker may have been motivated by racial animus. Rather, willfulness here
is tied to two factors: judicial precedence with regard to whether non-citizens are entitled
to constitutional protections and whether Parker lied or tried to cover up his actions that
day. Since this question has already been addressed in the first part of the judgment—
which concludes “that the evidence concerning use of force in this case is not adequate to
support a unanimous verdict of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt” (p.52)—Parker is again
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given the benefit of doubt and acquitted of all charges.
With regard to legal precedent, Haikala maintains that although as a green card
holder, Patel is justified in having a reasonable expectation to be free from unauthorized
searches by the police, the court does not find that this right has been made “specific and
definite” in the Eleventh Circuit to non-citizens with regard to Section 242. The judge
then goes on to add that her final decision, however, is not based on the question of law
but rather upon the evidentiary record that points to inconclusive proof against Officer
Parker. Note here how Fourth Amendment protections are rendered as unavailable to
non-citizens, irrespective of a person having been legally present in the United States.
Even if the evidentiary record was stacked up against Officer Parker, one can safely
guess that the lack of constitutional protections could be cited to dismiss the case. I
address this question in detail in the conclusion.
As for whether Officer Parker lied, the court pegs this question on circumstantial
evidence and rehearses the testimonies from both sides to argue that there is little
indication to suggest that Officer Parker lied that day. Since the question of the use of
unreasonable force has already been resolved in Officer Parker’s favor, it would indeed
be contradictory to suggest that he lied that day. The judge notes that the prosecution
relied on video evidence to argue that Officer Parker took Patel to the ground while
restraining his hands, which prevented the latter from breaking his fall. While the
technique that he used is one that is not taught in the police academy, the judge
concluded that it was more inclined to believe Officer Parker that he had lost his balance
while trying to restrain Patel. When the prosecution argued that the tone of Officer
Parker’s voice is proof of his intent to violate Patel’s rights, the judge countered it by
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claiming that police officers have to give clear, loud commands to enforce compliance
with their orders. Furthermore, Haikala notes that Patel’s ambiguous response to whether
he knew English could have forced Parker to give loud comments and, as such, they
cannot be seen as proof of intent.
As a result, and despite a fellow responding officer’s testimony that he saw no
threat from Patel, two juries failed to indict Officer Parker. The availability of visual
evidence documenting Patel’s takedown is not going to alter this phenomenon. Officer
Parker remained silent throughout the trail and the resulting controversy about the
question of race. Neither his racial identity as a white officer, nor that of Patel as a South
Asian, is the object of legal inquiry. Yet, my argument is that the description of Patel as a
“skinny Black guy” activated the modern day version of the Negro myth (Hook, 2004),
which holds that any person described as a “Black guy” is a potential offender and using
full force in such conditions is not a choice but a necessity. This is a position that was
articulated by Officer Parker and upheld by the courts, which share in the racialized
logics of police work.
Of Racialized Normativities
If the anti-Black logics of policing rendered a South Asian immigrant into a proxy
Black criminal, barring a few exceptions the South Asian diasporic responses avoided a
critique of racialized anti-Black policing. Rather, they emphasized the sexual- and
gender-normative nuclear family to signify a strong adherence to “American ideals.”
Additionally, such representations also amplified claims of innocence through an
affective rendering of disability that worked to implicitly normalize the criminality
attributed to other bodies. Mediatized representations of the police assault and the
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subsequent ordeal faced by the Patels depicted them as hardworking immigrant subjects
whose social and emotional lives centered on the heterosexual family. They were
narrated as leveraging the family not only emotionally and socially but also economically
as a resource to accumulate capital. Such a strategy resonates with the historical framing
of Asian Americans in general as family-oriented subjects (Pyke & Johnson, 2003) who
depend on their family as an emotional as well as economic resource.
Lauren Berlant (1997) argues that the cultural wars of the 1980s and the rise of
the conservative Right propped up an ideal citizen-subject marked by deep ties to his
family. Such a subject refrained from making claims on the state but rather reinvested his
energy in his family and in producing ideal future citizen-subjects who were untainted by
questions of racial and other forms of injustice. For Berlant, this inward focus and
heightened reinvestment in the family gesture to the depoliticization of social grievances
that is a key mark of neoliberalism’s ascendancy under Ronald Reagan. To this, Paul
Gilroy adds, “The family remains a key motif, but the multiracial family of nations has
been displaced by the racially homogenous nation of families. The nation is composed of
even, symmetrical family units…” (Gilroy, quoted in Desai, 2004, p.74). Here, the family
is not only the basic unit or the building block that together constitute the nation-state but
also becomes a microcosm of the state.
But such an investment in the heterosexual nuclear family as constituting the
highest American ideal was consolidated not because of any natural utilitarian value that
the family possesses. Rather, it has its roots in decades of demonizing the Black
community for its non-adherence to the heteronormative family norm. The Negro Family:
The case for national action, a report issued by Daniel P. Moynihan (1965) which best
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encapsulates this claim, criticizes the Black community for not adhering to the norm of
the heteronormative nuclear family and for the excessive number of single- mother
households, which were seen as socially deforming the Black child and emasculating the
Black man (for example, see Spillers, 1987). As Moynihan categorically states: “At the
heart of the deterioration of the fabric of Negro society is the deterioration of the Negro
family” (p. 5). In the place of the non-heteronormative familial arrangements in the Black
communities, Moynihan firmly advocates for national action “to strengthen the Negro
family so as to enable it to raise and support its members as do other families” (p. 47).
I contend that the South Asian investment in projecting themselves as familyoriented subjects has deep implications when read against this anti-Black history of the
heteronormative family as the core American building block. Discourses of conformity to
the heteronormative family ideal not only offer minimal access to the wages of whiteness
that is otherwise withheld from groups of color, but also readily transforms into an optic
to differentiate South Asians from Blacks seen as non-heteronormative. As a result, South
Asians are implicated in anti-Blackness when they become ventriloquists for
heteronormative family discourses, whether they do it willingly or not.
Such South Asian representations draw upon a strategy of self-making by
(over)emphasizing the centrality of the heteronormative family to South Asian
communities. It liberally draws upon the stereotyping of Asian Americans as familyoriented subjects while reinforcing it in new ways to present them as deserving of
recognition and legal protections. Additionally, South Asians are figured as economically
productive subjects who are working hard to live the American dream. Such claims not
only deny the vast variety of same-sex and non-normative hetero forms of sexual desire
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in the South Asian diaspora but also exploit notions of hard work and entrepreneurship
that are fundamental to neoliberalism to rewrite South Asians as respectable.
But any analysis of the representations of the Patels would be incomplete without
an understanding of the caste and class privileges that have traveled with them from
South Asia to the United States. One of the most economically and politically powerful
castes today in the state of Gujarat, India, the Patels are “an overdetermined entity,
enabled by historically and geographically contingent articulations of class, gender,
political, and religious elements” (Gidwani, 2008, p. 38). They emerged as a distinct
caste under British colonialism because of how colonial revenue policies favored certain
groups who were seen as skilled agriculturists and adept at collecting revenues from other
sharecroppers and other tenants. They quickly consolidated their hegemony in pre- and
post-independence India by migrating overseas to places such as East Africa and
repatriating earnings while also taking advantage of emerging economic policies that
favored large-scale agriculturalists and entrepreneurs. Today, they form one of the most
prominent and perhaps the wealthiest South Asian diaspora as members of the caste have
settled in several locations in the West (Parvin & Rutten, 1999). As most savarna caste
groups, the Patels practice endogamy. The other ways in which they differentiate
themselves from other castes is through practicing vegetarianism and through the high
value placed on ideas of thrift, entrepreneurial spirit, risk-taking, and highly gendered
forms of self-sufficiency that limit women to mostly household chores (Gidwani, 2008).
I have given this brief synopsis of the Patels because some of the traits associated
with them—particularly the high value placed on the entrepreneurial spirit and the
gendered understandings of the role of women—shaped how the attack against
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Sureshbhai Patel and the subsequent plight of the Patels were narrated through the media.
Furthermore, it is important to account for the privileges that accrue on account of class
and caste while making sense of the tragedy visited upon this immigrant family. I do so
not to deny the racial violence the Patels were subjected to but to present a more complex
picture of how various privileges and violence intersect in this case.
My analysis also uncovered an overreliance on representations of disability in
media discourses that evoked pity, which obfuscated how structural conditions—in this
case, anti-Black police violence—produce disability. I follow Sherene Razack’s (1998) in
using this term: “Pity is the emotional response to vulnerability, a response that does not
necessarily lead to respect—that is, to a willingness to change the condition that hurt
people with disabilities” (Razack, 1998, p. 138). Representations of Patel’s spinal injury
rendered him as a truncated subject, a framing that was critical in evoking “pity. ”
“Post assault, Gujarati grandfather on recovery path,” “Alabama Police
Department Brutality? Cops Accused of Paralyzing an Indian Grandfather After Tackling
Him for Looking ‘Suspicious’,” “Grandpa left paralyzed after encounter with cops,” and
“Meng Disturbed Over Injury of Grandfather Visiting from India” are just a few of the
headlines that narrate Sureshbhai Patel not as an immigrant or as an old person but
specifically as a “grandfather.” Strictly speaking, this is an accurate description as Patel
was visiting the United States to care for his developmentally challenged grandchild so
his daughter-in- law could return to her job (Post assault, Gujrati grandfather, 2015).
However, calling Patel a “grandfather” is not an innocent choice. Eric Garner was rarely
described as a caring father who was only trying to provide for his family. Tamir Rice
was never called an innocent child playing with a toy gun. Why then is Patel referred to
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as a grandfather in the media?
A story appearing on The Guardian opens with a picture of a disabled Patel being
led by his son, Chirag Patel, to the courthouse (Figure 1). The picture features the
caption: “Sureshbhai Patel arrives with his son Chirag at the federal courthouse during
the first trial in September” (Alabama officer accused of, 2015). Sureshbhai Patel is seen
using a four-legged walker as his son dressed in a blazer stands to his right ready to help
his father. Another news story in the local broadcast News 19 opens with a similar picture
of the Patels where the younger Patel is seen assisting his father, who is in a neck brace
and is struggling to walk. Chirag’s eyes are focused on his father and his left hand slowly
rests on his father’s back as the latter learns to use the walker. The story opens with a
somber lead: “He moves slowly, painfully… Using a walker and aided by his son,
Sureshbhai Patel moves from the bedroom to the living room of the home they now share
in Madison” (Riopka, 2015). A similar framing is deployed by another story as
Sureshbhai sits silently next to Chirag on a couch as the latter fields questions from the
media: “He is motivated and working really hard to get better,” Chirag says of his father
(Stephens, 2015).
Chirag is consistently framed by mediatized discourses as not only someone who
offers moral and emotional support but also as a caregiver who physically assists his
father as he learns to cope with his limited mobility. Sureshbhai’s daughter-in- law is
acknowledged in the media coverage, but I could not find a single news report that named
her, let alone included a direct quotation from her. Irrespective of this lack of direct
representation, she is presented as an economically productive subject who has now been
forced to put her career on hold and care for her father-in- law because of the assault. For
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example, this excerpt from the news story below barely gives us a glimpse of the
absentee daughter-in- law. Yet it succeeds in presenting her as an economic subject: “‘He
came here to help with the baby so my wife can go back to work,’ said Chirag Patel.
Instead his wife now stays home to care for both the baby and help care for her 57-yearold father-in-law” (Stephens, 2015). This framing implicitly presents South Asians as
patriarchal while coding the family as an economic resource that individuals can call on
during trying times.
What we see in these reports are glimpses of how notions of heteronormative
family mix with affective renderings of disability and the ideal of the “hardworking
immigrant” to render the Patels as recognizable subjects. My argument is that such
representational strategies firmly place Sureshbhai Patel within a heteronormative
extended family structure from where he becomes intelligible to “American” audiences
as a subject of pity. Although the extended family may appear different from the
heteronormative nuclear family that constitutes the core American ideal, it should be read
as a variation of the nuclear family rather than marking a departure from it. Furthermore,
the extended family marks racial difference as it is understood as representing the Asian
American family arrangement. Hence, it conveys a non-threatening variation that
articulates well with white America’s stereotype of Asian American difference while not
compromising the presumed universal need for family structures (Arendt, 1968).
I want to pay some attention here to the persona of the daughter-in- law that
emerges in the media reports. She is presented as aspiring to enter the workforce, perhaps
to both build a career for herself and to improve her family’s financial position. However,
she is narrated as having had to put her plans in abeyance because of the attack against
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Patel. This presents her as the ideal gendered neoliberal subject. In tracking the
emergence of homo oeconomicus as a neoliberal subjectivity, Dilts (2010) notes that
neoliberal theorists such as Gary Becker sought to liberate labor from classical as well as
Marxist conceptions by theorizing it not as labor but as human capital. Put differently,
they held that laborers were not an object of economic analysis but active economic
subjects:
What an individual does, in deciding to engage in labor, is forgo some other
“substitutable choice” to produce an income stream in the future, and in this way,
the neo-liberals argue, they can think of themselves, in the language of capital, as
bundles of abilities, attributes, and qualities. While these qualities can be either
innate or acquired, they are necessarily connected to a particular body, a
distinction that separates human capital from other forms. (p.136)
In sum, neoliberal theory of human capital holds that “entrepreneurial activities
and investments are the most important practices of the neo-liberal self” (p. 137). This
reading is particularly important to understand the role of Patel’s daughter-in-law. By
aspiring to go back to work and in seeking her father-in-law’s help to make this happen,
the daughter-in- law models a neoliberal self that tries to make the best of economic
opportunities while not completely abandoning family obligations. As such, she can be
seen as accepting the double-burden of production and reproduction that falls upon
women with a little help from her extended family.
But the extended family is no more Asian American than the nuclear family is
white. Sunaina Maira (2009) points out that the first major wave of migration from South
Asia in 1965 has been followed by another wave of immigrants entering the United States
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in the 1980s on family reunification visas. The Family Reunification Program was
framed as presenting the benevolent face of U.S. immigration since citizens and
permanent residents were permitted to sponsor their immediate family members for
citizenship. However, what distinguished those who entered the United States under this
program was that they were predominantly working- and lower-middle class, which
changed the model-minority profile associated with the South Asian community. Most of
them took up jobs as cab drivers or worked in gas stations and restaurants.
The Family Reunification Program consolidated the idea of the United States as
organized around the primacy of the family while in actuality it worked in concert with
the rolling back of the welfare state as the federal government gradually divested itself
from funding essential services such as housing and welfare assistance. This positioned
the family as the shock absorber that helped marginalized populations cope with
depleting services while, at the same time, providing a readily exploitable pool of
workers who could be employed at minimum or below-minimum wages (Reddy, 2011).
The valorization of the family in general and the extended family as an Asian American
peculiarity in particular should be seen as an ideological maneuver that obfuscates the
demise of the welfare state and the outsourcing of its services to the family. Given this
context, mediatized representation of the Patels resounds with white American audiences
as they appear as responsible subjects who are not burdening the state but dealing with
their own crisis by leveraging the family as an economic resource. Inadvertently, such
representations help South Asians amplify their differences from Black people through a
performance of gender and sexual normativities that is typically disassociated from
African Americans. An additional effect of such representational choices is that they

138

alienate queer South Asians from their community. However, time prevents me from
discussing this dimension here.
Although the heteronormative extended family and the gender and sexual
normative roles that constitute it were at the heart of reinforcing the idea of South Asians
as the model minority, it was not the only way in which mediatized representations
presented them as worthy of protection. Representations of disability were mobilized in a
manner that framed the “ultimate” impact of Patel’s spinal injury as personal and
economic rather than as produced because of a broader pattern of concerted violence
against bodies of color. In fact, the iconic image that has come to represent this story
captures the senior Patel lying on a hospital bed in a neck brace with wires crisscrossing
his body. However, such images were often framed in a decontextualized manner as they
sought to bring attention to the senior immigrant’s plight without calling attention to the
police violence that produced it in the first place.
But how may we make sense of the injury inflicted on Patel? It is a sign of our
times that Patel’s injury at the hands of Eric Parker evoked mixed reactions. Given the
frequency at which police kill Black and other people of color, Patel’s injury might have
seemed as a “preferable” if still an undesirable outcome compared to the outright
execution in the hands of cops. Yet, as Puar (2015) reminds us in the context of Israel’s
violent repression of Palestinians, the “right to maim” framed by Israel as a
“humanitarian response” still exercises biopolitical control over Palestinian bodies and
environments. It is not a “let live” (in Foucauldian terms) but a “will not let die,” which
leaves life suspended somewhere between life and slow death. Furthermore, it traffics in
the logic that disability is preferable to dying.
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While Puar’s reading of the right to maim might not be completely transposable
to Patel’s situation, there are nevertheless important lessons to be gained through a
comparative reading. Puar is right in pointing out that maiming works as a form of
biopolitical regulation that codes disability as an accidental outcome (in her case,
collateral damage), which precludes an analysis of the full arsenals and techniques police
deploy against different bodies. Furthermore, I find this reading relevant as policing in
the United States often draws upon military tactics and arsenals developed in battlefields
across the world, especially Israel. 27 In this sense, we can see how disability is not an
accident but is directly related to the violence that police inflict.
Nevertheless, the representations of Patel eschewed such an analysis by resorting
to sentimental renderings of disability. In these accounts, disability becomes an
unfortunate occurrence that is depoliticized through its personalization. First, most
headlines presented Patel as “partially paralyzed” While this may be technically true,
“partial” works to minimize the extent of injury that Patel suffered. Given his age, it is
unlikely that Patel will ever recover fully. But the media reports inadvertently glossed
over this dimension through the use of “partially paralyzed” (Fuchs, 2016). Additionally,
renderings of the injury inflicted on Patel were mostly narrated in the U.S. media as an
unfortunate occurrence, a side-effect of zealous policing rather than integrally related to
how police deal with bodies of color. This is articulated through the drawing of attention
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As #BlackLivesMatter activists noted, some of the tactics used against protestors in

Ferguson and elsewhere might have been acquired by police who frequently travel to
Israel on training programs. See (O'Connell, 2015).
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to the bodily debility facing Patel rather than to the police violence that produced it. By
concentrating on how Patel was coping with his condition, the media again rendered the
structural basis for disability obsolete by narrating it as an incident that brought the
family together. For example, the family’s attorney Hank Sherrod told MSNBC “I talked
to his son, Chirag, only less than an hour ago and the reports from the doctors are very
good — that he is improving faster than expected” (Diaz-Balart, 2015). Notice here how
“home” is a significant trope that is indispensable to narrate Patel as worthy of empathy.
Furthermore, the narration of Patel as healing from his condition not only works to take
attention away from injury towards recovery but also articulates well with the “positive
and upward” looking attitude that is a key mark of neoliberalism.28
Claims of innocence were also highly significant in situating Sureshbhai Patel
and, by extension, South Asians as having been wrongly targeted by the authorities
because of an “accidental” likeliness to the racialized criminal profile that is at the heart
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The affective life of neoliberalism promotes such feel-good values as positivity as

individuals are constantly instructed not to look for structural causes for their condition
but rather to turn internally and cultivate an attitude of positivity to overcome the dire
situations that they face. Furthermore, such a positivity also has an economic dimension.
As Emma Luck (2016) demonstrates, under neoliberalism some advertisers have deftly
capitalized on body positivity to promote their products by branding them as “feminism.”
Likewise, my argument is that in a social milieu conditioned by neoliberal sensibility,
Patel’s recovery, which gestures to his intention to overcome the odds facing him,
presents him as an ideal subject.
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of police work. Such a framing rests on the presumption that there is indeed a criminal
subject who can be rightfully apprehended as breaking the law without recognizing that it
is the repressive state apparatus and its laws that produce crime as a punishable activity
through racialized logics. To paraphrase Cacho (2012) again, criminalization is not only
about being stereotyped as a criminal; rather, it actively prevents certain bodies from
being able to comply with the law.
As I have been arguing throughout, Sureshbhai Patel was repeatedly presented as
an innocent immigrant who had come to the United States to care for his family. Not only
he but also his son Chirag is represented as unacquainted with a life of crime. In other
words, innocent. When questioned in an interview about the attack on his father, Chirag
emphasizes his absolute unfamiliarity with crime as well as with the legal system in
general: “I am just an engineer. And I would let the law work” (Stephens, 2015). The first
part of his response tacitly conveys Chirag’s conformity with the model minority myth
through his self-identification as an engineer. Given the transition of the United States
into a service economy that innovates cutting-edge technology and provides technical
support to the rest of the world, Chirag gets coded as an integral part of the hightechnology workforce that has helped the United States maintain its global supremacy.
Additionally, it comports well with the myth of Asian Americans as scientifically
inclined and technologically advanced and therefore forming a bulk of the tech
workforce. Just as his wife, Chirag gets rendered as a productive economic subject.
But I am more interested here in the second part of his statement: “And I would
let the law work.” By saying so, Chirag reposes his faith in law and its supposed
indifference to the question of race. Further along in the interview, Chirag notes that he
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“does not welcome the fame” that the incident has brought him and his family. “The
reason is pretty bad,” he adds (Stephens, 2015). I contend that his readiness to “let the
law work” and his shying away from a more overt stand on racialized police violence
appeals to a white liberal sensibility that abhors the politicization of racial injustice and
firmly believes that any question of discrimination be solely the domain of the legal
apparatus. This has also been a flashpoint of conflict within Leftist struggles that agree on
the fact of policing as an instrument of racial terror but insists that protests only
exacerbate the situation. While I am generally sympathetic to the pressure of assimilation
that coerces immigrant families into articulating discourses that present the United States
as a fair and egalitarian society, I am troubled by how the South Asian response as
ventriloquized by Chirag foreclosed the opportunity for making connections with the
Black-led anti-police violence movement while inadvertently benefiting from it. South
Asian representation of Sureshbhai Patel and his family as aggrieved familial subjects
who were wrongly targeted by the authorities leaves untroubled ideas such as “crime,”
“innocence,” and “guilt” as foundational concepts that guide policing, despite the fact
that they are racially structured. This helps frame the attack against Patel as an
unfortunate accident at best or the work of an individual racist at worst, and it also
obfuscates anti-Blackness as a constitutive logic of contemporary policing.
Yet, Shakuntala Patel, the wife of the senior Patel, articulated an alternative
reading of this incident that refused to minimize the attack against Patel. “I am shocked,”
she told The Indian Express in a mixture of Gujarati and Hindi. “The way they threw him
to the ground was unkind. He is an old man. I am worried about him. My son told me that
although movement has returned to one hand, other parts of his body are still paralysed
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(sic). He committed no crime” (Raja, 2015). Unlike the earlier excerpt that presented
Patel as recovering, notice here how Shakuntala Patel refuses to minimize the attack
against her husband. She went on to add:
I am scared to live in a country where they attack you for no reason. I want to go
there now because my husband and my son need me, but once Suresh recovers, I
will bring him back to India. I wish my visa is granted on humanitarian grounds
so that I can be there to take care of my husband. It is the US government that is
responsible for his condition. (Raja, 2015)
Here, Shakuntala Patel, steers clear of the depoliticized responses that dominated
the mainstream media as well as the South Asian reaction to the attack. Neither does she
participate in the American dream. In its place, she offers a trenchant critique of the
police violence that left her husband disabled. By noting that “It is the US government
that is responsible for his condition,” Shakunatala Patel refuses to see the attack against
Patel as an unfortunate occurrence but rather promptly lays it at the footsteps of the racial
state. While her family is very important for her, it is precisely this importance that
informs her political position: to bring her husband back home. If Chirag and others
present themselves as “wedded” to the American dream, Shakuntala Patel articulates a
position that is much more attuned to the racial realities on the ground.
I contend that herein lies an alternative imaginary – one that is attentive to the
violence that comes with being an immigrant. And it is no surprise that it is articulated by
a woman from a village in Gujarat waiting to get a humanitarian visa so she can join her
husband in the United States. My aim here is not to valorize Shakuntala Patel but to point
out the structural nature of her critique. While migrants are expected to live with
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violence, as if it is a normal part of being a migrant, Shakuntala Patel refuses to accept
this status quo as she stands up against police violence. She clearly pronounces not the
police officer but the United States as guilty for what has happened to her husband. In
doing so, she refuses to see the take down of Patel as an egregious act by an individual
officer but rather positions it as a structural issue that the entire state apparatus is
responsible for. While she may be motivated by personal interest—in this case the
wellbeing of her family—her critique is clearly structural and refuses to be seduced by
the myth that is the American dream.
Conclusion, or New Beginnings
Policing in the United States has historically functioned as an important register
of race-making. The following excerpt from Barbara Fields and Karen Field’s Racecraft
(2012) captures an incident in which the colorline and its ensuing loyalties are in a flux:
So, BAM, a wreck; and out of this wreck comes a white man. Good Lord! Now,
out of the other wreck comes a Negro woman in her houseshoes (sic). And I was a
sight, trying to hold up my gown with my hands through the coat pockets and
standing there in my worn-out slippers. In fact, my car wasn’t really a “wreck,” I
only had a small dent, but the other one looked bad. As my witness, Mr. Crawford
sent a boy for a cop and waited with me, all of us more or less ‘on display’ out in
the middle of the avenue. “Miz Fields, now don’t you worry,” Mr. Crawford said.
But to tell you the truth, neither one of us knew what mightn’t happen. The only
thing I knew about the other driver was that he came from Vermont, which I read
off his plates. He didn’t talk to me, and I didn’t talk to him. When the cop got
there, he walked around the two Model Ts, not saying much either—at first. But
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then, all of a sudden, Praise the Lord, the cop began to shout and carry on, “You
damn Yankees so-and-so. You damn Yankees such-and-such.” From the time I
heard that, I kept on not saying a word, I kept quiet sure enough. I was not the
“damn Yankee.” (Fields & Fields, 2012, pp. 128-129)
Ms. Fields, a Black woman in Charleston, got into a wreck involving another driver from
Vermont. Given the racial dynamics of the South, Ms. Fields believed it her fate that the
cops would hold her responsible for the accident. But the officer who arrived on the scene
let a different loyalty get the better of him. As soon as he realized that the driver was a
“Yankee,” he turned on him.
Fields and Fields use this incident to give us a glimpse into the lived reality that
was the Jim Crow, which does not align in any simplistic way with the racial orthodoxies
that many of us are fond of reproducing. Even though the responding officer seemed to
have sided with a Black woman, a rarity for Black women like Sandra Bland, whose
encounter with patrol officers turned fatal), what is of interest to me here is the primary
role of policing in deciding who is rendered the object of law’s disciplinary regimes and
who becomes the subject of its empathy.
I started this chapter by asking how racialized policing implicates South Asians in
anti-Black discourses. I offered the figure of the phobic stranger by combining the
insights of Frantz Fanon and Sara Ahmed to suggest that such a scripting of his body
elicited the brutal response that is emblematic of law enforcement’s treatment of Black
and Native bodies. Yet, the resulting South Asian response refracted through the media
and other modes of self-representation avoided an engagement with anti-Black policing.
Rather, it embraced heteronormativity and the nuclear family as central South Asian
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tenets, relied on a sentimental rendering of Patel’s disability that obfuscated the structural
conditions that produced it and made claims to innocence that not only reposed faith in
the law but also reinforced the devaluation of Blackness. My objective was to show how
racialized policing, at certain moments, produces South Asians as proxy Black (dark)
subjects, which coerces South Asians to produce themselves as a distinct group, i.e. notBlack. The quest for legal redress and the pressure to assimilate into the white nationstate come together to elicit particular rhetorical maneuvers that underwrite the
production of South Asians as a distinct racial-ethnic group. Given the United States’
racial history, such efforts readily translate into anti-Blackness as they contribute to the
devaluation of Blackness and its continued scripting as “criminal” and “disposable.”
This is also borne out by my own experience and in my interactions with other
South Asians. Most South Asian responses that I have witnessed over the social media
and elsewhere expressed deep anguish over the fate of Sureshbhai Patel. Yet, barring a
few voices, rarely did the systematic nature of anti-Black policing become a focus of
debate in the South Asian diasporic community. Most attempts to make sense of this case
left constitutive ideas such as the fairness of the law, colorblindness, innocence, and the
devaluation of Blackness intact. Even those voices that called for justice for Patel relied
on inclusion and justness as frameworks to make their claim.
What might a response look like that does not in/advertently participate in the
disposability of Blackness but works to foreground the systematic nature of stateendorsed racial violence against bodies of color as the techniques of repression come to
be honed on the bodies of Black and Native people? What would it look like for South
Asians to challenge anti-Black policing without just capitalizing on all the work that
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Black activists have done against the epidemic of police violence? Surely, if Patel’s case
has gained any visibility, it is thanks to primarily Black-led movements such as
#BlackLivesMatter that have taken on the issue of police violence with utmost attention.
What I want to suggest below is not an answer but some possibilities that can potentially
take us in this direction.
The first step in this direction would be coming to grips with the systematic nature
of anti-Black policing that is poised to gradually draw other bodies of color into its orbit.
Given the constitutive role of anti-Black logics, any critique of the so-called excesses of
policing is likely to remain expedient and self-serving if it does not consider how policing
is designed to instinctively react violently against Black and Native bodies. As such, my
argument is that it is necessary to stop interpreting the violence against Patel as the work
of an overzealous officer or as an unfortunate incident but grapple with policing as
constitutively anti-Black. Such a reading opens several coalitional possibilities between
South Asian Americans and Black activists who are leading the fight against the menace
of police violence.
Additionally, it is also incumbent upon South Asians to rethink the embrace of
heteronormativity as a tactic that helps them align with whiteness. In her work aptly titled
Deviance as resistance (2004), Cathy Cohen addresses the need for queering African
American Studies by centering the “experiences of those who stand on the outside of
state sanctioned, normalized White, middle- and upperclass, male heterosexuality” (p. 29)
and who are often also marginalized within their own communities. Cohen notes that
instead of pathologizing Black deviance, Black scholars would be better served from
closely studying the lives of those heavily dispossessed, not because such behaviors and
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identities hold a great secret, but they can delineate the conditions under which
transgressive behavior can be mobilized into transformative political resistance. In
addition, studying them would also expose the normative rules that undergrid society that
even movements for social liberation often underwrite.
I want to suggest in a similar vein that decentering heteronormativity would
demand an end to South Asian investment in gender and sexual normativities that is often
a resort to gain what is denied on account of racial difference. A queer of color
perspective would caution us that heterosexuality is not always unilaterally privileged
over queerness as the state often punishes hetero desires that do not comport to normative
expectations of marriage and family. 29 Yet, in the case of the Patels, it is not just the
acceptance of heterosexuality but the way in which the family is normatively gendered
and rendered as an economic and social asset that gesture to the reign of
heteronormativity. Inadvertently, such representations reinforce the anti-Black history of
the family as the foundational unit of American national culture that South Asians seek to
enter.
In highlighting these possibilities, I do not mean to privilege a lofty politics over
the mundane pressures of everyday life that affects immigrants. But being folded into
power on a conditional basis is bound to unravel, as Patel’s injury at the hands of Eric
Parker demonstrates. Rather, my point here is that our desires for inclusion and
recognition have become the very tools that the state wields to fracture a broad-based
coalition against its various violence inflicted upon bodies of color and other

For the most comprehensive discussion of this phenomenon, please see Cathy Cohen
(1997).
29
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marginalized groups. Ultimately, a just and ethical struggle demands nothing more than a
severance from the racial state (Goldberg, 2002) and its liberal promise of equality and
redress that has become the horizon of politics. It also asks for a divestment from
whiteness as it structures the politics of inclusion and whose pressure is particularly acute
on immigrants who have been excluded from the rewards of citizenship.
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Chapter 4
Exemplary Subjects: Hindu Americans and Hawaiʻian Settler Colonialism
In 2012, at the age of 32, Tulsi Gabbard was elected to the U.S. House of
Representatives from Hawaiʻi’s 2nd District. A two-time Iraq veteran who also had
experience in politics at the city- and state-levels in Hawaiʻi, her victory while surprising
was not improbable as Hawaiʻi has overwhelmingly voted Democrat ever since a
coalition led by Asian Americans took over the reins of the party soon after WWII
(Trask, 2008). But while the results might not have registered as nothing more than the
mundane outcome of an electoral battle both inside and outside Hawaiʻi , this was not the
case.
Tulsi’s30 electoral success set off celebrations 8,000 miles away in India as there
was much excitement over the election of the “first Hindu” to the U.S. Congress. In 2007,
an attempt to open the Senate with a Hindu prayer evoked hostility from fundamental
Christians, which was widely publicized in India as an insult to Hinduism (Rajghatta,
2007). In addition, noted Indian American politicians such as former Louisiana Governor
Bobby Jindal and South Carolina Governor Nikki Haley have converted to Christianity
without which their rise to power would have been impossible (Choudhury, 2012). Given
30

I will refer to Tulsi Gabbard by her first name, as it plays a key role in her

identification as a Hindu woman. Tulsi, which is the Sanskrit name of holy basil, is very
important in Hindu ceremonies, especially in the Vaishnava traditions to which Tulsi
adheres. Her name also plays a key role in her identification as Hindu in American
politics.
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this history of perceived slight against Hinduism, the Indian news media waxed eloquent
about how Tulsi had breached the religious glass ceiling by not abandoning her faith.
They were also joined by the Hindu American constituency mostly comprising Indian
Americans who also took immense pride in Tulsi’s victory (Haniffa, 2012). In her, they
saw a figure who could work to bring India and the United States together by leveraging
her political power while also serving as a role model for young Hindu Americans who
may not often feel comfortable about their religious identity.
But the celebration of Tulsi’s victory belies two issues. First, it occludes the
ongoing colonization of Hawaiʻi and the dispossession of the Kanaka Maoli, the
indigenous people of Hawaiʻi, on their ancestral homelands. Her election is but a recent
episode of a long history in which non-Hawaiians, especially Asian Americans, rise
through the ranks politically and economically while the islands continue to slide into
acute forms of settler control (Trask, 2008). Second, Tulsi represents the conjoining of
Hindu nationalism and its virulent Islamophobia with U.S. imperial interests (Jilani,
2015), which has immense consequences for not only for those rendered as enemies by
the global War on Terror about also for the anticolonial struggle in Hawaiʻi .
This chapter explores how South Asian Americans, especially Hindu Americans,
are implicated in settler colonialism—the third pillar of white supremacy. Simply put,
settler colonialism marks the elimination of the Native through a host of technologies
ranging from genocide to assimilation that concomitantly tries to write the settlers as
natives (Wolfe, 2006). I analyze the public and private personas of Congresswoman Tulsi
to understand how Hindu Americans are implicated in settler colonialism through their
participation in projects that invest them with power while further eroding the
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sovereignty claims of the Kanaka Maoli or the indigenous peoples of the islands of
Hawaiʻi. I am especially interested in how Tulsi’s Hindu identity and access to
institutional power overlap against the backdrop of post-9/11 Islamophobia, liberal
multiculturalism, and growing American military and commercial interests in the
archipelago to further entrench settler colonialism in Hawaiʻi.
More specifically, this chapter seeks to answer the following questions: What are
the links between Hindu nationalism and the struggles for sovereignty in Hawaiʻi? How
does the discursive production of Tulsi’s political positions as U.S. Congresswoman and
of her private persona as an ideal multicultural subject implicate particular Hindu
subjectivities in settler colonialism? How do these processes reproduce settler colonial
logics of dispossession that affect Kanaka Maoli claims to their ancestral lands? Finally,
how may Hindu Americans articulate an anticolonial politics that refuses to partake in the
destruction of Hawaiʻi?
This chapter’s title borrows from Sunera Thobani’s monograph, Exalted subjects:
Studies in the making of race and nation in Canada (Thobani, 2007). Thobani explores
the processes that constitute certain bodies as foreign and alien, bodies against whom
national subjects become legible. She notes that race becomes central to national
formation in countries like Canada, where the European Christian white subject is
imagined as law-abiding (juridical), committed to diversity, and progressive—in sum,
“exalted”—while others, especially Native people, are rendered as heathen and primal.
These distinctions are sustained not only by state practices but also by the power relations
that emerge in everyday interactions. This corpus of practices shapes an exalted
subjectivity that comes to structure the nation itself by providing the basic grid of

153

intelligibility about whose lives count and whose does not.
I develop Thobani’s elucidation of “exalted subjects” to map another subjectivity
that has become increasingly critical to the operation of power under multicultural settler
colonialism. “Exemplary subjects” names those non-white immigrants who have
overcome significant odds to make “home” in this hemisphere through their individual
efforts and hard work rather than by seeking redress for racial injury from the state. In
doing so, they help gloss over the violence of settler colonialism by diverting attention
away from the structural nature of dispossession towards the efficacy of individual
attempts in overcoming historical hurdles. A central argument in my research is that the
role of exemplary subjects needs to be demystified for any anticolonial coalition between
indigenous and non-indigenous people to become possible.
Exemplary subjects are not exalted subjects in that they are not the constitutive
subjectivity around which the nation coalesces. Put differently, while exalted subjects are
those whose values become those of the nation, exemplary subjects try their best to
embody these values to establish their credentials as rights-bearing subjects. As such,
performance plays a key role in the political and social lives of exemplary subjects. I am
using performance here not in the poststructuralist sense (Barad, 2003), but as a
neoliberal regulatory technology that coerces individuals and groups to reproduce
specific behaviors, such as flying the U.S. flag, by rewarding such behaviors through an
incentive-based system (Ball, 2003). In sum, I am using exemplary subjects as a variation
of the model minority myth to map the operation of power within multicultural settlercolonial societies whereby non-indigenous, non-white immigrant populations become the
very tools through which the dispossession of indigenous people becomes intensified. As
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a concept, exemplary subjects undergirds my project as it helps me map how South Asian
Americans participate in settler-colonialism.
The next section of this chapter opens with a brief account of indigeneity and
settler colonialism. Here, I draw upon scholarship that focuses on North America to
understand the dynamics of settler colonialism and its relationship to indigeneity and to
non-indigenous, non-white others to outline some of the ways in which it is normalized
as an inevitable force of history. Then, I turn to Hawaiʻi, whose occupation both draws
upon and yet diverges from the settler colonialism of continental United States. Hawaiʻi
is a key site in the United States’ imperial network as the United States Pacific Command
is headquartered there. Additionally, it is the only “state” that has an Asian American
majority. Hence, I am interested in the role that Asian Americans play in rationalizing the
occupation of Hawaiʻi.
I use “militourism” as articulated by Teresia Teaiwa (1999) to map the role of
Tulsi in the dispossession of the native people of Hawaiʻi. Militourism refers to how the
massive presence of the military in Polynesia in general and Hawaiʻi in particular
supports the tourist economy, while the pervasiveness of the tourist industry makes the
military invisible. My argument is that Tulsi’s public and private persona emblematizes
the ways in which the military and tourism play important roles in the occupation of
Hawaiʻi.
I start by outlining the emergence of Tulsi as an important figure in American
politics by mapping the larger circuits of power that she is enmeshed in. Tulsi is a conduit
for Hindu nationalism, which has severe implications for Hawaiʻi. The next section reads
her political career closely to understand how Hindu-inspired Islamophobia is brought to
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bear upon Hawai’i before I turn to understand how her private persona also contributes to
the dispossession of the Kanaka Maoli. Finally, I conclude the chapter by trying to
demystify Hindu American settler-colonialism in Hawaiʻi .
Occupation by Another Name
This section of the chapter takes J. Kēhaulani Kauanui’s (2016) caution seriously
that it is disingenuous to dwell on settler colonialism without acknowledging the
foundational role of indigeneity as the condition of possibility for the former. Indigeneity
not only endures against the genocidal impulse of settler colonialism—which is to
eliminate the Native—but “settler colonialism is a structure that endures indigeneity, as it
holds out against it” (Kauanui, 2016). In other words, Kauanui calls for an
acknowledgement that settler colonialism as an organizing concept may also work to
elide the question of indigeneity31 if the latter is not deployed as a core analytic. Jodi
Byrd (2011) adds that indigeneity can “provide possible entry points into critical theories
that do not sacrifice Indigenous worlds and futures in the pursuit of the now of the
everyday” (p. xxxix). Hence, this section focuses on the dialectical relationship between
indigeneity and settler colonialism before I map the role of non-indigenous, non-white
others in this process with an eye on Hawaiʻi . Although my focus here is on North
America, I draw upon a broader literature that maps the transnational dimensions of
indigeneity and settler colonialism.

31

To proffer an analogy that may illuminate this problem better, one can think here of

how generic discussions of “racism” may conceal the question of anti-Blackness, thereby
reducing racism to discrimination.
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I want to start by acknowledging that peoples native to this hemisphere have
inhabited this land since pre-contact times, a history that settler colonialism tries to erase
through the manufactured fiction of terranullism. Cree scholar Loraine Le Camp explains
terranullism as “the habit on the part of academics of all backgrounds to adopt a postconquest set of assumptions, that the Americas are originally empty lands, devoid of any
valid Indigenous presence” (quoted in Lawrence & Dua, 2005). Hence, I find it important
to acknowledge how indigeneity continues to persist despite the genocidal violence that
targets it. For the purposes of this chapter, I posit indigeneity in the North American
context as a genealogy of belonging that is primarily based in a spiritual and material
non-exploitative relationship to land that informs the cosmologies and day-to-day living
of groups of people who can trace back their existence to pre-contact Americas or Turtle
Island.32 Indigeneity, in its simplest form, then distinguishes those who are “native” to a
land base from those who are not (Merlan, 2009). This non-exploitative genealogical
relationship to land is what pits indigeneity against settler colonialism.
Settler-colonialism tries to erase the Native so it can claim sole ownership over
land. As Patrick Wolfe (2006) argues, if franchise colonialism is based on the extraction
of resources where colonizers come as sojourners to make profits and eventually return

32 “Turtle

Island” is a term used by indigenous peoples to refer to the Americas. It is an

important part of the cosmologies of the Delaware Indians, and is also widely shared by
other tribes, notably the Iroquois (Miller, 1974). Although not all tribes have the same
origin story, it has been widely taken up within the contemporary Indian movement as an
alternative epistemology to articulate a non-Eurocentric idea of the Americas.
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back to the metropole, it is ownership of land that matters for settler colonialism:
“Whatever settlers may say—and they generally have a lot to say—the primary motive
for elimination is not race (or religion, ethnicity, grade of civilization, etc.) but access to
territory. Territoriality is settler colonialism’s specific, irreducible element” (p. 388). To
this, Lorenzo Veracini (2011) adds “… if I come and say: ‘you, work for me’, it’s not the
same as saying ‘you, go away’. This is why colonialism is not settler colonialism” (p.1).
It is because of this reason that settler colonialism is wrapped up in what Wolfe (2006)
calls the “logic of elimination” (p. 387), which posits that the Native has to continuously
disappear for the settler to take the former’s place on unceded lands. This continuous
process of disappearing the Indian makes invasion “a structure not an event” (p.388) as
symbolic and material tactics are deployed to eliminate the Native.
The positive outcomes of the logic of elimination can include officially
encouraged miscegenation, the breaking-down of native title into alienable
individual freeholds, native citizenship, child abduction, religious conversion,
resocialization in total institutions such as missions or boarding schools, and a
whole range of cognate biocultural assimilations. All these strategies, including
frontier homicide, are characteristic of settler colonialism. (p. 388)
Note here that it is not only killings and other forms of transgressive bodily
violence against Natives, but assimilation through a variety of biopolitical strategies that
are characteristic of settler colonialism. Wolfe calls this totality “elimination,” which
includes genocide but is not limited only to this mode. What then are the ways in which
settler colonialism “destroys to replace” (Wolfe, 2006, p. 388)?
First I want to start by recounting the genocidal strategies that render Natives
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invisible and disposable. These include state-sponsored killings and removals carried on
through armies, frontiersmen, and vigilantes who are best understood as actors of the
same settler-colonial formation (Blackhawk, 2006; Churchill, 1997). Genocide also
manifests centrally as sexual violence since Native women are especially targeted to stop
them from reproducing. As Andrea Smith (Smith, 2015) notes, sexual violence is a tool
of colonialism and genocide as it defines certain people as inherently “rapable.” Sexual
violence not only takes the form of state-sanctioned sexual violence, including rape and
other forms of violations, but also includes calculated policies such as sterilization abuse
and medical experimentation in Native communities.
Lest we see genocide as an event of the past, Native people are disproportionately
targeted by the police and prison systems on and off the reservations. Although Native
Americans comprise 0.8 percent of the total population, they account for 1.9 percent of
police killings (Males, 2014), making them the most-targeted group by law enforcement.
In particular, Native Americans between 24-35 years old are one of the most vulnerable
groups facing state violence (Loevy, 2015). According to the Lakota People’s Law
Project’s report Native lives matter (2015), Native youth comprise only 1 percent of the
national youth population, but account for 70 percent of the youths committed as
delinquents and 31 percent of the youth committed as adults with the Federal Bureau of
Prisons. On any given day, 1 in 25 American Indians age 18 or older is under the
jurisdiction of the criminal justice system.
Sexual violence also suffuses contemporary Native communities. Native
American and Alaska Native women are 2.5 times more likely to be raped or face sexual
assault than non-Indigenous women. Additionally, 50 percent of the rapes of Native
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women is accompanied by additional physical violence as compared to the national
average of 30 percent for non-Native women (Amnesty International, 2007). It is
significant that in 86 percent of the cases of rape involving Native women in 2004, the
perpetrators were non-Native men. In contrast, 65.1 percent of white victims and 89.9
percent of Black victims of rape reported that the perpetrator was from their own race (
Amnesty International, 2007). Several conditions, like the fact that tribal courts are not
authorized to prosecute non-Native men, allow the latter to target Native women (Minno,
2012). This reveals how settler colonialism lives on as a structure and not just as an
event. Such conditions of bodily and sexual violence combine with high rates of
alcoholism, substance abuse, poverty, and lack of access to mental and physical health
services (Beals et al., 2005) to create ecologies of extreme violence in Indian
communities.
These genocidal conditions work in concert with tactics of elimination that are
both symbolic and biopolitical. Hegemonic renderings of indigeneity often present it as
primitive, backward, and simple (if it is presented as anything other than extinct) while
settlers are imagined as modern, progressive, and fully- formed subjects (Byrd, 2011).
This works as a tactic of elimination by devaluing indigeneity. Moreover, settler
colonialism inculcates a deep libidinal desire in the settler to interpellate himself as the
Native, even as he works to eliminate indigeneity. Labor—specifically turning the wild
west frontier into habitable spaces that produce capitalist value—becomes a primary
mode of self-indigenizing for white settlers (Phung, 2011). Philip J. Deloria (1998) has
astutely called this phenomenon “playing Indian.”
Perhaps the most trenchant form of biopolitical elimination is evident in the
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state’s attempt to water down Indian blood. If the United States practiced a policy of
hypodescent with regard to its Black population whereby the presence of Black blood
secured a child’s status as Black (Spillers, 1987), its Indian policy has been structured by
hyperdescent aimed at de-Indianizing Native populations. With blood quantum
determining indigeneity, the policy of hyperdescent works biopolitica lly to shrink the
pool of those who can qualify as Indian (Garroutte, 2003). This is done with the explicit
aim of freeing up Indian land for settler expansion.
But the effects do not end here. As Joanne Barker astutely argues, there is an
internal mirroring in Native communities of the logics of exclusion—particularly racism,
sexism, homophobia and exclusions based in blood quantum—which have historically
determined the relationship between indigenous nations and the United States. The
United States has also made the enforcement of these logics integral to its administration
of Indian communities through such legislative maneuvers as the Indian Reorganization
Act of 1934 and the Bureau of Indian Affairs. Barker contends that owing to these
reasons, demands of authenticity are mounted through the very tropes of exclusions
practiced by the United States.
Finally, there are other forms of elimination of the Native that draw in nonindigenous, non-white others to participate in Native dispossession. This phenomenon is
the focus of this chapter. Such tactics centrally deploy settler liberal multiculturalism and
frameworks of inclusion that organize social movements in a manner that anticolonial
struggles of indigenous people are consistently sidelined or subsumed under other
struggles, especially anti-racist ones (Lawrence & Dua, 2005; Tuck & Yang, 2012). Put
differently, non-indigenous, non-white others have been coerced into participating in
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settler colonialism and Native dispossession not only through their acceptance of notions
of hard work and entrepreneurship that compels them to produce capitalistic value on
Native land, but even their modes of resistance such as Civil Rights- inspired antiracist
activism may contribute to Native dispossession. 33 If land, money, and credit all emerge
in relation to the colonization of Indian lands (Vimalassery, 2013), then their
accumulation, however small, contributes to Native dispossession. I explore these
dynamics in detail in the context of Hawaiʻi .
Hawaiʻi and (Asian) Settler Colonialism
“To acknowledge the 100th anniversary of the January 17, 1893 overthrow of the
Kingdom of Hawaiʻi , and to offer an apology to Native Hawaiʻians on behalf of the
United States for the overthrow of the Kingdom of Hawaiʻi ”: thus begins the text of the
United States Public Law 103-150, a joint resolution of the U.S. Congress passed on Nov.
23, 1993, and signed into law the same day by then U.S. President Bill Clinton.

33

34

It came

Postcolonial theory has also participated in the erasure of Native peoples as it has

failed to pay attention to the persistence of settler colonialism as the constitutive
condition for postcolonial theory. If postcolonial theory emerged from the work of thirdworld migrants in the metropole (Loomba, 2015), it is important to acknowledge that the
metropole is stolen land. As Indigenous scholar Qwo-Li Driskill asks: “If you are reading
this in the United States or Canada, whose land are you on, dear reader?” quoted in (M.
Arvin, Tuck, & Morrill, 2013).
34

Joint Resolution to Acknowledge the 100th Anniversary of the January 17, 1893

Overthrow of the Kingdom of Hawaiʻi , Pub. L. No. 103-150, 107 Stat. 1510 (1993).
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a century after the undemocratic overthrow of the Hawaiʻian kingdom headed by Queen
Liliʻuokalani by the U.S. marines in a coup engineered by white sugar planters.
Settler encroachment started soon after the disastrous expedition of British
explorer James Cook to the islands in 1779 when he was killed by Native Hawaiʻians for
trying to abduct and hold their king for ransom (Cook & Price, 1971). A steady trickle of
foreigners, or haole in Hawaiʻian, brought with them a host of diseases to which Native
Hawaiʻians had no immunity. As a result, the number of Native Hawaiʻians dropped from
an estimated 800,000 to one million Native Hawaiʻians in 1778 to 40,000 in 1893 when
the U.S. military disposed the Hawaiʻian government by force (Fujikane, 2008). The
haole had started to gain a foothold in the affairs of the kingdom with the establishment
of constitutional monarchy in 1840. They were a major force in the passage of reforms
known as mahele in 1848, which led to the fragmentation of Hawaiʻian lands into private
holdings. Mahele was a reformation of the land system that divided the land interests of
King Kamehameha II and other high-raking officials and led to the end of common
holdings among Hawaiʻians (Chinen, 1958).
American investors had started to build large-scale sugar plantations on the
islands of Hawaiʻi by1850 and looked to the political unrest in Asia to recruit laborers.
The first group of Asian migrants to arrive in Hawaiʻi were the Chinese, who by 1882
comprised a quarter of the population of the Kingdom of Hawaiʻi (Fujikane, 2008). But
the passage of the Chinese Exclusion Act in 1882 made the islands an unwitting
destination for Chinese laborers as they were refused entry into continental United States.
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This led to growing anti-Chinese sentiments in Hawaiʻi, which culminated in restrictions
on Chinese immigration. It also led to recruitment of laborers from Japan, and the Issei
(first generation of Japanese laborers) started arriving in the islands in 1885 (Kimura,
1992). By 1900, they had become the biggest settler group in Hawaiʻi. American sugar
planters also recruited laborers from Korea and the Philippines, all countries destabilized
by U.S. interventions. Steadily, Asians became a major presence on the island and
outnumbered Native Hawaiʻians.
Haole elites had formed their own militias known as the Honolulu Rifles with
support from the U.S. military to exert more pressure on the Hawaiʻian monarchy
(Kauanui, 2008). In 1887, the militias forced King Kalākaua to sign what would be
known as the Bayonet constitution, which stripped him of executive authority and gave
wide-ranging powers to white planters in Hawaiʻian affairs. It also severely restricted the
rights of Native Hawaiʻians and excluded Asians altogether. Queen Liliʻuokalani, who
assumed power after the death of her brother, attempted to promulgate a new constitution
in 1893, which led to the illegal overthrow. United States Minister of Foreign Affairs
John L. Stevens, in coordination with a handful of white planters, used the U.S. marines
to depose the queen by force (Silva, 2004). Hawaiʻi remained an independent republic
until 1898 when the United States annexed it as a territory. But it was not admitted into
the union as it was considered “Asiatic” territory (Saranillio, 2013). Following a
deceptive campaign that refused to list independence as an option,
Hawaiʻi was formally included as a state in 1959.
Asian Settler Colonialism
It is important to locate the role of Asians in this history, not just as an oppressed
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group but as having a more complicated role in the colonization of Hawaiʻi. As Fujikane
(2008) argues, Asian Americans are frequently cited in the rhetoric of Hawaiʻi as a
multicultural paradise, which is ideologically at odds with the claims of sovereignty and
self-determination espoused by the indigenous Kanaka Maoli. Furthermore, AsianAmerican power is not just symbolic as Asian Americans have ascended to important
positions of power in government as well as in tourism and other sectors. As such, the
often-cited racial oppression of Asian Americans should be read as part of a larger history
in which they emerge as more complex actors whose desires and actions reinforce settler
colonialism in Hawaiʻi.
If the white oligarchy consolidated its power through the Republican Party and
exercised domination over the islands, Asian Americans beginning in the 1950s found in
the Democratic Party a vehicle for their political ascendancy and to bolster their
socioeconomic position. Nisei (second-generation Japanese) soldiers who were returning
after serving in WWII established themselves as patriotic United States citizens and took
over the Democratic Party to end the domination of the Republican Party over the islands
(Kyle Kajihiro, 2008). Although this victory, popularly called the “Democratic
Revolution,” was based on promises of land reforms that would benefit the working
class, Asian Americans slowly became major actors in the emerging real estate and
tourism sectors in ways that intensified the dispossession of Native Hawaiʻians (G.
Cooper & Daws, 1990). Furthermore, their takeover of the Democratic Party did little to
address Hawaiʻian land claims. In fact, it may have worked to exclude Kanaka Maoli
from political power altogether. It is no surprise, then, that Japanese Americans, Chinese
Americans, and whites continue to be the dominant groups on the island in terms of
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socio-economic status and occupational mobility while Kanaka Maoli and Filipinos
consistently rank the lowest (Okamura, 2008). And given the Asian American clout in the
Democratic party, it is also not surprising that United States Public Law 103-150, with
which I opened this section, was sponsored by two Asian American politicians: Daniel
Akaka35 and Daniel Inouye, both Democratic senators from the islands.
And lest one argues that Asian American ascendancy has little to do with the
dispossession of Kanaka Maoli, one only needs to look at how Asian Americans have
colluded with whites and benefitted from legal challenges that have contributed to the
further erosion of entitlements set aside for Native Hawaiʻians after the overthrow of the
monarchy. In the 2000 Rice v. Cayetano case, the Supreme Court ruled that voting for the
Office of Hawaiʻian Affairs (OHA) should be opened to non-Hawaiʻians as restricting
voting along the lines of race was a violation of the Fifteenth Amendment (Kauanui,
2002). Soon after, the courts in the Arakaki et al v State of Hawaiʻi declared that same
year that non-Hawaiʻians could run for OHA positions. This culminated in the election of
Japanese American veteran Charles Ota to office (Fujikane, 2008).
It should go without saying that not all Asian Americans in Hawaiʻi share the
same access to power and privilege. Japanese Americans and Chinese Americans
comprise the well-heeled classes of Hawaiʻi while Filipino and Vietnamese Americans
trail behind them (Fujikane, 2008). Even within each group, members may have varying
access to resources. Furthermore, South Asian Americans in general and Indian
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Daniel Akaka has Chinese and Kanaka Maoli lineage, but has consistently aligned

himself with Asian-American interests.
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Americans in particular do not have the same presence in Hawaiʻi as they do in
continental United States. But as Fujikane (2008) again reminds us:
The status of Asians as settlers, however, is not a question about whether they
were the initial colonizers or about their relationship with white settlers. The
identification of Asians as settlers focuses on their obligations to the indigenous
peoples of Hawaiʻi and the responsibilities that Asian settlers have in supporting
Native peoples in their struggles for self-determination. (p. 7)
In other words, any project committed to indigenous decolonization should center
indigenous people and land in its analysis (Tuck & Yang, 2012). This obligation does not
replace the white/non-white binary with an indigenous/settler binary nor rationalize
nationalism by packaging it under indigenous sovereignty—as Nanditha Sharma and
Cynthia Wright (2008) erroneously argue —but provides a better analytics of power that
can help us move beyond the position of Asian Americans as oppressed by apprehending
their complex role in the colonization of Hawaiʻi.
In line with these arguments, I deploy a settler of color critique (Saranillio, 2013)
to analyze how Asian Americans, despite being racialized in relation to whiteness, also
participate in the colonization of Hawaiʻi. I am inspired here by Fujikane and Okamura’s
anthology, Asian Settler Colonialism: From Local Governance to the Habits of Everyday
Life in Hawaiʻi
Hawaiʻi (2008), from which I draw upon extensively. Their work collates contributions
from several Asian-identified scholars who reflect upon Asian complicit in the ongoing
dispossession of Hawaiʻi (Fujikane, 2008). As Fujikane (2008) notes in her introduction:
Asian Settler Colonialism calls for a methodological and epistemological shift
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away from predominant accounts of Hawaiʻi as a democratic, multicultural or
multiracial state by showing us instead the historical and political conditions of a
white- and Asian-dominated U.S. settler colony. (p. 3-4)
In sum, I ground my work within the analytics of Asian settler colonialism as I
use a settler of color critique to read the public and private persona of Tulsi Gabbard
metonymically. I do so to understand the ideological and material labors she performs in
normalizing the status of Hawaiʻi as a settler colony. I begin the next section with a dense
description of the figure of Tulsi. I then organize my findings under two sections to
outline how Hindu nationalism, Islamophobia, and settler liberal multiculturalism come
together in a toxic cocktail to bear on the ongoing dispossession of the Kanaka Maoli in
the archipelago. I use both primary sources, primarily media reports and selfrepresentations via public sites, as well as secondary sources to construct the persona of
Tulsi.
The Exemplary Subject: Tulsi Gabbard
Congresswoman Tulsi Gabbard, on whom this chapter is centered, is not a South
Asian or Indian through descent. She is of mixed heritage: her father is of Samoan and
Caucasian descent and a deacon in the Catholic church while her mother is Caucasian and
a practicing Hindu (Haniffa, 2012). Her only link with the Indian American constituency
in the United States is her religion: she is a practicing Hindu. As such, my
methodological choice needs some clarification. By analyzing the persona of Tulsi, I am
attempting to map a complex articulation of race that might gesture to a new and
emerging paradigm of what “South Asian (American)” and “Indian American” mean in
North America, not only to those that are hailed by those terminologies but also as
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designations of identities and geocultural markers. 36
A key argument that I have made throughout my dissertation is that religion has
assumed prime significance for North American racial formations in the post-9/11 era.
My second chapter argued that an intensificatio n of neo-orientalist logics after 2001
produced Islam as dangerous, which coerced Sikhs to instantiate their difference from
Muslims. While my overall project has arguably focused on the place of religion,
particularly Islam, in security configurations, I am very interested in how religious
identities also reinforce ideas of normativity by scripting certain bodies as acceptable and
others as deviant. In this context, I discussed how Christonormativity (Ferber, 2012)
worked in conjunction with whiteness and European descent to ascribe value to some
while rendering this process opaque. In the same vein, I am interested in tracking how the
election of Tulsi as the first Hindu congresswoman aligns her with India and South Asia
in ways that not only underscore the undeniable importance of a Hindu identity to
contemporary conceptualizations of India—which itself has come to stand in for South
Asia (Desai, 2004)—but also to the overall importance of religious identities to racial
configurations.
Tulsi’s foregrounding of her faith as a Hindu aligns her with Hinduism,
Hindutva37 and India, all concepts that have been deployed interchangeable by the Hindu
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I am grateful to my friend and noted desi blogger Yasmin Nair for this phrasing and for

helping me think through this issue.
37

A key trend in contemporary scholarship and in popular media narratives is to posit an

analytical separation between Hinduism, the religion, and its appropriation by the Hindu
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Right to redefine the modern Indian nation-state narrowly as “Hindu” against the
numerous historical ethnic and cultural ties that bind the subcontinent. In other words,
while my focus here is on the Hindu Indian American community, I do so not to default
to the dominant Indian nation-state framework that still dominates South Asian and South
Asian American scholarship but to demonstrate how a Hindu identity becomes
isomorphic with India. This has implications in understanding the colonization of
Hawaiʻi as well as the specter of Hindu nationalism that is becoming prominent in South
Asia and South Asian American communities.
As religious minorities, and especially as people not from the Abrahamic
tradition, Hindus have been discriminated in the United States, a country which formally
professes a separation of the church and the state but is thoroughly structured by JudeoChristian ideas (Silk, 1984). As I argued in Chapter 2, the term “Hindoo” was historically
used to refer to South Asian immigrants in the United States irrespective of their religious
identities (Puar, 2007; Shah, 2011), which gestures to the significance of religion in

Right to “Hinduize” India. The latter is commonly known as Hindutva or the
politicization of Hinduism to secure political power (A. Sharma, 2002). Such a separation
is hinged to the idea that it is the appropriation of Hinduism—and not Hinduism itself—
which is at the root of the problem. My argument is that there are deep contradictory
tendencies within Hinduism—especially the hierarchical caste system—which creates the
constitutive conditions for the appropriation of Hinduism into a conservative political
ideology. As such, I contend that this division between Hinduism and Hindutva is
untenable.
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working as an alibi for race. Hindus in the United States, an overwhelming majority of
whom are from modern-day India, have faced instances of violence ranging from the
infamous dot-buster gang of New Jersey who terrorized the South Asian American
community (Anand, 2006) to the vandalism of Hindu temples (Masunaga, 2015). Kyati
Joshi (2006) argues that these instances of violence are connected to the racialization of
religion: “a phenomenon wherein the fact of an individual’s race creates a presumption as
to her religious identity” (p. 212). Yet, discrimination and violence are only one part of
the complex story of Hindu immigrants in the United States.
A politicized Hindu identity has been the nucleus around which an ascending
Indian American constituency has coalesced in the United States. Owing to complex
factors both here and in the South Asian subcontinent—including the rise of Hindutva or
rightwing Hindu political mobilization in India which catapulted the BJP to power in
2014, and the globalization of Islamophobia after the 9/11 attacks—Hindu nationalism
has emerged as a major conduit that conjoins the South Asian Hindu diaspora here in
North America with the hegemonic political class in India while aligning both with
global configurations of white supremacy that are seen as locked in a war with Islam. As
a result, Hindu identity in the North American context has slowly come to be seen as a
cognate of India itself. Neo-orientalism’s collapsing of brown bodies as Muslim-looking
has also contributed to this phenomenon as it has intensified the drive within South Asian
communities to differentiate themselves along religious lines.
Mathew and Prashad (2000) argue that the rise of Hindu identification among the
Indian diaspora in the United States is as much a response to the racism and alienation
faced by Indian Americans as it is an outgrowth of the rise of Hindu nationalism in India.
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Religious gatherings often double up as social and cultural events and are of great
significance to members of the diaspora as they help reconnect with others. But the
Hindu Right’s ingenuity, the authors note, lies in capitalizing on this alienation to recode
Indian Americans as Hindu Americans:
To reach the several elements of the Indian-American community in this
complexity of diasporic life, the Hindu Right fashions protean forms. These forms
allow Yankee Hindutva to occlude the mainspring of its agenda – to constitute a
‘Hindu American’ community that is a faraway supporter of the Hindu Right in
India. (p.518)
Similarly, Arvind Rajagopal (2000) contends that Hindu nationalism and the
strong Hindu-identification it fosters function as an ideology of cultural rejuvenation in
the United States as they give diasporic subjects something very ancient to identify with
in an age of extreme uncertainty while also advancing other conservative causes. In
addition, a Hindu identity can easily accommodate itself to a minority status and to ideas
of liberal multiculturalism and religious pluralism in the United States by amplifying the
“inclusivity” and “peaceful” nature widely associated with Hinduism. At the same time, it
allows the Hindu community to leverage its affluence to sponsor projects that seek to
Hinduize India.

38
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Indian Americans have the highest median household income among all ethnoracial

groups in the United States. In 2013, the median income for a household headed by an
Indian immigrant was $103,000 compared to $48,000 for immigrants and $53,000 for
“native”-born households. Concomitantly, only 6 percent of Indians lived in poverty
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While I agree with Prashad and Mathew and Rajagopal’s analysis that the Hindu
Right feeds on the alienation of the Indian diaspora and rearticulates it along religious
lines, my argument is that cultural and social alienation are not the only reasons why
Indians choose to identify as “Hindus.” The subcontinent and what is modern-day India
have a longstanding history of antagonisms which, despite their complicated origins,
have been repeatedly presented as Hindu-Muslim conflicts (Brass, 2011), which makes
religion a prime mode of identification in South Asian communities. And given that a
majority of the Indians in the United States are Hindu and come from higher castes39 that
have a vested interest in this conflict, 40 it is not a surprise that the Hindu identity has been

compared to 19 percent immigrants and 15 percent “native”-born populations. See Zong
and Batalova (2015).
39

Kurien (2001) notes that upper castes form only 25 percent of the Indian population but

they dominate the diaspora in the United States. While caste has its theological origins in
Hinduism, it is not limited to that religion alone but also found among the adherents of
Islam, Christianity, and Sikhism in the South Asian region. Muslims in the subcontinent,
for instance, stratify themselves in terms of quom (Ahmad, 1978) while Dalits who
converted to Christianity to escape caste oppression have continued to experience the
effects of caste in myriad forms (Micheal, 2007).
40

Space and time prevent me from unpacking this phenomenon in more detail. But to

give a brief context, caste is clearly linked to recurring communal conflicts in India. The
Ram Janmabhoomi mobilization, which set the stage for the rise of the Hindu Right in
electoral politics and intensified India’s communal polarization, was organized soon after
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an important identification for many immigrants.
Additionally, two other factors buttress the growing preference to assert a Hindu
identity among expatriate Indian Americans who follow Hinduism. The first is the War
on Terror and its constitutive ideological structure, Islamophobia, which align Hindu
identity and India with Western neo-imperialism while coding Muslims and Muslim
South Asian nations such as Pakistan and Bangladesh as the other. For instance, soon
after the 9/11 attacks, rumors started circulating that the Indian embassy in Washington
had asked Indian nationals to wear a bindi (the red dot on the forehead which is seen on
Hindu women) to distinguish themselves from Muslims (Prashad, 2005). As Sangay
Mishra (2013) notes, the post-9/11 period initiated a re-intensification of identifying
across religious lines, which made it difficult to build a pan-ethnic South Asian response
to racist attacks facing them. The Indian lobby in the United States astutely used
Islamophobia as a political strategy to distance India from Muslim Pakistan (a key front
of the War on Terror) by recoding the former as “Hindu” (Therwath, 2007). What I am
suggesting here is that the propensity to identify as Hindu for various conservative
reasons also articulated well with the emerging geopolitical climate of the post-9/11 era.

former prime minister V.P. Singh tried to implement the Mandal Commission’s
recommendations, which increased the government jobs and university positions reserved
for Dalits and members of other backward castes (OBCs) from 27 percent to 50 percent.
BJP President L.K. Advani, who decried the commission as an attempt to divide the
Hindus, projected the idea that the common enemy facing Hindus was Islam, not the
caste structure.
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Second, and closely tied to the first one, is the growing discourse of India as a
superpower, which has added another incentive for Indian Americans to identify along
religious lines. The post-9/11 era coincided with the rise of neoliberal India as structural
adjustments of the 1990s started bearing fruit. Steadily, India renounced its Cold War
neutrality and moved closer to the United States. The first decade of the 21st century also
witnessed the BJP consolidate its electoral base. In fact, the party’s 2004 electoral
campaign was titled “India Shining,” which trafficked in the idea that the country was an
emerging economic and military power that the Hindu rightwing party would restore to
its rightful place (“From ‘India Shining,’” 2009). It also implicitly signaled to the United
States that India was open to business (“White Indians,” 2013). These developments
made it very important to differentiate this emerging “super power” from the other poorer
nations of the subcontinent, especially Muslim ones. As such, a Hindu identification was
invoked to do the ideological work of differentiating India from Muslim South Asian
nation-states. The idea of an ascendant India has decisively driven the country into the
Western camp with a Hindu identification forming the cultural basis for such a shift.
I have belabored this history to demonstrate how “Hindu” has become the central
mode of identification for Indian Americans. My argument is that Tulsi’s extensive
portrayal in both the United States and Indian media as the “first Hindu congresswoman”
has aligned her with the Hindu Indian American constituency in ways that make her a
strong conduit for Hindutva politics. This has immense ramifications to understand the
ongoing settler colonialism in Hawaiʻi.
The Indian American community in general and the Hindu American community
in particular has embraced Tulsi enthusiastically the point that such a warm reception was
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not accorded to other Indian American politicians such as Bobby Jindal and Nicki Haley,
both of whom have converted to Christianity (Haniffa, 2012).. Hence, despite her nonSouth Asian or “Indian” descent, Tulsi is a sound methodological choice for this project
to understand the Hindu American entanglement in settler colonialism in Hawaiʻi . To
reiterate, I am not claiming that Tulsi’s Hindu identity makes her Indian American.
Rather, her wide reception as the “first Hindu Congresswoman” articulates well with the
centrality of a Hindu identity to contemporary Indian Americans. As a result, a close
reading of her political and private persona provides a productive opportunity to not only
understand the changing racial configurations of the post-9/11 era that rearticulate Indian
Americans as Hindu Americans, but also allows me to map how Hindu nationalism—and
by extension, Hindu Indian Americans—are interpellated in the occupation of Hawaiʻi.
Hindu Congresswoman: The Exemplary Politician
A female combat veteran who served two tours in the Middle East, U.S.
congresswoman representing Hawaiʻi ’s 2nd district, avid surfer, lifelong vegetarian,
political maverick, first Samoan American to be elected to the U.S. Congress and, more
recently, a “Bernie” supporter who broke ranks with the Democratic Party elite to support
the socialist senator from Vermont—thus go some of the descriptions of Tulsi. Yet, as I
argued in the beginning pages, they all pale in comparison to her repeated depiction in the
popular media as the first Hindu congresswoman. Such a representation narrates
America’s multicultural democracy as finally opening itself to multi-religiosity, thereby
proffering a progressive teleology of American advancement towards inclusivity. But this
is not the only lesson to be learned here.
There is a long history in Hawaiʻi of non-Hawaiians, especially Asian
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Americans, using their stint in the military to build political careers. As Kyle Kajihiro
(2008) notes, anti-Japanese racism following the bombing of the Pearl Harbor drove the
Nisei to redeem their honor on the battlefield. Ironically, this became the very grounds
upon which Japanese Americans such as U.S. senator Daniel Inouye, former U.S.
Representative Spark Matsunaga, former Governor George Ariyoshi, and former Bishop
Estate trustee Matsuo Takabuki built their political careers after Hawaiʻi was accepted as
a state in 1959. If, “Politically, the vehicle for Asian ascendancy is statehood,” as
Haunani-Kay Trask states (2008, p. 97), then Asian Americans used their military careers
as a stepping stone to consolidate political power within this “new” state.
Tulsi’s story rehearses this historical injustice. Her father, Gerald Michael “Mike”
Gabbard, is of Samoan and Caucasian descent and is a Democratic member of the
Hawaiʻian Senate where he represents District 20. A social conservative, he is best
known as founder of Alliance for Traditional Marriage and Values, which ran an
expensive campaign against the legalization of same-sex marriage in Hawaiʻi (Bolante,
2004). Gabbard chairs the Water, Land, and Agriculture Committee (Gabbard, 2016).
Tulsi’s mother, Carol Gabbard, is of Caucasian descent and is a practicing Hindu. Tulsi
holds a degree in international business from the Hawaiʻian Pacific University (“The
unique, historic, and inspiring,” 2016). She has served two tours in the Middle East.
It is important to mention here that although her Samoan ancestry places Tulsi as
a close cousin of the Kanaka Maoli, located as both are in the Polynesia (M. R. Arvin,
2013), she is still not indigenous to the islands. For instance, speaking as a Tokelauan
woman now residing in Hawaiʻi, Sania Fa’amaile Betty P. Ickes (2014) narrates how she
is still a settler on Hawaiʻian lands, even though she is part of the same Polynesian
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culture that includes Hawaiʻi.
It is customary for Tokelauan guests to honor their hosts with gifts of goods
and/or services; this nurtures reciprocity and fosters respect by adding value to the
relationship instead of draining the host’s resources. Thus, an important issue for
us to consider is the well-being of Native Hawaiʻians, whose lands and resources
became our pu’uhonua (p. 247).
Note here the use of the word “host” to refer to Hawaiʻians, which identifies Ickes
as an outsider—a settler—in Hawaiʻi. Ickes argues that irrespective of the duration that
one has lived in Hawaiʻi and regardless of the common cultural bonds of Polynesians, the
ongoing occupation of Hawaiʻi makes non-Hawaiʻians settlers. Hence my argument that
Tulsi’s Samoan ancestry does not necessarily make her indigenous to the islands.
Tulsi rose through the ranks, which is part of her appeal as a strong Democratic
candidate. In 2002, at 21, she was elected to the Hawaiʻi House of Representatives from
the 42nd House District, becoming the youngest legislator to be elected in the history of
Hawaiʻi . She enlisted in the Hawaiʻi Army Guard in 2003 and left for a tour of the
Middle East in 2004. Upon her return, Tulsi served as the legislative aid for Senator
Daniel Akaka from 2006-2009 when she left for a second tour of Middle East with her
unit. She ran for the Honolulu City Council elections and won upon her return. Mazie
Hirono, who represented the 2nd District in the House of Representatives, announced that
she would run for the Senate. Tulsi announced her candidacy for the seat and has since
won two times (“The unique, historic, and inspiring,” 2016).
Tulsi’s record of receptivity to Kanaka Maoli issues is uneven. During her stint
with the Honolulu City Council, she supported Native Hawaiians in their fight to protect
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96 acres of agricultural land at Ka’olae in ‘Ulehawa, also considered the birthplace of the
demi-god Māui. Yet, at the same time, she introduced Bill 54 that allowed city workers to
confiscate personal items left on private property, despite protests from members of
Occupy Hawaiʻi movement and others (Winpenny, 2011). This especially affected
Kanaka Maoli, given the rampant homelessness among indigenous Hawaiians who are
often forced to live in public spaces (LaDuke, 2004).
In addition, and despite widespread opposition from Hawai’ian sovereignty
activists, Tulsi has been a supporter of the Native Hawaiian Government Reorganization
Act, popularly known as the Akaka Bill after Sen. Daniel Akaka who introduced it. The
bill seeks to win federal recognition for Native Hawaiians akin to Native American tribes,
which would allow a special relationship with the United States and a right to selfdetermination under federal law by bringing the Kanaka Maoli under the Department of
the Interior. Yet, as J Kēhaulani Kauanui (2014) points out, the Akaka bill is a strategy by
the state to contain the Hawai’ian sovereignty movement, as it offers vague promises of
self-determination under federal law only if the Kanaka Maoli agree to forgo their right to
self-determination under international law and accept U.S. suzerainty. But Tulsi has
forged ahead with her support for the bill by maintaining that passing the legislation to
recognize Native Hawaiians as an indigenous people is one of her top priorities (“Native
Hawaiian Issues,” 2016).
More recently, Tulsi took the country by surprise when she broke ranks with the
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Democratic Party to support the candidature of Bernie Sanders. 41 She resigned as vice
chairwoman of the Democratic National Committee in February of this year in order to
endorse Sanders’ bid for the party nomination (Alcindor, 2016). Her action was widely
received as a bold move against the party elites, which also secured her status as a rising
iconoclast politician who did not refrain from taking an unpopular stance. This image had
been in the making for some time with Tulsi disagreeing openly with President Obama
over his stand to work with rebels opposed to Syrian President Basheer al-Assad (Kopan,
2015), which earned her several conservative admirers. Her support of Sanders worked to
reinforce her public reception as a bold politician who would not shy away from taking
an unpopular stand.
But nothing makes transparent how Hindutva- inspired Islamophobia comes to
bear upon the dispossession of the Kanaka Maoli than Tulsi’s support of military
initiatives. Tulsi’s deep ties to the armed forces is at odds with the sovereignty struggles
of the Kanaka Maoli. Furthermore, her political career is directly connected to her service

41

Although a comprehensive analysis of her political position is beyond the purview of

this chapter, it is nevertheless important to note that Tulsi’s support for Sanders might
have been influenced by her opposition to Hillary Clinton’s stand on Syria. In a
document unclassified by the U.S. Department of State following an uproar over her
private email server, Clinton claimed that the best way to help Israel is to assist the
people of Syria in overthrowing the regime of Bashar al-Assad (Prashad, 2016). This is
contrary to Tulsi’s position that the U.S. should cooperate with Assad to root out ISIS, a
position that I discuss later.
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in the military, which, along with her pro-Hindutva stance, informs her belligerent
position towards what she terms “radical Islamic extremism.” This has severe
implications for Hawaiʻi as her antagonism towards Islam recodes her support for the
military as rationale and expedient in a post-9/11 climate. This reinforces the security
apparatus in Hawaiʻi at a time when it is widely represented as downsizing there (Kyle
Kajihiro, 2009). In addition, it situates the islands as an important symbolic and material
site in the global war against the Muslim world. In sum, my argument is that Tulsi’s
powerful position in institutional politics as a Congresswoman transforms Hindutvainspired Islamophobia into policies that focus the military’s aggression against the
Muslim world. This entangles Hawaiʻi symbolically and materially in the global war
against Islam while justifying this process and the consequent dispossession of Kanaka
lands as not only necessary but inevitable. If the militarization of Hawaiʻi poses unique
challenges to the self-determination of the Kanaka Maoli, then Tulsi’s entanglement with
Hindu nationalism and her endorsement of belligerent militaristic solutions to the
problem of “radical Islam” reinforce the militarization of Hawaiʻi. This process needs to
be unpacked.
Ever since U.S. President John Tyler extended the “Manifest Destiny” into the
Pacific in 1842 by claiming Hawaiʻi as part of the U.S. sphere of influence, the
archipelago has become transformed into a central site for the United States’ military
interests. From Brigadier General Montgomery M. Macomb’s 1919 statement that “Oahu
is to be encircled with a ring of steel” (Kyle Kajihiro, 2009) to Governor Wallace Rider
Farrington’s declaration in 1924 that “Every day is national defense day in Hawaiʻi ”
(quoted in Lind & Farrington, 1984), and from the infamous Pearl Harbor attacks that
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spawned a deep sense of insecurity in Americans and pushed the United States to
strengthen its military, to the 9/11 attacks that have renewed calls for the militarization of
the Pacific, American militarism has played a central role in the islands. This has
prompted some analysts to describe Hawaiʻi as the most densely militarized state in the
union (Ferguson & Turnbull, 1999).
After tourism, defense is the second largest industry as the U.S. Pacific Command
(PACOM), the biggest of the combatant command of the U.S. Armed Forces, is
headquartered in Hawaiʻi . PACOM’s Area of Responsibility (AOR) spans over half of
the planet or 100 million square miles and over half of the world’s population spread
across 36 countries, including two of the largest economies, China and India (U.S. Pacific
Command, 2016). Approximately 360,000 U.S. military and civilian personnel are
assigned to the USPACOM’s AOR. Furthermore, every branch of the military has a
presence on the island. For instance, the U.S. Army has 22 different installations with
close to a 100,000 employees (“The Side Of Hawaiʻi You Probably Won’t See From
Your Resort (INFOGRAPHIC),” 2013). A study by RAND Corporation estimated that
during financial years 2007-2009, the Department of Defense spending in Hawaiʻi
averaged $6.527 billion a year, including $4.074 billion in personnel expenditures and
$2.453 billion in procurement expenditures (Hosek, Litovitz, & Resnick, 2011). In 2009,
military personnel, civilians employed by the Department of Defense, and dependents
comprised 10 percent of the Hawai’ian population (Hosek et al., 2011), not accounting
for the veterans who live in Hawaiʻi . One gets a sense of the military’s demographic
impact on the archipelago if one considers that Native Hawaiians accounted for 21
percent of the islands’ total population in the 2010 census.
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The military also controls 20.6 percent of the land base of Hawaiʻi (“Military
occupied areas in Hawai’i,” 2009). In some places, like Oahu, 25 percent of the island is
under the direct control of the military (LaDuke & Cruz, 2013). The magnitude of the
problem becomes even more stark if one considers the rampant homelessness among the
Native Hawai’ian population on their own lands (LaDuke, 2004). Furthermore, the
military has also inflicted extensive environmental and spiritual damages to the land. The
most egregious example is that of the 28,800-acre island of Kaho’olawe, which was taken
over by the Navy in 1941 after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor and a heavy amount
of ordnance was used for training on the island. Despite the presence of a number of
cultural and spiritual sites, the Navy bombed Kaho’olawe for over 50 years before finally
returning it back to the State of Hawaiʻi in 1994 (Kajihiro, 2009). Although over $460
million has been spent in clean-up efforts, the island is still not clear of unexploded
ordnance (“Military occupied areas in Hawai’i,” 2009).
I have outlined the ways in which the military is a major presence in Hawaiʻi as it
provides the context to understand how Tulsi’s deep ties to the armed forces affects
Kanaka Maoli claims to their land. Tulsi’s political ascendancy is entangled with her
military career, especially her service in the Middle East. She joined the Hawaiʻi Army
National Guard in 2003 to avenge the attack of 9/11 as she wanted to fight those who had
declared a war on “America” (Reininga, 2015). In 2004, she volunteered for a 12-month
tour of Iraq with the 29 Support Battalion medical company, receiving the Meritorious
Service Medal at the end of the tour (Hoe, 2012). She returned in 2006 to serve as a
legislative aide for U.S. Senator Daniel Akaka in Washington, where she built a strong
political network. Tulsi graduated from the Accelerated Officer Candidate School in 2007
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but continued to work with Akaka until 2009 when she again voluntarily deployed to the
Middle East with her battalion. One of her missions during her second tour was to serve
as a primary trainer for the Kuwait Army National Guard, an assignment for which she
received an award (Geiger, 2012).
Tulsi’s antagonism towards what she terms “radical Islam” has roots not only in
her post-9/11 service in the armed forces, which became a major conduit for neoorientalism as I argued in Chapter 2, but also in her pro-Hindu nationalist position that
places Muslims as the historic enemies facing a “Hindu India.” Tulsi’s alignment with
Hindu nationalism is more than just symbolic or accidental. She has enthusiastically
embraced Hindutva politics and closely works with the Hindu rightwing BJP as well as
with other Hindu social and political organizations by representing their interests in the
United States. In 2005 the George Bush administration decided not to issue a visa to
Narendra Modi, current Prime Minister of India who was then the chief minister of the
state of Gujarat, for his controversial role in the Godhra riots in which Hindu mobs killed
about 2500 Muslims (Jaffrelot, 2003). At the time, Tulsi vocally opposed the decision to
deny Modi visa, calling it a “great blunder” (“PM Modi to meet,” 2014). In 2013, a year
before Modi was elected prime minister of India, Tulsi opposed House Resolution 417
that called upon India to protect its religious minorities, claiming that such a move would
affect the friendship between the United States and India (“PM Modi’s trip,” 2014). In
August 2014, Tulsi was the star speaker at a gathering of Indian American supporters of
the BJP organized by the Overseas Friends of BJP (Jilani, 2015). In her address, Tulsi
condemned the religious persecution experienced not by Muslims but by Hindus and
Christians in the Middle East (Ponangi, 2014). That same year, the United States granted
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visa to Modi after he led the BJP in a landslide victory in India’s general elections and
was elected prime minister. Modi insisted on meeting Tulsi following his address to
Indian Americans at New York’s Madison Square Garden. Tulsi gifted Modi with her
personal copy of the Bhagavad Gita on which she had taken oath to office (Balachandran,
2016).
Tulsi’s access to institutional power allows her to translate Hindutva- inspired
Islamophobia into policies that not only intensify the global war against Muslims but also
have severe implications for the Kanaka Maoli. Once elected to the House of
Representatives, Tulsi was keen on serving on the House Armed Services Committee and
the House Foreign Affairs Committee (M. Cooper, 2016). Soon after her appointment to
the former, she announced:
Hawai’i plays a significant role in advancing our defense and foreign policy in the
Asia-Pacific region, and this appointment ensures Hawai’i will continue to have a
voice on this critical committee. I am honored to join the committee and look
forward to working with all of its members as we set priorities and funding levels
for the Department of Defense, provide for our men and women in uniform, and
support a robust national security strategy that focuses on emerging threats around
the globe. (“Rep. Tulsi Gabbard appointed,” 2014)
Tulsi seamlessly renders Hawaiʻi into a strategic asset for the U.S.’s security
interests from which to control over half of the planet, including Muslim nations. Absent
from this articulation is the conception of Hawaiʻi as anything other than a key
component of the United States’ security calculus. Such a view is contrary to the Kanaka
Maoli understanding of land as a living entity from which they emerge and which needs
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to be cared for and protected from all abuses, including those from the military. As Kyle
Kajihiro (2008) notes:
At its root, the conflict between Kanaka Maoli and the military over land involves
a fundamental clash between the Kanaka Maoli relationship to a living ‘āina,
(literally ‘that which feeds’) and the Euro-American concept of land as flat and
lifeless real estate. (p. 176)
Furthermore, Tulsi has challenged even nominal efforts by the Obama
administration to reach out to Muslims by arguing that it is not material deprivation but
theological motivation that prompts Muslims into embracing extremism (“Rep. Gabbard:
We must,” 2015). She openly mocked Secretary of State John Kerry by stating that he
was naïve to think that “if we give them [Islamic extremists] $10,000 and give them a
nice place to live that somehow they’re not going to be engaged in this fighting” (Jilani,
2015). Tulsi’s insistence on a military offensive as the only solution to “radical Islamic
extremism” is not only deeply orientalist but weds U.S. militarism with Hindutva
ideology to further entrench the military in Hawaiʻi and elsewhere. She has also called
for the United States to ally with any country that would help in the eradication of Islamic
extremists (Bamforth, 2015).
Consistent with her position, Tulsi voted against the House-Senate compromise
for the National Defense Authorization Act of 2015 citing concerns over the introduction
of a provision in HR 3979 to train and provide arms to moderate Syrian rebels fighting
the government of Bashar al-Assad in Syria. As she noted, “I could not in good
conscience vote to support so-called moderate forces who often work hand-in-hand with
al-Daida and ISIS, and whose personnel and weapons often end up in the hands of those
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terrorists” (“VIDEO: Rep. Tulsi Gabbard,” 2014). After the Act passed, she teamed up
with Rep. Austin Scott of the Republican Party to introduced House Bill 4108, a
bipartisan effort that sought an end to the arming of Syrian rebels (“Reps. Tulsi Gabbard,
Austin,” 2015). Tulsi astutely mobilizes anti-war and anti-interventionist rhetoric to
prevent the arming of Syrian rebels while, at the same time, calling for an all-out war
against ISIS under the guise of fighting radical Islamic extremists:
The U.S. is waging two wars in Syria. The first is the war against ISIS and other
Islamic extremists, which Congress authorized after the terrorist attack on 9/11.
The second war is the illegal war to overthrow the Syrian government of Assad.
The war to overthrow Assad is counter-productive because it actually helps ISIS
and other Islamic extremists achieve their goal of overthrowing the Syrian
government of Assad and taking control of all of Syria—which will simply
increase human suffering in the region, exacerbate the refugee crisis, and pose a
greater threat to the world. Also, the war to overthrow Assad is illegal because
Congress never authorized it. (“Reps. Tulsi Gabbard, Austin,” 2015)
This strategy repeats the trope of good war v. bad war logic (Chinkin, 1999) by
underwriting the overthrow of Assad as undesirable while, at the same time,
rearticulating the destruction of ISIS as not only desirable but necessary. But its rhetorical
prowess inheres in how it is presented as an argument informed by strategic, practical,
and “ethical” concerns even as the Hindutva roots of this militarized Islamophobia and its
role as a catalyst in the militarization of Hawaiʻi remain hidden. Furthermore, it
articulates well with the anti-war liberal constituency in the United States that abhors
regimes changes by the United States but continues to view Islam as a threat. Lastly,

187

Tulsi’s framing of the arming of Syrian rebels as illegal but calling for the destruction of
ISIS draws on the rhetorical precedent set by the argument that the Iraq invasion was a
bad war but the invasion of Afghanistan was a just one (Orend, 2006).
Tulsi voted in favor of the National Defense Authorization Act of 2016, which
would apportion $604 billion for national defense and overseas operations. She
cosponsored a provision that would allow Washington to reallocate 25 percent of the
$715 million set aside for the Iraq Train and Equip Fund (ITEF), to directly train and arm
Sunni and Kurdish forces fighting the ISIS (“Rep. Tulsi Gabbard includes,” 2015). As
she noted, such a move was important to “fight against the terror of Islamic extremist
groups like ISIS and Al-Qaeda” while supporting a provision that required the Secretary
of Defense to submit a comprehensive strategy to the Congress on what steps the United
States is taking in fighting “Islamic extremism worldwide” (“Rep. Tulsi Gabbard
includes,” 2015). The contradictory stance of Tulsi to arm paramilitaries fighting ISIS
while denouncing military assistance to rebels fighting the al-Assad government should
not be lost here. In highlighting this inconsistency, I am not claiming that arming rebels
fighting al-Assad is morally preferable over supplying weapons to Sunni and Kurdish
forces fighting the ISIS. Rather, I use it to illuminate how Tulsi’s ideological animosity
towards “radical Islam” drive such politically-expedient decisions.
In addition to including special provisions focused on containing “radical Islam,”
Tulsi secured $500 million in military investments for Hawaiʻi . This includes over $30
million for power grid updates at the Pacific Missile Range Facility, nearly $61 million
for enhancements at the Joint Base Pearl Harbor-Hickam (JBPHH), over $22 million for
waterfront improvements at JDPHH for the Navy’s Seal Delivery Vehicle Team, and
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over $100 million for various projects at Schofields Barracks, including the construction
of a behavioral health and dental clinic facility (“Rep. Tulsi Gabbard includes,” 2015).
Apart from this allocation, Tulsi also negotiated an amendment that keeps U.S. Navy
forces assigned to the Pacific Fleet under the control of USPACOM, thereby reinforcing
its operational capabilities, and two other amendments that secure Hawaiʻi ’s ballistic
missile capabilities against a presumed threat from North Korea by requiring the
Department of Defense to come up with a plan for enhanced radar capacity. All of this
points to the ways in which the political establishment collides with the security
apparatus to further militarize Hawaiʻi under the guise of providing economic
opportunities while using the discourse of U.S. national security and job creation to
underwrite these moves.
What I have tried to demonstrate here is how Tulsi’s Hindutva- inspired
Islamophobia intensifies her ties to the security apparatus, which in no small measure
contributes to the ongoing dispossession of the Kanaka Maoli by further entrenching the
military on the islands. If the Cold War and its attendant military spending underwrote
the rise of Asian American politicians in Hawaiʻi who often benefitted from military
contracts, Tulsi’s support for Islamophobic military expansion not only continues the
phenomenon of non-Hawaiians determining what is good for Hawaiʻi and its place in the
United States’ security calculus, but also situates the archipelago as a central site in the
Global War on Terror. America’s interests, it seems, again trump the concern of the
Kanaka Maoli for the ‘āina.
In sum, Tulsi represents the exemplary politician. Hers is a rags-to-riches story as
she went from being elected to the Hawaiʻi House of Representatives to the U.S. House

189

of Representatives. Furthermore, she is presented as a progressive Democrat who is not
afraid to take an unpopular stand. Yet, a closer reading suggests that Tulsi represents
settler interests. Additionally, she is a strong votary of the Hindutva ideology as she often
works as an intermediary between the pro-Hindu BJP led by Modi and the United States.
It is at the intersections of these two roles that her contribution to the ongoing repression
of Native Hawaiʻians becomes illuminated. Her belligerent Islamophobia calls for more
militarization, which can only hasten the dispossession of the Kanaka Maoli as it siphons
vital resources, particularly land, to build war apparatuses even as indigenous concerns
are sidelined.
Playing “Indian”: The Exemplary Multicultural Subject
Embracing pro-Hindutva political position is not the only way in which Tulsi
becomes interpellated into the dispossession of the Kanaka Maoli. If her public persona is
a conduit for Islamophobia, her private persona exemplifies liberal settler
multiculturalism by signifying Hawaiʻi as a tropical paradise open for settler pleasure. By
private persona, I mean representations of the domestic aspects of Tulsi’s life that draw
upon specific strategies that intensify the depoliticization of Kanaka Maoli struggles.
Here, I use a feminist critique of the distinctions between the private and the public to
build my analysis (Pateman, 1983). While I am using “private” normatively, i.e. to mark
how certain representational strategies produce Tulsi as an ideal American multicultural
subject by invoking her domestic life, I do so only to demonstrate the political work it
does in shoring up the image of Hawaiʻi as a multicultural paradise and consequently of
Kanaka Maoli as culturally regressive and not in sync with the times. Ultimately, my
project is interested in undoing the private/public distinction by demonstrating the
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“public” resonance of the “private” life.
There are several ways in which representations of Tulsi’s private persona
contributes to the underwriting of Hawaiʻi as a land without claims. For instance, her
self-representation as a Hawai’ian “local” repeats the Asian American strategy of staking
claims over the islands through the logic of domicile rather than descent (Trask, 2008).
But given the focus of this chapter—which is to chart how a Hindu identification
articulates through the persona of Tulsi to intensify the dispossession of the Kanaka
Maoli—I want to concentrate on the spectacle of Tulsi’s “traditional Hindu wedding” and
how it mobilized Hindu cultural practices in a manner that delegitimization of Kanaka
Maoli claims over their lands. While the wedding itself may appear as a mundane fact of
life, an ethnic curiosity at the most, there are important ways in which it has implications
for Kanaka Maoli land claims, which I try to chart in this section.
Tulsi’s wedding is anything but mundane, and Hinduism is more than incidental
here. What transforms the event from a conventional nuptial into an occasion of
significance is its extensive dissemination through the media as a “dream wedding” and
public spectacle. A media spectacle, according to Douglas Kellner (Kellner, 2010),
“includes those media events and rituals of consumption, entertainment, and competition
like political campaigns that embody contemporary society’s basic values and serve to
enculturate individuals into its way of life” (p. 4). Such events write the exceptional as
normal and vice-versa, thereby shaping what counts as normative values in society. I read
Tulsi’s wedding as a media spectacle that normalizes Hawaiʻi as a “land without claims”
that is open to settler multicultural appropriation. In doing so, I am following
Bacchilega’s (2007) lead who argues that the production of Hawaiʻi as a “legendary
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place” was accomplished through the widespread appearance of narratives about Hawaiʻi
’s wahi pana or “storied places” in English- language publications. If this is indeed the
case, then the representation of Tulsi’s Hindu wedding in the media becomes a vehicle to
produce Hawaiʻi in particular ways that have implications for Kanaka Maoli claims over
their lands.
Tulsi divorced her first husband, childhood sweetheart Eduardo Tamayo, citing
the heavy toll the Iraq war took on her. “It was sad and difficult, but unfortunately, not an
uncommon story for people who go through being separated for nearly two years,” she
said (Powers, 2013). Her current husband, Abraham Gaurachandra Williams, is a
cinematographer and a practitioner in the Vaishnava tradition with ties to the Hare
Krishna movement (Kaneya, 2015). Although Tulsi was acquainted with him, she says
they did not know each other well until 2012 when he volunteered on her campaign.
Williams asked her out a year-and-a-half later and their relationship slowly developed
(“Rep. Tulsi Gabbard opens,” 2015).
Their developing courtship transforms Hawaiʻi into an unspecific locale and even
appropriates its spiritual practices for romantic play while rendering this process
invisible. Tulsi narrates how Williams proposed to her over a surfing session:
I was home from D.C., and the day before Thanksgiving, he mentioned he wanted
to go for a sunset surf on the South Shore that night. I was in meetings all day,
and by the time we left, the sun was starting to set. We got stuck in traffic at a
really long red light, and he was getting so frustrated. I couldn’t understand what
the big deal was.
By the time we got there and were paddling out, the sun was just about to dip
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under the horizon. He paddled quickly out to the lineup, way ahead of me, and
waited as I slowly made my way out. Then he paddled over, pulled out a doubletethered contraption attached to a gold duct-tape-covered flotation device, with a
beautiful ring attached, and said, ‘I have a question for you: Will you marry me?’”
(Woletz, 2015)
This excerpt may seem innocuous as it appears to capture nothing more than an
unconventional marriage proposal. Yet, it is in the mundane that violence inheres.
Surfing, or he‘e nalu in Hawai’ian , is a sacred practice for the Kanaka Maoli that has
also been a source of great cultural pride (Gilio-Whitaker 2014; Nendel, 2009). Surfing
the seas using long boards made after elaborate ceremonies required tremendous prowess
(Nendel, 2009). It also brought together the spiritual, ceremonial, material, and social
dimensions of Hawai’ian life. However, surfing underwent a profound change in the
early part of twentieth century. While Christian missionaries, on the one hand, proscribed
surfing for Native Hawaiians, haole leaders, on the other hand, appropriated it as a new
marketing tool to peddle the islands as a tourist destination for mainland Americans.
Williams’ “surfing proposal” and its subsequent narration by Tulsi is part of this history
that decontextualizes Hawai’ian spiritual and cultural practices for the benefit of nonHawaiians, both white and non-white. It reduces surfing into an activity open to anyone
as long as they are ready to take the plunge, thereby robbing the cultural and spiritual
specificity of Hawai’ian practices. Furthermore, it bolsters the image of the islands as
comprising beaches, waves, and surfing while displacing the contentions over these very
spaces that are alive in Hawaiʻi .
The proposal is only a trailer for the spectacle of the wedding, which represents

193

Hawaiʻi as a land without claims or, more specifically, as open to multiple entitlements.
Weddings purportedly celebrate the heterosexual romance constitutive of American
domesticity. But, as Chrys Ingraham (Ingraham, 2009) argues, they have transformed
from events that formalize alliances to spectacles that set normative rules about
heterosexual and, increasingly, homosexual relationships in a consumer-driven culture.
While Ingraham’s focus is on white weddings—with “white” referring to both race as
well as the ostensibly expensive nature of modern weddings—I am interested in how
Tulsi’s multiracial, multicultural wedding in Hawaiʻi renders certain claims as illegible
while amplifying others. I submit that Hawaiʻi ’s selection as the perfect venue for the
wedding, while appearing natural because of the domicile of the couple, works well with
the historical construction of the islands as a multicultural paradise where different
cultures can thrive even as the Kanaka Maoli are being pushed out symbolically and
materially. In this context, Hinduism plays an important role as it helps in reconsolidating
the image of Hawaiʻi as exotic while pushing out Kanaka Maoli culture and claims. This
move continues the strategy of cultural evisceration that has been central to the
colonization of Hawaiʻi.
“Inside U.S. Rep. Tulsi Gabbard’s ‘Perfect’ Hawaiian Hindu Wedding” reads a
headline in People magazine as it gushes over the big day (Dowd, 2015). The story opens
with a photograph of Tulsi wearing an intricately embroidered blue lacha-style dress or
Indian bridal wear. Her bridal makeup, complete with a red dot on her forehead and
wedding jewelry, is evocative of the elaborate costumes of Bollywood movies. She is
hugged from behind by Williams who is dressed in a white sherwani and is draped in a
lei made of leaves. They both stare into the camera as the sun sets behind them. The
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wedding occurred by the Kahalu’u Fishpond on KāneoheBay in windward Oahu, we
learn from another story (“Rep. Tulsi Gabbard gets,” 2015).
Oahu, as I argued earlier, is a particularly intense site of Hawai’ian dispossession
as the military occupies over 25 percent of the land there (LaDuke & Cruz, 2013).
Furthermore, a massive presence of both active military personnel and veterans has
priced out “local” residents out of the housing market. According to the Economic
Research Organization at the University of Hawaiʻi published in 2013, a single family
home is unaffordable without an annual income of $96,000 while a townhouse would
require an income of around $48,000, which are above the median income in Oahu
(“UHERO 101.3,” 2013). This statistic does not account for Kanaka Maoli homelessness
on Oahu, which is one of the highest (Yamane, Oeser, & Omori, 2010). But the wedding
elides such inconvenient details as it figures the island as a settler paradise.
Adjectives such as “perfect” vie with “magical” (Andrews-Dyer, 2015) and
“colorful” (Lesley, 2015) to frame the wedding for the audience. But what are the
elements that make the wedding “perfect,” “magical,” or “colorful”? My contention is
that Tulsi’s wedding reinforces the white settler association of Hawaiʻi with exoticness,
which is accomplished through a Bollywoodized version of Hindu cultural practices that
became the defining aspect of the wedding. It works in concert with Hawaiʻi as an ideal
setting as it absorbs the lands into the narrative of the wedding, thereby making all
competing claims illegible. “It really was a Hawaiian-style Hindu wedding, from the
palm trees to birds of paradise flowers, to the birds chirping in the background ” (Dowd,
2015). This has immense consequences as cultural exoticness is deployed in a manner
that works to suppress claims over land even as the image of Hawaiʻi as a tropical

195

paradise is shored up by such representations.
Media accounts consistently framed the ceremony as a traditional Hindu Vedic
wedding performed by a Brahmin priest, Vinod Dave, who was flown in from California
(“Rep. Tulsi Gabbard gets,” 2015). The details of this event are lavishly shared with the
audience: “…the priest built a fire and asked God to be present... The couple then put
grains and bananas into the fire as an offering, and at another point they walked around
the fire seven times while reciting prayers” (Dowd, 2015). Tulsi and Williams appear in
a photograph sitting next to each other on a slightly elevated seating as they hold small
utensils with offerings while the priest is by their side, ostensibly chanting mantras in
front of the fire. Media accounts went on to add that much of the ceremony was in
Sanskrit and concluded with a yoga kirtan with the guests encircling the newly-wed
couple. Even the meal was meat-free with the guests feasting on “paneer tikka masala,
samosas, mango and tomato chutney and saffron rice” complete with a cake adorned
with henna-like decorations (Dowd, 2015).
How may we understand the representation of Hindu cultural practices in the
wedding? After all, how different would it be with a regular white Christian wedding?
My argument is that Tulsi’s “Hindu” wedding produces overlays the stereotypical
exoticness of Hawaiʻi with another form of exoticness. This reinforces the association of
Hawaiʻi with settler pleasure while also bolstering settler claims to the islands as open for
all under the guise of multiculturalism. What is significant here is the ability to conduct a
Hindu wedding on a land that is occupied. By doing so, I argue, Hindu settlers, just like
Christian settlers, write themselves into the land by turning Hawaiʻi into a “perfect
setting” for their events without any concomitant recognition of Kanaka Maoli struggles
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for their ancestral homelands. If Christianity has evoked resistance because of its historic
association with the subjugation of the Kanaka Maoli (Kauanui, 2008), a Hindu wedding
may not attract the same scrutiny under the guise of multiculturalism and cultural
pluralism, even though it participates in the dispossession of Hawaiians.
Second, the wedding scripts Hawaiʻi as a multicultural paradise, which reduces
any resistance to settler desires to a sign of regression and the inability to move with the
times. Note that Tulsi describes the event as a “Hawaiian-style Hindu wedding.” By
doing so, she is trying to harmonize her Hindu identity with Hawaiʻi, as if there were no
animosity between the two. But this can be accomplished only if the settler colonialism
of Hawaiʻi is seen as a thing of the past that need not concern us anymore, and if the role
of Hindu Americans can be seen as derivative rather than primary in the colonization of
Hawaiʻi . In other words, non-white settlers can derive benefits just like white settlers
while seeing their role as secondary. Gabbard, in fact, confirmed that Hawaiʻi would
continue to be the couple’s primary home (“Rep. Tulsi Gabbard opens,” 2015).
The description “Hawaiian-style Hindu wedding” also frames it as a hybrid event
that brings the best of two worlds together. But this privileging of the hybrid needs to be
critically analyzed. In her critique of Gloria Anzaldúa’s articulation of mestizaje as a
form of higher consciousness, Saldaña-Portillo (2003) argues that in its privileging of the
mixed, mestizaje traffics in the idea that the Indian is primitive and will be eventually
replaced by the mestizo. Put differently, this strategy reifies a social Darwinist approach
where hybridity represents the gradual phasing out of the unmixed or the primitive. In the
same manner, Tulsi’s “Hawaiian-style Hindu wedding” appropriates Hawaiʻi as an
adjective that embellishes her Hindu wedding and eventually becomes subsumed into it
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to create a “more-evolved” hybrid subjectivity and cultural practice that will reign over
the islands of Hawaiʻi . It also becomes an instantiation of liberal settler multiculturalism,
or the idea that all cultural practices have an equal standing and are welcome on
colonized lands when indigenous culture itself survives as a mere curiosity in the settler’s
eyes (Povinelli, 2002). In sum, the wedding figures Hawaiʻi as a place where settler
desires can play free of interruption under the guise of social advancement.
It is precisely this sort of representations that entrench tourism in Hawaiʻi. As
Trask (1999) has argued, tourism has been a major factor in the dispossession of the
Kanaka Maoli both through its ideological work of encoding Hawaiʻi as a tropical
touristic destination and also through the material consequences that have steadily made
the Kanaka Maoli homeless on their own lands:
My use of the word tourism in the Hawai‘i context refers to a mass-based,
corporately controlled industry that is both vertically and horizontally integrated
such that one multinational corporation owns an airline and the tour buses that
transport tourists to the corporation-owned hotel where they eat in a corporationowned restaurant, play golf, and ‘experience’ Hawai‘i on corporation-owned
recreation areas and eventually consider buying a second home built on
corporation land. Profits, in this case, are mostly repatriated back to the home
country. In Hawai‘i, these ‘home’ countries are Japan, Taiwan, Hong Kong,
Canada, Australia, and the United States. In this sense, Hawai‘i is very much like
a Third World colony where the local elite—the Democratic Party in our state—
collaborate in the rape of Native land and people. (p. 139)
This excerpt outlines how tourism works as a material force in the lives of the Kanaka
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Maoli. But, more importantly, it also demonstrates how the Democratic Party has been an
active agent in this process. If Kay-Trask’s critique is organized around the Democratic
Party’s role in acting as an agent of transnational business interests that have capitalized
on the stereotype of Hawaiʻi as a vacation destination, Tulsi’s “Hawaiian-style Hindu
wedding” highlights the ways in which her domestic persona articulated through
institutional power extends this phenomenon by continuing the dispossession of Hawaiʻi
by settlers. It not only renders Hawaiʻi as a dreamy destination but renders as illegible the
sovereignty claims of Kanaka Maoli.
Finally, I end this section with the following excerpt that illustrates the work that
marriage accomplishes in representing Tulsi not just as an ideal multicultural subject
whose ethnic difference helps gloss over the colonization of Hawaiʻi , but also as
someone who is hardworking and industrious. A story appearing in The Washington Post
tells the audience that soon after her “magical” wedding, Tulsi was on her way to
Washington to get back to work: “Not every newlywed has to maneuver around the
House calendar, but Gabbard hardly skipped a beat… Gabbard will travel back whenever
her schedule allows, and her husband will make the trip to D.C. when the
congresswoman can’t return home” (Andrews-Dyer, 2015). Tulsi represents herself as a
“karma yogi” or someone dedicated to the service of others (Balachandran, 2016). Such
instantiations not only reinforce the representation of Tulsi as a hard worker but
consolidates the idea of Asian-American commitment to personal uplift through hard
work, as I have argued throughout this project. But Tulsi is also framed as the ideal
familial subject whose home life does not come in the way of her work. More
importantly, Hawaiʻi is signified here as the sphere of the domestic to which Tulsi will
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return to take a break from work. This resounds with the feminization of Hawaiʻi
(Ferguson & Turnbull, 1999) while the United States retains its masculine identity as the
locale of work.
In sum, what I have tried to demonstrate in this section is how a mundane event—
a wedding—becomes the vehicle to normalize the colonial dynamics of Hawaiʻi with
Hindu cultural practices providing the cover for the ongoing dispossession of the Kanaka
Maoli. More importantly, the Hawiian-style Hindu wedding renders Tulsi as the
exemplary multicultural subject who adds to the exoticness that is Hawaiʻi by bringing
her own set of cultural practices while harmonizing her domestic life with her public
duties. And lest my critics accuse me of politicizing a private event by over-reading a
marriage, I want to remind them that one of the ways in which colonization writes itself
as a completed project is through mundane and quotidian events. When settlers live on
colonized indigenous lands, all private and personal acts have implications as they
invariably intersect with the ongoing colonization of Native peoples. This is certainly true
for a celebrity politician whose wedding was far from a mundane affair as it reinforced
the stereotypical Hawaiʻi rather than the contested place that are the islands.
Conclusion, or Towards Unmaking Exemplary Subjects
I started this chapter by asking how Hindu nationalism and its cousin, belligerent
Islamophobia, intensify the dispossession of the Kanaka Maoli. For this purpose, I traced
the figure of Tulsi as a conduit for Islamophobia and settler liberal multiculturalism that
have implications for the ongoing colonization for Hawaiʻi. I identified some of the
settler colonial logics of dispossession that are illuminated in the political and private
persona of Tulsi, including the reinforcing of the image of Hawaiʻi as both a strategic site
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for U.S. security interests and as a tropical paradise, embrace of values of hard-work and
industriousness, and performing the ideal ethnic subject who fortifies the association of
Hawaiʻi with exoticness. If non-indigenous, non-white others have become one of the
primary instruments of settler colonialism, then how may we interrupt this process to
begin building stronger coalitions between indigenous people and non-indigenous nonwhite others?
Despite not being a Native Hawaiʻian, Tulsi presents herself as embodying the
“Aloha” spirit (“The unique, historic, and inspiring,” 2016). Yet, nothing could be farther
from the truth. Tulsi has steadily acted on behalf of Hindutva and white settler colonial
interests in a manner that sidelines or diffuses Kanaka Maoli activism for their land. First,
her institutional position as a Congresswoman affords her access to tremendous power,
which allows Tulsi to translate Hindutva- inspired Islamophobia into policies that
strengthen the military. This has ramifications for the sovereignty struggles in Hawaiʻi as
it further entrenches the U.S. war machine on the islands. If militarization is the face of
settler colonialism in Hawaiʻi , Tulsi’s call for an all-out offensive on ISIS calls for a
beefing up of the military at a time when it is widely seen as downsizing in Hawaiʻi
(Dame, 2015). In this, Tulsi is primarily an agent of the institutional interests of mainland
United States that, despite incorporating Hawaiʻi as a state, continues to see it as a
colonial outpost. As such, her political power is leveraged to subordinate Hawaiʻi to the
United States’ security and other interests.
Furthermore, it is not only Tulsi’s institutional position that has ramifications for
the anticolonial struggles of the Kanaka Maoli. Tulsi circulates in media discourses as the
ideal ethnic multicultural subject who recodes Hawaiʻi as a settler paradise without
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claims. Tropes of heterosexual monogamy, hard work, and settler liberal multiculturalism
come together in the figure of Tulsi to reinforce the dispossession of Hawaiʻi. Her perfect
“Hawaiian-styled Hindu wedding” reduces Hawaiʻi to an exotic locale, reinforcing the
association of the islands with tropical beaches, leis, and vacations, while effectively
recruiting a certain performance of Hindu cultural practices to bolster this association.
Her projected image as a “local” Hawai’ian also adds to this signification.
What then needs to be done? The first step, I suspect, is to untangle the links
between the rise of Hindu nationalism in the United States, American settler colonial
military and tourist interests, and the dispossession of Hawaiʻi, as I have attempted to do
in this project. While Hindu nationalism and the sovereignty struggles in Hawaiʻi seem
unconnected, this is not the case as the former has conjoined itself with U.S. military
interests to reign in “radical Islam.” This makes it imperative that South Asian Americans
in general and Hindu Americans in particular challenge the rise of Hindu nationalism and
Islamophobia within their communities as well as interrupt its incorporation into the
United States’ security calculus.
Furthermore, such a position demands that the Hindu American community
deeply introspects what it means to be included in the corridors of power. Tulsi’s election
as the first Hindu Congresswoman has been a great source of pride for the community as
other Indian Americans such as Bobby Jindal and Nikki Haley’s rose to power only after
their conversion to Christianity. Nevertheless, an uncritical celebration of this fact
ignores the deepening ties between Hindutva politics and U.S. institutional power that
codes Muslims as enemies and normalizes the colonization of Hawaiʻi. As members who
have immigrated from a post-colony, nothing is more ethically binding on Hindu
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Americans than interrupting such logics and building solidarity with the Native people of
Hawaiʻi. This also means that we evaluate our own position of power within the settler
colony that racializes us but also actively recruits us in the service of its own interests. As
minorities in the United States, it is important that Hindu Americans be weary of the
logics of liberal settler multiculturalism and the lure of inclusion into what is a violent
settler structure.
Hawaiʻi is more than a tropical paradise and a settler outpost for U.S.’s security
interests. It is a contested territory whose colonization is far from complete. And Hindu
nationalism has unfortunately come to play a role in the ongoing disenfranchisement
experienced by Hawaiʻi ’s indigenous peoples. It is no accident then that the first Hindu
Congresswoman was elected from Hawaiʻi ’s 2nd district to the U.S. House of
Representatives. It is only by breaking the nexus between Hindu nationalism,
Islamophobia, and the ongoing dispossession of Native Hawaiians that settler colonialism
and Islamophobia can be challenged.
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Chapter 5
Insurgent Subjects: Beyond Normative Inclusion
Un/desirable subjects is an attempt to grapple with South Asian racialization as
part of larger socioeconomic and geopolitical dynamics. The project sought to outline a
comprehensive theory of South Asian racialization as a relational process that is
entangled with neo-orientalism, anti-Blackness, and settler-colonialism, or what Andrea
Smith (2006, 2012) has called the three pillars of white supremacy. These pillars, as I
argue, draw in South Asians in a manner that renders some of them as desirable while
others are marked as disposable. Furthermore, lines are drawn both internally within the
South Asian community and externally between South Asians and others to produce
devaluation. To wit, if the pervasiveness of neo-orientalist logics after 9/11 and the
extreme importance placed on religious identities and national origins took a toll on
South Asian communities by intensifying identification on religious lines, such an
ideology worked hand-in-hand with anti-Blackness and settler colonialism to heighten
Indian American and Hindu American investment in normative ideologies that aligned
them with whiteness rather than racial others.
In Chapter 1, “Expendable subjects,” I examined Sikh racialization in the post9/11 United States. In that chapter, I argued that Sikh racialization was integrally tied
with anti-Muslim racism. If (turbaned) Sikhs continue to be targets of racial violence
because they are “Muslim looking” (Ahmad, 2007), my contention is that such a
likeliness is assiduously produced by the circulation of neo-orientalist knowledges that
racialize religious and other differences and, concomitantly, intensify an investment in
gender and sexual normativities to constitute certain bodies as threats. I suggested that
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Sikh civil rights activism based in gaining recognition for attacks against Sikhs as a
separate hate crime category as well as an embrace of liberal multicultural values to
present Sikhs as respectable subjects trafficked in the same neo-orientalist logics. In its
place, I asked that the question of who is Sikh and what constitutes Sikhi (the essence of
Sikhism) not be foreclosed along racial and ethnic lines but be kept open to answer the
true ethical call of Sikhism.
The second chapter, “Fungible subjects,” explored how anti-Black policing
produced Sureshbhai Patel, a 57-year-old Indian immigrant visiting his son in the United
States, as a proxy Black subject while erasing this process through discourses of
criminality and threat. I read this incident against a history of police violence against
Black bodies that has been largely condoned by the court systems. I used the concept of
the “phobic object” as enunciated by Frantz Fanon (1967) with the figure of the
“stranger” explored by Sara Ahmed (2000) to suggest that anti-Black policing rendered
Patel as a “phobic stranger,” which evoked an extreme response from officer Parker.
Instead of contextualizing this attack as part of the concerted use of police as a tool of
white supremacy against bodies of color, the South Asian American response barring a
few exceptions relied upon rendering the Patels as family-oriented hardworking
immigrant subjects whose dreams had been destroyed by the attack. Given the
constitution of Black people as sexually promiscuous and dependent on state handouts,
such discourses emanating from South Asian Americans readily translate into antiBlackness as they contribute to the devaluation of Blackness and its continued scripting
as “irresponsible,” “criminal,” and “disposable.” In this context, it is important for South
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Asians to rethink heteronormativity and build long-standing coalition with racial others
who have been at the forefront of the struggle for racial justice.
In “Exemplary subjects,” the third chapter, I analyzed the role of Hindu
Americans in reinforcing settler colonialism in Hawaiʻi by pursuing the public and
private persona of the Tulsi Gabbard. Her electoral victory as the first Hindu elected to
the U.S. Congress brought Hindu nationalist politics, especially Islamophobia, to bear on
the archipelago by beefing up the military in Hawaiʻi while erasing this process from
public scrutiny. At the same time, the congresswoman’s “Hawaiian-styled Hindu
marriage” on Oahu reinforced the stereotype of the islands as an exotic location where
settler pleasure could be pursued, even as Native Hawaiians are being displaced from
their own lands. If “militourism” is the particular modality of the occupation of Hawaiʻi ,
as Teresia Teaiwa (1999) argues, then it is important to demystify how Tulsi’s public
persona (her political career) and her private persona (her wedding as spectacle) come
together to normalize the continuing settler colonization of Hawaiʻi through her support
of the military and stereotyping of Hawaiʻi as an exotic location for settler pleasure. I
argued that it is important to untangle the links between the rise of Hindu nationalism in
the United States and American settler colonial military and tourist interests to
understand how Hindu Americans are implicated in the dispossession of Hawaiʻi. I
questioned the uncritical celebration of Tulsi’s election by the Hindu American
community, which raises important questions about the ethical costs of being folded into
power. In its place, I suggested that as postcolonial migrants ourselves, Hindu Americans
realign their loyalties with the Native people of Hawaiʻi. This is a tall order, given the
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growing embrace between Hindutva- inspired Islamophobia and the U.S. War on Terror,
but not impossible.
Together, these sites explored how South Asians are implicated in neo-oriental,
anti-Black, and settler colonial structures which, at times, produced them as undesirable
while coercing them to become ventriloquists for discourses that undergirded the
devaluation of racial others. Whenever South Asians have become targets of violence, as
the first two chapters demonstrated, the dominant response has been to default to notions
of racial injury that seek restitution by amplifying discourses that not only bolster the role
of the state as an arbitrator of racial justice but also buttress violent structures such as
multiculturalism and meritocracy that reinforce the violence against other racialized
groups. The master’s tools may never dismantle the master’s house, as Audre Lorde
(1984) prophetically pointed out, but they certainly help in strengthening the structures
that the master erected. Together, these structures constitute what I term post-brownness,
a phenomenon in which South Asians recognize brownness as inseparable from the South
Asian identity in the United States. Yet, it is predominantly seen as a burden that is to be
overcome or embraced only when expedient (for example, to elaborate racial injury)
instead of seeing it as a valuable resource to build relationships with other
disenfranchised communities in the United States.
If what distinguishes a women of color critique from other Left analyses is its
insistence on building ethical coalitions that do not sacrifice difference, then I want to
explore the possibilities that may exist to build coalitions between South Asians and
racial others in the United States. Such alliances would involve not only identifying the
common violence that targets all bodies of color, including South Asians, but also a firm
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grappling with the privileges that South Asians, especially Indian Hindu Americans, have
come to accumulate in the United States, often at the cost of other racialized groups.
Without such a dialectical analysis, South Asians will continue to believe that the racial
violence facing them is an exceptional phenomenon or that they have been mistakenly
targeted (Sidhu, 2013) instead of understanding their victimization as part of a larger
structural phenomenon that targets all bodies of color (and many white bodies), if only
differentially.
Building a coalition would involve a firm rejection of all normativities, especially
sexual and gender ones. Often, non-white bodies are targeted because of their assumed
inferiority, which may be articulated along gender and sexual lines. Paradoxically, this
may reinforce a belief in, and an attempt to, perform gender and sexual normativities that
may exclude those within groups who are unable to meet such criterion. Furthermore, as
women of color have historically argued, the notion of deviance is always already
racialized in a manner that it refracts the violence of racialization internally upon bodies
unable to meet the criterion of normativity as articulated by the colonizers. In its place,
they argue for an embrace of deviance as a valuable asset in the fight against white
supremacy.
In sum, what I am suggesting is a return to building coalition between South
Asians and other marginalized groups that is both intentional as well as embodied. By
intentional, I mean the forging of political coalitions that are based in shared goals of
undoing white supremacy and its many iterations. Embodied, on the other hand, gestures
to how sexual and gender variations are not to be despised but might be precious grounds
upon which to build these alliances. If the former is aligned with contemporary modes of
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transacting politics, the latter allows for turning the most intimate practices of life, i.e.
ones gender and sexuality, as grounds for a new form of politics. In addition, embodied
politics also rejects notions of normativity in favor a politics that does not abandon those
who are worst victims of state and vigilante violence.
Together, these two modes of politics constitute what I term insurgent politics.
Insurgent politics refers to an active struggle against the logics that produce some bodies
as valuable and others as disposable. According to postcolonial scholar Ranajit Guha
(1994), from whom I borrow the term, insurgency is “a motivated and conscious
undertaking on the part of the rural masses” (p. 337). Although its use to explain
oppositional politics in the North American context seems ahistorical, it is a term that
allows for a translation of deep consciousness into political mobilization. Here, I am
influenced by Chela Sandoval’s (2000) argument that disenfranchised groups develop a
variety of sign-reading techniques to deal with the day-to-day oppression that they face.
Yet, what remains unaddressed in her work is how these sign-reading techniques may
allow for building coalitions across racial and ethnic lines. I submit that reorienting South
Asians in the United States towards their implication in neo-orientalism, anti-Blackness,
and settler colonialism can produce an insurgent politics that accounts for the mutual
constitution of privilege and dispossession. Furthermore, such an approach can also bring
together the intentional and the embodied to envision new forms of politics that go
beyond the regulatory techniques of the ordinary. I am not suggesting here that such a
coalition preempts or extends over the antagonisms that shape these groups’
relationships. Rather, my hope is that it allows for an understanding of how white
supremacy shapes these groups’ experiences of racialization. In other words, I am not
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asking for an ahistorical coalition but one that is attentive to how South Asian American
privilege is tied in with its constitution as desirable under whiteness but might also
exceed it on its own.
As an example, let me illuminate insurgent politics by applying it to the case of
Sureshbhai Patel. An insurgent political position would help Patel see the attack against
him by Officer Parker not as an anomaly but as part of an established pattern of racialized
violence against bodies of color. Instead of depoliticizing the attack, i.e. seeing it as
distinct, Patel and his family would use the publicity generated by the attack to call
attention to the problem of police violence against bodies of color and other
disenfranchised groups, especially Black and indigenous bodies. Second, instead of
defaulting to representations of the normative hardworking immigrant South Asian
family, the Patels could, argue in public forums that the daughter-in- law has had to rely
upon the senior Patel for childcare because of the withdrawal of welfare services by the
state. This would call attention to how the attrition of welfare services such as childcare
has an overall negative impact on disenfranchised communities, which is then used by the
state to render some groups as respectable and others as not. An insurgent politics would
also deliberately interrupt the image of the South Asian heteronormative nuclear family
by calling attention to the multigenerational composition of the Patel household. Lastly,
Shankuntala Patel’s vocal opposition to the United States’ treatment of an old man would
be prominently highlighted rather than sidelined. It would also mean building stronger
relationships with Black groups on the ground challenging police violence.
In sum, what I am envisioning is an alternative politics that could help South
Asians in the United States not only build stronger coalitions with other groups but, in
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doing so, evolve a more ethical response to the problem of racial violence. Furthermore,
such a response would produce an intersectional approach as it would amplify the voices
of women of color and others who do not fit normative stereotypes (such as bearded
women who wear turbans) and are often sidelined because of the power that gender and
sexual normativities exercise over all communities. My hope in embarking on this project
is that South Asians such as Indian Hindu Americans can come to terms with their
privileges and thereby help build stronger coalitions of the oppressed.
Limitations and Future Directions
This study used a comparative racialization framework to understand how South
Asians are implicated in neo-orientalism, anti-Blackness, and settler colonialism. While
this approach offered several opportunities to understand racialization as a relational
process, it also stymied others. Differences among South Asians—for example between
Indian Americans and Pakistani Americans—are often as acute as those between South
Asians and others. This has been left untheorized in this project. Furthermore, by
focusing on Sikhs, Indian Americans, and Hindu Americans, this project has repeated the
trend of recentering India, which stands in for South Asia itself. I hope that future work
can examine both the internal differences that constitute South Asian formations and also
challenge the hegemony of India.
Second, the prevalence of caste has also been left undertheorized by this project.
If caste functions as a cognate of race in India, as Ghurye (1969) argues, then it can be
safely extrapolated that race functions in coordination with caste dynamics in the United
States, as an emerging generations of Dalit Americans have pointed out (Swapnil, 2015).
This project, then, should be enhanced by a caste-inclusive analysis of how racial
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formations occur in South Asian groups. This would address the growing demands that
the South Asian diaspora, especially Hindu groups, hold themselves accountable to an
anti-caste politics. This is arguably a task that will grow in urgency.
Lastly, Un/desirable subjects’ focus on neo-orientalism, anti-Blackness, and
settler colonialism leaves other others who may not be hailed by these logics. For
instance, undocumented immigrants are often racialized as illegal others (Cacho, 2012)
against whom documented South Asians may present themselves as deserving of state
recognitions. However, they are not accounted for by this project. In addition, the war on
drugs is transferring criminalization to brown bodies while continuing to entrap Black
bodies in new regimes of policing and surveillance. Furthermore, as Christopher Rivera
(2014) points out, the post-9/11 era has bene marked by the emergence of the brown
threat that conflates Latinos and Middle Easterners as a threat in the American
imagination. As such, future work on South Asian racialization has to examine how
discourses of il/legality and security configurations interpellate South Asians in Latino
racialization.
South Asian racialization is neither exceptional, nor can it be reduced as an
epiphenomenon of other forms of racialization. But it is only through an honest
engagement with how races are relationally constituted that the many layers of this
phenomenon can be accounted. This project is but a small attempt in this direction, and I
hope that future projects can take on these missing dimensions to arrive at a multifaceted
understanding of South Asian racialization.
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M. (Eds.) Cultivating Canada: Reconciliation through the lens of cultural
diversity, (pp. 289-298). Ottawa: Aboriginal Healing Foundation.
Physicians for Social Responsibility. (2015, March). Body Count of the “War on
Terror”: Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan. Washington D.C.: Physicians for Social
Responsibility. Retrieved from
http://www.ippnw.de/commonFiles/pdfs/Frieden/Body_Count_first_international
_edition_2015_final.pdf
Pinto, N. (2015, January 29). When cops break bad: Inside a police force gone wild.
Rolling Stone. Retrieved from
http://www.rollingstone.com/culture/features/when-cops-break-bad-albuquerquepolice-force-gone-wild-20150129?page=13
Police killed more than 100 unarmed black people in 2015. (2016). Mapping Police
Violence. Retrieved from http://mappingpoliceviolence.org/unarmed/

245

Porter, P. (2009). Military Orientalism: Eastern war through Western eyes. New York:
NY: Columbia University Press.
Post, J. M. (2005). Psychological Operations and Counterterrorism. JFQ: Joint Force
Quarterly, 37, 105-110.
Povinelli, E. A. (2002). The Cunning of Recognition: Indigenous alterities and the
making of Australian multiculturalism. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.
Poynting, S. (2002). Bin Laden in the suburbs: Attacks on Arab and Muslim Australia ns
before and after 11 September. Current Issues in Criminal Justustice, 14(1), 4364.
Prashad, V. (2005). How the Hindus became Jews: American racism after 9/11. Trinity
College Digital Repository. Retrieved from
http://digitalrepository.trincoll.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1052&context=fac
pub
Prashad, V. (2009, January 26). The India Lobby: Drunk with the sight of power.
Counterpunch. Retrieved from http://www.counterpunch.org/2009/01/26/drunkwith-the-sight-of-power/
Prashad, V. (2016, June 18). Brain-dead diplomats: Why did 51 American State Dept.
officials ‘dissent’ against Obama and call for bombing Syria? Alternet. Retrieved
from http://www.alternet.org/world/brain-dead-diplomats-why-did-51-americanstate-dept-officials-dissent-against-obama-and-call
Puar, J. K. (2007). Terrorist Assemblages: Homonationalism in queer times. Durham,
NC: Duke University Press.
Puar, J. K. (2008). “The turban is not a hat”: Queer diaspora and practices of profiling.

246

Sikh Formations: Religion, Culture, Theory, 4(1), 47-91.
doi:10.1080/17448720802075439
Puar, J. K. (2015). The “right” to maim: Disablement and inhumanist biopolitics in
Palestine. Borderlands, 14(1), 1-27.
Puar, J. K., & Rai, A. (2002). Monster, terrorist, fag: The war on terrorism and the
production of docile patriots. Social Text, 20(3), 117-148.
Pyke, K. D., & Johnson, D. L. (2003). Asian American women and racialized
femininities “Doing” gender across cultural worlds. Gender & Society, 17(1), 3353.
Radhakrishnan, S. (2011). Appropriately Indian: Gender and culture in a new
transnational class. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.
Rajagopal, A. (2000). Hindu nationalism in the US: Changing configurations of political
practice. Ethnic and Racial Studies, 23(3), 467-496.
Rajghatta, C. (2007, July 13). Christian activists disrupt Hindu prayer in US Senate.
Times of India. Retrieved from
http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/world/us/Christian-activists-disrupt-Hinduprayer-in-US-Senate/articleshow/2199387.cms
Ramnath, M. (2011). Decolonizing Anarchism: An anti-authoritarian history of India’s
liberation struggle. Oakland, CA: AK Press.
Rana, J. A. (2011). Terrifying Muslims: Race and labor in the South Asian diaspora.
Durham, NC: Duke University Press.
Razack, S. (1998). Looking White People in the Eye: Gender, race, and culture in
courtrooms and classrooms. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.

247

Razack, S. (2008). Casting Out: The eviction of Muslims from Western law and politics.
Toronto, Canada: University of Toronto Press.
Reddy, C. (2011). Freedom with Violence: Race, sexuality, and the US state. Durham,
NC: Duke University Press.
Richter-Montpetit, M. (2014). Beyond the erotics of Orientalism: Lawfare, torture and
the racial–sexual grammars of legitimate suffering. Security Dialogue, 45(1), 4362.
Rivera, C. (2014). The brown threat: Post-9/11 conflations of Latina/os and Middle
Eastern Muslims in the US American imagination. Latino Studies, 12(1), 44-64.
Robinson, S. (2000). Marked Men: White masculinity in crisis. New York, NY:
Columbia University Press.
Rodriguez, D. (2011). The Black presidential non-slave: Genocide and the present tense
of racial slavery. Political Power and Social Theory, 22, 17-50.
doi:10.1108/S0198-8719(2011)0000022008
Rodriguez, D. (2012). Beyond “police brutality”: Racist state violence and the University
of California. American Quarterly, 64(2), 301-313.
Roy, S., & Shaw, I. S. (2016). Communicating Differences: Culture, media, peace and
conflict negotiation. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
Said, E. W. (1978). Orientalism. New York, NY: Vintage Books.
Said, E. W. (1997). Covering Islam: How the media and the experts determine how we
see the rest of the world. New York, NY: Vintage Books.
Said, E. W. (2003). Freud and the Non-European. London, England: Verso.
Sandoval, C. (2000). Methodology of the Oppressed. Minneapolis: University of

248

Minnesota Press.
Saldaña-Portillo, M. J. (2003). The Revolutionary Imagination in the Americas and the
Age of Development. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.
Sandoval, C. (2000). Methodology of the Oppressed. Minneapolis, MN: University of
Minnesota Press.
Santora, M. (2012, December 30). Woman is charged with murder as a hate crime in a
fatal subway push. New York Times. Retrieved from
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/30/nyregion/woman- is- held- in-death-of- manpushed-onto-subway-tracks- in-queens.html
Santora, M., & Hartocollis, A. (2012, December 30). Erika Menendez, suspect in fatal
subway push, had troubled past. New York Times. Retrieved from
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/31/nyregion/erika- menendez-suspect- in-fatalsubway-push-had-troubled-past.html
Saranillio, D. I. (2013). Why Asian settler colonialism matters: A thought piece on
critiques, debates, and Indigenous difference. Settler Colonial Studies, 3(3-4),
280-294.
Sekhon, V. (2003). The civil rights of “Others”: Anti-terrorism, the Patriot Act, and Arab
and South Asian American rights in post-9/11 American society. Texas Journal
on Civil Liberties & Civil Rights, 8(1), 117-148.
Sexton, J. (2010). People-of-color-blindness: Notes on the afterlife of slavery. Social
Text, 28(2), 31-56. doi:10.1215/01642472-2009-066
Shah, N. (2011). Stranger intimacy: Contesting race, sexuality, and the law in the North
American West. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.

249

Shankar, L. D., & Srikanth, R. (1998). A Part, Yet Apart: South Asians in Asian America.
Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press.
Sharma, A. (2002). On Hindu, Hindustān, Hinduism and Hindutva. Numen, 49(1), 1-36.
Sharma, N., & Wright, C. (2008). Decolonizing resistance, challenging colonial states.
Social Justice, 35(3 (113), 120-138.
Sharpe, C. (2009). Monstrous Intimacies: Making post-slavery Subjects. Durham, NC:
Duke University Press.
Shepard, M. (2015, August 28). Attacks on police officers called “hate crime.”
Albuquerque Journal. Retrieved from
http://www.abqjournal.com/635498/news/attacks-on-cops-called- hate-crime.html
Sidhu, D. S. (2013). Lessons on terrorism and “mistaken identity” from Oak Creek, with
a code on the Boston Marathon bombings. Columbia Law Review Sidebar, 113,
76-87.
Sidhu, D. S., & Gohil, N. S. (2009). Civil Rights in Wartime: The post-9/11 Sikh
experience. Farham, England: Ashgate.
Silk, M. (1984). Notes on the Judeo-Christian tradition in America. American Quarterly,
36(1), 65-85. doi:10.2307/2712839
Silva, N. K. (2004). Aloha Betrayed: Native Hawaiian resistance to American
colonialism. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.
Simi, P., Bubolz, B. F., & Hardman, A. (2013). Military experience, identity
discrepancies, and far right terrorism: An exploratory analysis. Studies In Conflict
& Terrorism, 36(8), 654-671. doi:10.1080/1057610X.2013.802976
Smith, A. (2006). Heteropatriarchy and the three pillars of white supremacy. In Women

250

of Color against Violence (Ed.), Color of violence: The INCITE! anthology (pp.
66-73). Cambridge, MA: South End Press.
Smith, A. (2012). Indigeneity, settler colonialism, white supremacy. In D. HoSang, O.
LaBennett, & L. Pulido (Eds.), Racial Formation in the Twenty-First Century (pp.
66-90). Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
Smith, A. (2015). Conquest: Sexual violence and American Indian genocide. Durham,
NC: Duke University Press.
Snow, J. (2004). The civilization of white men: The race of the Hindu in United States v.
Bhagat Singh Thind. In H. Goldschmidt & E. A. McAlister (Eds.), Race, Nation,
and Religion in the Americas (pp. 259-281). New York, NY: Oxford University
Press.
Sohi, S. (2014). Sites of “sedition,” sites of liberation: Gurudwaras, the Ghadar Party, and
anticolonial mobilization. Sikh Formations, 10(1), 5-22.
doi:10.1080/17448727.2014.888247
Soliz, J. (2016). Inter‐racial and multiethnic communication. The International
Encyclopedia of Interpersonal Communication, 1-6.
Spillers, H. J. (1987). Mama’s baby, papa’s maybe: An American grammar book.
Diacritics, 17(2), 65-81.
Spivak, G C. (1990). The Post-Modern Condition: The end of politics? In Hawthorn, C.
Aronsen, A., & Dunn, J. Eds. The Post-Colonial Critic: Interviews, Strategies,
Dialogues: Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak. Routledge: Nova Iorque.
Spivak, G. C. (1999). A Critique of Postcolonial Reason: Toward a history of the
vanishing present. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

251

Spivak, G. C. (2010). Can the subaltern speak? In R. C. Morris (Ed.), Can the subaltern
speak? Reflection on the history of an idea (pp. 21-78). New York: Columbia
University Press.
Stepansky, J., Parascandola, R., & Tracy, T. (2012, 2012-12-31T15:41:39-0500).
Sunando Sen, man shoved to his death on subway tracks, mourned at funeral.
Retrieved from http://www.nydailynews.com/new-york/subway-shove-victimmourned-article-1.1230475
Stephens, C. (2016a, February 24). Alabama assault trial for Madison Officer Eric Parker
postponed until April. AL.com. Retrieved from
http://www.al.com/news/huntsville/index.ssf/2016/02/alabama_assault_trial_for_
madi.html
Sterling, T. (2006, August 24). 12 arrested on jet to India to be freed. The Washington
Post. Retrieved from http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2006/08/24/AR2006082401126_pf.html
Swapnil, S. (2015). Caste and diaspora. International Journal of Social Science and
Humanity, 5(1), 80-82.
Takaki, R. (1989). Strangers from a Different Shore: A history of Asian Americans.
Boston, MA: Little, Brown and Company.
Taylor, K. Y. (2016). From #BlackLivesMatter to Black Liberation. Chicago, IL:
Haymarket Books.
Teaiva, T. (1999). Reading Paul Gauguin's Noa Noa with Epeli Hau'ofa's Kisses in the
Nederends: Militourism, feminism, and the" Polynesian" body. In V. Hereniko &
R. Wilson (Eds.), Inside Out: Literature, cultural politics, and identity in the new

252

Pacific (pp. 249-264). New York: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.
Tehranian, J. (2007). Selective racialization: Middle-Eastern American identity and the
Faustian pact with whiteness. Connettecut Law Review, 40, 1201-1236.
Therwath, I. (2007). Working for India or against Islam? Islamophobia in Indian
American lobbies. South Asia Multidisciplinary Academic Journal, 1. Retrieved
from http://samaj.revues.org/262
Thobani, S. (2007). Exalted Subjects: Studies in the making of race and nation in
Canada. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.
Thobani, S. (2012). Racial violence and the politics of national belonging: The Wisconsin
shootings, Islamophobia, and the war on terrorized bodies. Sikh Formations, 8(3),
281-286. doi:10.1080/17448727.2012.752681
Trask, H.-K. (1999). From a Native Daughter: Colonialism and sovereignty in Hawaiʻi.
Honolulu, HI: University of Hawaiʻi Press.
Trask, H.-K. (2008). Settlers of color and “immigrant” hegemony: “Locals” in Hawai’i.
In C. Fujikane & J. Y. Okamura (Eds.), Asian Settler Colonialism: From local
governance to the habits of everyday life in Hawai’i (pp. 45-65). Honolulu, HI:
University of Hawaiʻi Press.
Tuck, E., & Yang, K. W. (2012). Decolonization is not a metaphor. Decolonization:
Indigeneity, Education & Society, 1(1).
UHERO 101.3: Can the median household afford the median home on Oahu? (2013).
UHERO. Retrieved from http://www.uhero.Hawaiʻi .edu/news/view/238
United States v. Bhagat Singh Thind. (1923). The American Journal of International
Law, 17(3), 572-578. doi:10.2307/2187916

253

U.S. Pacific Command. (2016). About United States pacific command. USPACOM.
Retrieved from http://www.pacom.mil/AboutUSPACOM.aspx
Veracini, L. (2011). Introducing: Settler colonial studies. Settler Colonial Studies, 1(1),
1-12.
Viets, S. (2016, March 18). Meet White Lives Matter: The racist response to the Black
Lives Matter movement. Southern Poverty Law Center. Retrieved from
https://www.splcenter.org/hatewatch/2016/03/18/meet-white- lives- matter-racistresponse-black-lives-matter- movement
Vimalassery, M. (2013). The wealth of the Natives: Toward a critique of settler colonial
political economy. Settler Colonial Studies, 3(3-04), 295-310.
doi:10.1080/2201473X.2013.810701
Volpp, L. (2002). The citizen and the terrorist. UCLA Law Review, 49(5), 1575-1600.
Wang, J. (2015, April 22). Against innocence. RAW. Retrieved from
http://radicalwashtenaw.org/2015/04/22/jackie-wang-against- innocence/
Weber, M. (1976). The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism (2nd ed.). London,
England: Allen & Unwin.
Weheliye, A. G. (2014). Habeas Viscus: Racializing assemblages, biopolitics, and black
feminist theories of the human. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.
Weitzer, R., & Tuch, S. A. (2005). Racially biased policing: Determinants of citizen
perceptions. Social Forces, 83(3), 1009-1030.
Westley, W. A. (1955). Secrecy and the police. Socialist Forces, 34, 254-256.
Westley, W. A. (1970). Violence and the Police: A sociological study of law, custom, and
morality. (Vol. 28). Cambridge, MA: Mit Press.

254

White Indians. (2013). n+1, (16). Retrieved from https://nplusonemag.com/issue-16/theintellectual-situation/white-indians/
Williams, T. (2016, April 1). More racist and homophobic texts by San Francisco police
are found. The New York Times. Retrieved from
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/01/us/more-racist-and-homophobic-texts-bysan-francisco-police-are-found.html?mwrsm=Facebook&_r=0
Wilson, J. Q., & Kelling, G. L. (1982). Broken windows. Atlantic monthly, 249(3), 29-38.
Winpenny, J. (2011). The Hawaiʻi Independent: All sides agree Bill 54 does little for
Honolulu’s “homeless” problem. The Hawaiʻi Independent. Retrieved from
http://hawaiiindependent.net/story/homeless-council-bill-passes-despiteopposition
Wolfe, P. (2006). Settler Colonialism and the elimination of the native. Journal of
Genocide Research, 8(4), 387-409.
“WTF: ‘Turban Primer.’” (2012, August 8). Angry Asian Man. Retrieved from
http://blog.angryasianman.com/2012/08/wtf-turban-primer.html
Wynter, S. (2004). Unsettling the coloniality of being/power/truth/freedom: Towards the
human, after man, its overrepresentation--An argument. CR: The New Centennial
Review, 3(3), 257-337.
Yamane, D. P., Oeser, S. G., & Omori, J. (2010). Health disparities in the Native
Hawaiian homeless. Hawai’i Medical Journal, 69(6 Supplement 3), 35-41.
Yancy, G., & Butler, J. (2015, January 12). What’s wrong with “All Lives Matter”? New
York Times. Retrieved from
http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2015/01/12/whats-wrong-with-all-lives-

255

matter/?_r=0
Yimam, B. (2015, November 24). Newly hired police chief apologizes over email with
racial slur. Pittsburgh’s Action 7 News. Retrieved from
http://www.wtae.com/news/Newly- hired-police-chief-apologizes-over-emailwith-racial-slur/36639328
Zarrugh, A., & Wheatley, C. (2013). The unbearable whiteness of being: Situating Asian
Americans, an evening with Michael Omi. University of Texas. Retrieved from
http://sites.la.utexas.edu/utaustinsoc/2013/02/11/the-unbearable-whiteness-ofbeing-situating-asian-americans-an-evening-with-michael-omi/
Zong, J., & Batalova, J. (2015). Indian immigrants in the United States. Migration Policy.
Retrieved from http://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/indian- immigrants-unitedstates

256

